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ABSTRACT
There is substantial evidence that our ability to monitor our actions is based on the 
use of an internal forward model that uses an efference copy of the motor command 
to predict the sensory consequences of an action This prediction is used to attenuate 
the sensory consequences of our actions. There is accumulating evidence that our 
ability to understand and predict the actions of others and their consequences is based 
on the same systems that are involved in monitoring our own actions. This thesis 
describes a series of experiments investigating the neural mechanisms underlying our 
ability to monitor our actions and predict their sensory consequences, and our ability 
to understand and predict the actions of others.
I describe two fMRI experiments investigating the neural mechanism underlying 
sensorimotor attenuation during eye-blinks. I find that the neural response to visual 
stimulation is actively suppressed during eye-blinks. Another two studies provide 
evidence that our ability to monitor the actions of others and their consequences is 
based on the same neural mechanisms that are involved in monitoring our own 
actions and predicting their sensory consequences. They also suggestthat the mirror 
system acts in a predictive manner, anticipating the actions of others, rather than 
merely responding to sensory input. I also examine the possibility that, in addition to 
using our motor systems to understand the actions of others, we understand the 
sensations experienced by others by representing these sensations in our own sensory 
cortices. I find evidence of a touch mirror system, which responds to both the 
observation and experience of touch. Finally, I describe two electroencephalography 
experiments that shed light on the development of our ability to understand other 
people’s actions, providing evidence for the early development and involvement of 
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION
To successfully interact with the world we must be able to monitor our actions and 
their consequences. One possible mechanism that might underpin this ability is the 
use of an internal forward model that predicts the consequences of an action on the 
basis of an efference copy of the motor command eliciting that action This 
prediction can be used for motor control by comparing it to the desired outcome of 
an action and thus allowing us to rapidly adjust the motor command if the prediction 
does not match the desired outcome. The predicted sensory feedback can also be 
compared to the actual sensory feedback following an action, thus allowing self­
produced stimuli to be distinguished from externally generated stimuli. Self­
produced stimuli can then be attenuated and processing capacity directed towards 
externally-produced stimuli, which are more likely to correspond to important 
environmental changes that could impact on survival.
Amongst all externally generated stimuli the actions of other living creatures are 
most significant. An animal’s survival depends on its ability to monitor the actions of 
prey, predators and conspecifics, and to predict their future actions, the consequences 
of which will have significant implications for the animal Anticipating a predator’s 
actions may allow one to escape, whereas anticipating the behaviour of prey could 
make the difference between lunch and starvation. The ability to monitor and predict 
the actions of conspecifics can be equally important as they are potential mates, 
rivals and allies. For highly social animals, such as primates, including humans, the 
actions of conspecifics are of particular importance. Human survival therefore also 
depends on our ability to successfully navigate our social world, thus as well as being 
able to predict the consequences of our own actions, we need to be able to monitor 
and predict the actions of others and the consequences of these actions, so that we 
can adjust our behaviour accordingly.
There is substantial evidence that our own motor system in intrinsically involved in 
our ability to understand the actions of others, and predict their future actions. Action 
observation activates a network of regions, known as the ‘mirror system’ that is also 
activated by execution of the same action. This mirror system is believed to be the 
basis of action understanding through simulation of the observed movement. It has
17
been proposed that the mirror system acts in a predictive manner, simulating the 
actions of others, predicted on the basis of the current situation and prior knowledge, 
and using the internal forward model, normally used to predict the consequences of 
our own actions, to verify its prediction. Minimising the prediction error allows us to 
recognise what actions others are performing and to infer the intentions behind these 
actions.
In this thesis I will investigate some of the neural mechanisms underlying our ability 
to monitor our own actions and predict their sensory consequences, and our ability to 
understand and predict the actions of others.
1.1 An internal forward model for predicting the consequences of our actions
It has been proposed that animals use an efference copy (von Holst, 1954) of their 
motor commands sent from the motor areas controlling the actions, in parallel with 
the motor signals, to predict the sensory consequences of their actions. On the basis 
of this efference copy, a prediction of the sensory consequences of the action is 
generated by an internal forward model (Wolpert and Miall, 1996). This sensory 
prediction is known as a corollary discharge (Sperry, 1950). This idea of an internal 
forward model that predicts the consequences of our actions was first proposed by 
Helmholtz in 1867 in the context of eye movements (Helmholtz, 1867). Helmholtz 
observed that when making eye movements we do not perceive the world as moving 
despite visual input moving across the retina, whereas if you moved your eye, 
without using the eye muscles, by pushing it with your finger, the world does appear 
to move. This led him to suggest that the motor command contained information that 
enabled the visual system to predict and compensate for the sensory consequences of 
the eye movement. This idea was elaborated by Von Holst and Sperry in the 1950s, 
and is now a well established concept.
As initially proposed in the context of eye movements, the sensory prediction, or 
corollary discharge, generated by the forward model can be used to cancel self­
produced sensory stimulation. It can also be compared to actual sensory feedback, 
and thus be used to distinguish self-produced from externally produced sensory 
stimuli. It has also been proposed that the sensory prediction can be compared to the
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desired outcome of an action and thus plays a role in motor control (Wolpert and 
Miall, 1996).
1.1.1 Prediction in motor control
For accurate motor control the current state of the moving body part must be 
monitored during the action and compared to the desired state, so that if necessary 
the motor commands can be adjusted to correct for any discrepancy. The current 
state of the limb could be assessed on the basis of sensory feedback in the form of 
proprioceptive and visual signals, but this is not ideal due to delays in sensory 
transduction, central processing and in motor output. These delays can combine to 
give a total delay of up to 300ms for feedback during a visually guided response 
(Wolpert and Miall, 1996). Since fast arm movements can last as little as 200ms a 
motor control system based purely on sensory feedback is clearly inadequate.
Instead it has been proposed that a forward model predicts the outcome of a motor 
command, and this prediction can then be used to provide an internal feedback signal 
by comparing the prediction to the desired state of the limb, which is much more 
rapid than actual sensory feedback (Wolpert and Miall, 1996). The forward model 
uses an efference copy of the motor command and information about the current state 
of the system, to predict the next state of the system, i.e. the position in space, joint 
angles, velocity etc. of the moving limb, and associated proprioceptive and visual 
feedback. The error between the predicted state and the desired state can then be used 
to correct the movement. The predicted sensory feedback is subsequently compared 
to the actual sensory feedback so that any errors in the forward model can be 
detected and corrected, thus ensuring the accuracy of the forward model. Such a 
system is known as an observer model and combines the advantages of predictive 
control, namely speed, with those of sensory feedback control.
Wolpert and colleagues demonstrated that a Kalman Filter version of such an 
observer model accurately predicts the empirical data from a task in which 
participants had to estimate the location of their arm at the end of movements made 
in the dark, with and without externally applied forces (Wolpert et al., 1995) (see 
Figure 1.1). This model uses Kalman gain to weight the effects of sensory feedback
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correction and internal simulation on the next state estimate. Models based solely on 
sensory feedback or internal simulation, were unable to accurately predict the 
empirical data. This provided direct evidence supporting the existence of an internal 
forward model that uses motor commands to estimate the current state of the arm, 
and sensory feedback to update the model, by comparing it to sensory feedback 
predicted by the forward model.























Further evidence for the use of an internal forward model in motor control comes 
from studies of grip force modulation. When an object is held between the thumb and 
index finger, the grip force counteracts the load force. When the object is moved 
acceleration causes changes in the load force and therefore the grip force must 
change to prevent the object from slipping. A series of experiments have 
demonstrated that when objects are moved by the subject, the grip force changes in 
parallel with the load force and is always slightly greater than the load force 
(Johansson et al., 1992b;Johansson et al., 1992a;Johansson and Westling, 
1984;Westling and Johansson, 1984). This close association between grip force and 
load force implies predictive control, as if subjects were relying on sensory feedback 
there would be a delay between the change in load force and the necessary 
adjustment in grip force. In contrast when the movement of the object is externally 
generated, the change in grip force lags behind the load force by 60-100ms, 
suggesting that in this case the subject is relying on sensory feedback rather than 
prediction to adjust their grip (Johansson et al., 1992b;Johansson et al., 1992a). 
Examination of grip force modulation under different external load conditions
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demonstrates that the motor system is able to predict both the trajectory of the 
movement, and the load properties of the object (Flanagan and Wing, 1997). Subjects 
moved an object under 3 different load conditions: inertial, viscous and elastic loads. 
The load force during the movement depends on the external load conditions and on 
the trajectory of the hand movement. In all three conditions the grip force fluctuated 
in parallel with the load force, thus showing that the modulation of grip force 
anticipates the changes in load force. In fact the grip force led the load force by 14ms 
on average. This suggests that the central nervous system has an internal model of 
both the load properties and of the movement trajectory, and that it integrates these 
two to predict the load force, and thus the necessary grip force.
1,1.2 Attenuation of the sensory consequences of our own actions
In addition to enabling rapid and accurate motor control, an internal forward model 
can in principle be used to recognise and attenuate or cancel the sensory 
consequences of our own actions. All organisms, including humans, are constantly 
bombarded with signals arising from their environment. Some of these are the 
sensory consequences of their own actions, but others are sensory consequences of 
the environment or of the actions of others. Somehow, from this undifferentiated 
mass of signals, humans (and other organisms) must extract the few stimuli that 
correspond to important changes in their environment. It is therefore a basic 
requirement for an organism that it should be should be able to distinguish the 
sensory consequences of its own actions from those of the environment or other 
agents.
It has been proposed that animals use the sensory prediction, known as corollary 
discharge, generated by an internal forward model on the basis of an efference copy 
of their motor commands to distinguish the sensory consequences of their own 
actions from externally produced sensory stimuli (Sperry, 1950;von Holst,
1954;Wolpert and Miall, 1996). This sensory prediction, or corollary discharge, is 
compared with the actual sensory feedback, thus allowing self and externally 
produced sensory stimuli to be distinguished. The self-produced sensory stimuli can 
then be attenuated, cancelled, or compensated for. In contrast, externally produced 
stimuli cannot be predicted and so their perception is not attenuated.
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As already mentioned, this idea was first introduced in the context of eye movements 
in the 1870s (Helmholtz, 1867) and elaborated in the 1950s (Sperry, 1950;von Holst, 
1954). It was proposed that motor areas involved in the control of eye movements, as 
well as sending motor commands to the eyes, simultaneously sent an efference copy 
of those commands to visual cortex, predicting the sensory consequences of the 
movement. This would allow the visual system to compensate for the retinal 
displacement that occurs during eye movements. However it seems that such a 
compensation mechanism is not restricted to eye movements. Support for the 
existence of such a mechanism comes from a number of experiments demonstrating 
attenuation of the response to self-produced sensory stimulation in several 
modalities.
Evidence for attenuation of self-produced somatosensory stimulation comes from a 
series of experiments involving tickling (Blakemore et al., 1998b;Blakemore et al., 
1999a;Blakemore et al., 1999b;Blakemore et al., 2001). Starting from the common 
observation that one can not tickle oneself, Weiskrantz demonstrated experimentally 
that self-produced stimulation to the sole of the foot was indeed perceived as less 
tickly than externally administered tactile stimulation (Weiskrantz et al., 1971). On 
the basis of this finding Blakemore and colleagues investigated why self-produced 
tactile stimulation was perceived as less ticklish than an identical externally produced 
tactile stimulus. In the self-produced condition, subjects moved a robot arm in a 
controlled manner with their left hand. This caused a second robot to reproduce the 
same movement with a piece of foam on their right hand. In the externally produced 
situation the second robot simply applied the same pattern and force of tactile 
stimulation to the right hand as in the self-produced condition. Subjects consistently 
rated the externally produced stimulus as more ticklish than the self-produced 
stimulus (Blakemore et al., 1999a). The robotic interface allowed a delay, which was 
varied parametrically, to be introduced between the movement of the left hand and 
the movement of the tactile stimulus on the right hand. Parametrically varying 
degrees of trajectory perturbation, (0°, 30°, 60° and 90°), between the movement of 
the left hand and the movement of the tactile stimulus, were also introduced. The 
tickliness rating of the tactile stimulus increased significantly with increasing delay 
and trajectory perturbation (Blakemore et al., 1999a). These results suggest that self­
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produced movements attenuate the response to tactile stimuli, which arise as a 
consequence of that movement. The degree to which self-produced tactile stimuli are 
attenuated depends on the degree of error between the sensory stimulation predicted 
by an internal forward model of the motor system and the actual sensory feedback 
produced. Thus when the delay or trajectory perturbations are high there is a greater 
discrepancy between the sensory stimulation predicted by the movement of the left 
hand and the tactile stimulation actually received by the right hand so attenuation of 
the stimulation is reduced.
An fMRI study comparing the same self-produced (the left hand stimulates the right 
hand via a robot) and externally produced (the robot alone stimulates the right hand) 
tactile stimulation conditions as described above, plus an extra condition in which the 
left hand was moved without resulting in stimulation of the right hand, revealed that 
the somatosensory cortex was activated more by externally produced tactile 
stimulation than by self-produced stimuli (Blakemore et al., 1998b). This reduction 
in somatosensory cortex activation is likely to be the neural correlate of the reduced 
perception of tickliness associated with the self-produced stimulation. In the 
cerebellum, activity was reduced when movement of the left hand generated a tactile 
stimulus compared to when movement of the left hand did not result in tactile 
stimulation of the right hand. The cerebellum was also significantly activated by 
externally produced tactile stimulation alone. In other words, when the actual sensory 
feedback following movement matched the predicted sensory feedback (self­
produced tactile stimulation) activity in the cerebellum decreased, as did that of the 
somatosensory cortex. This suggests that the cerebellum differentiates between 
movements on the basis of their sensory consequences. Thus it may be involved in 
the modulation of the somatosensory cortex, by predicting the sensory consequences 
of a movement, and providing a signal which leads to the attenuation of the sensory 
response to the self generated stimuli.
Positron Emission Tomography was subsequently used to investigate the effect of the 
parametrically varied distortion in the timing of the self-produced tactile stimulation 
described earlier (Blakemore et al., 2001). As the delay between the tactile stimulus 
and the motor commands for the movemert causing it increases, the sensory 
predictions of the postulated forward model in the brain will become less and less
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accurate and the discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory consequences 
of the movement will increase. The study showed that activity in the right lateral 
cerebellar cortex was positively correlated with the delay between movement of the 
right hand and stimulation of the left hand. This supports the earlier proposal that the 
cerebellum is involved in signalling the discrepancy between the actual sensory 
consequences of a movement and those predicted by the forward model on the basis 
of motor commands (Blakemore et al., 1998b).
Further evidence for attenuation of self-produced somatosensory stimuli comes from 
studies of force perception. Shergill and colleagues demonstrated that self-generated 
forces are perceived as weaker than externally generated forces (Shergill et al.,
2003). A torque motor applied a force to the subject’s left index finger. Subjects 
were then instructed to apply the same force to their left finger with their right index 
finger by pushing on a force transducer placed above the left index finger. The force 
transducer measured the applied force. Subjects consistently applied a force greater 
than that previously applied by the motor, suggesting that in the case of the self­
produced force the somatosensory consequences of the finger press are predicted and 
that this prediction is use to attenuate the perception of the sensory stimulation
A similar study replicated these findings and demonstrated that the sensory 
attenuation decreases if there is a discrepancy between the predicted and actual 
sensory consequences of the movement (Bays et al., 2005). Subjects tapped one of 
their fingers with the other via a force sensor placed between the two fingers. Their 
right index finger tapped on a force sensor above their left index finger, while a 
similar force was applied to the left index finger below by a torque motor. The force 
on the left finger was perceived as weaker when it occurred while the right index 
finger pressed on the force sensor, compared to when the right finger made no 
movement. The attenuation of the perceived force of the tap on the left index finger 
decreased as a delay was introduced between the tap of the right index finger and the 
tap applied to the left hand). After a delay of 300ms there was no longer any 
significant attenuation.
In a second study, in some trials the force sensor was moved at the start of the trial 
unbeknown to the subject so that when they made the tapping movement with their
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right index finger it did not make contact with the sensor (Bays et al., 2006). 
Meanwhile the tap was still applied to the left index finger by the motor at the time 
when the right finger would usually have made contact with the force sensor. In this 
condition the tactile stimulation on the left index finger was still attenuated, 
demonstrating that attenuation does not rely on a postdictive mechanism requiring 
sensory feedback from the active finger. Instead it is consistent with a predictive 
mechanism of attenuation based on the motor commands. However the mere 
presence of a motor command is not sufficient for attenuation as demonstrated in a 
second experiment. This time the subjects’ right index finger never made contact 
with the force sensor but the tap on the left index finger was still associated with the 
movement of the right index finger, except in delay trials when the tap occurred 
500ms after the movement of the right index finger. The tap felt on the left index 
finger was not perceived as stronger in the delay conditions, showing that a simple 
association between a movement and a tactile stimulus is not enough for attenuation 
of that tactile stimulus to occur. Instead the attenuation of tactile sensations depends 
specifically on the prediction of contact between the two fingers.
Further evidence that attenuation of self-produced sensory stimulation is caused by a 
predictive mechanism based on motor commands rather than on sensory feedback 
from the moving body part, comes from a recent study demonstrating sensorimotor 
attenuation by central motor command signals in the absence of movement (Voss et 
al., 2006). Subjects moved their right finger in response to a tone, and had to judge 
the intensity of cutaneous stimulation to the moving finger (relative to a 
simultaneously applied stimulus to their stationary left finger). In control conditions 
the right finger was also kept still. As expected, cutaneous stimulation was perceived 
as weaker when applied during finger movement, compared to rest TMS was 
applied over the primary motor cortex at the time when the subject normally initiated 
a finger movement (synchronous with the tone), thus delaying the actual movement 
of the finger by an average of 145ms. The TMS delays the corticospinal output of the 
motor commands, without otherwise affecting the motor pattern. Cutaneous 
stimulation was applied to the finger between the TMS pulse and the delayed finger 
movement. Sensation of this cutaneous stimulus was attenuated even though the 
finger movement had not yet occurred, and this attenuation did not differ 
significantly from that observed during actual finger movement. This demonstrates
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that the prior motor command to move is sufficient for sensory attenuation to occur, 
and that movement itself is not necessary, and thus that attenuation of sensation 
during voluntary movements arise from an efferent signal rather than sensory 
feedback from the moving body part. The attenuation was not merely due to the TMS 
alone, as it was greater than attenuation seen after TMS without movement, nor was 
it due to presence of a movement shortly after the stimulation, as the sensation of 
stimuli applied prior to a movement (without TMS) was not attenuated in control 
trials.
There is also evidence for attenuation of self-produced stimuli in the auditory 
modality in humans and monkeys. Shafer and Marcus first demonstrated that the 
EEG potentials evoked by self-triggered auditory stimuli had a significantly smaller 
amplitude and faster latency than the potentials evoked by externally triggered 
auditory stimuli (Schafer and Marcus, 1973). The degree of attenuation decreased 
linearly with the length of delays introduced between the auditory stimulus (a tone) 
and the action generating the stimulus (a button press). A reduced response to self­
produced compared to externally generated tones has also been demonstrated using 
MEG (Martikainen et al., 2005). Similarly the MEG response to self-generated 
speech is reduced compared to the MEG response to playback of the same speech 
sounds (Curio et al., 2000;Numminen et al., 1999). Furthermore in squirrel monkeys, 
over half of neurons in the STS that respond to vocalisations of other monkeys, do 
not respond when the monkey itself vocalises, but they do respond to the play back 
of recorded self produced vocalisations (Muller-Preuss, 1978;Muller-Preuss and 
Ploog, 1981).
In the visual modality, in which context sensorimotor attenuation was first proposed, 
there is also some evidence supporting this idea. Firstly as observed by Helmholtz, 
when we move our eyes the world does not appear to move even though visual 
objects move across the retina, whereas if our eyes are moved by an external force 
(such as a finger pushing the eyeball to one side) the world does appear to move 
(Helmholtz, 1867). This suggests that the motor command is necessary for the visual 
system to anticipate and compensate for the sensory consequences of the eye 
movement. Conversely if we try to move our eyes but our eye muscles are paralysed 
so that the eye does not actually move, the world appears to move in the direction of
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the attempted eye movement (Kommuller, 1932). This suggests that the visual 
system is trying to compensate for the intending eye movement even though it never 
happened.
Prediction and cancellation of the sensory consequences of our actions also appears 
to operate during blinks. Humans blink every few seconds, yet remarkably the 
pronounced interruptions to visual input they cause are rarely noticed. In contrast 
external darkenings of the visual field that have a similar duration and magnitude as 
the interruption to visual input caused by a blink are immediately apparent 
(Volkmann et al., 1980). During blinks neither the eyelid sweeping across the pupil 
nor the transient changes in brightness that occur at the beginning or end of the blink 
are usually perceived. Moreover, visual experience remains constant across the 
significant gap in visual input that results from eyelid closure.
Several psychophysical studies have demonstrated that visual sensitivity is reduced 
during eyeblinks, an effect known as blink suppression (Manning et al., 1983;Riggs 
et al., 1982;Volkmann et al., 1978;Volkmann et al., 1980;Volkmann et al.,
1982;Volkmann, 1986). Blink suppression mainly affects sensitivity to low spatial 
frequency visual stimuli (Ridder and Tomlinson, 1993) and reaches a maximum 30- 
40 ms before the eyelid begins to cover the pupil (Manning et al., 1983; Volkmann, 
1986). It has been proposed that blink suppression may represent a neural mechanism 
associated with the blink motor command that has evolved to minimise the percept of 
the eyelid occluding the pupil (a low spatial frequency stimulus) and the transient 
changes in illumination that occur during the blink (Volkmann, 1986). The existence 
of blink suppression therefore implies an underlying neural mechanism by which 
blinking influences the processing of visual stimulation.
A recent iMRI study has shown that the response to visual stimulation is attenuated 
by voluntary saccades, which may account for the observed reduction in visual 
sensitivity during saccades, a phenomenon known as saccadic suppression (Sylvester 
et al., 2005). However the neural mechanism underlying the phenomenon of blink 
suppression and the maintenance of visual continuity across blinks remains 
unknown. In Chapters 4 and 5 ,1 investigate the neural basis of these phenomena 
using fMRI. In Chapter 4 ,1 compare the neural responses to self-produced
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darkenings (blinks) and externally generated darkenings, and in Chapter 5 ,1 
investigate whether the neural response to visual stimulation is suppressed during 
blinks, a possible explanation of the psychophysical phenomenon of blink 
suppression.
1.2 Monitoring other people’s actions
The actions of others, whether they are predators, prey, or conspecifics will have a 
significant impact on the survival of an animal and thus it must be able to modulate 
its own behaviour accordingly. Therefore, as well as being able to monitor their own 
actions and predict the sensory consequences of their own actions, animals should 
also be able to monitor and predict the actions of others and the consequences of 
these actions. There is accumulating evidence that we use the same neural systems 
for controlling and monitoring our own actions and their consequences, and for 
understanding and predicting the actions of others.
1.2.1 The mirror system for the observation o f action
There is increasing evidence that our own motor system is activated during the 
observation of action, and that it is this involvement of our motor system that allows 
us to understand the actions of others. Activation of parts of the motor system during 
action observation was first discovered in monkeys in 1992 (Di Pellegrino et al., 
1992).
Area F5 is a region of the monkey premotor cortex characterised by the presence of 
neurons that code for goal related motor actions such as hand and mouth grasping. In 
1996, Rizzolatti and colleagues discovered a set of neurons, termed “mirror 
neurons”, in area F5, which fire both when the monkey performs a specific action 
and when it observes another individual, in this case the experimenter, performing 
the same, or a similar, action (Gallese et al., 1996;Rizzolatti et al., 1996a). 
Observation of either the agent performing an action, such as grasping, or of an 
object, e.g. food, alone was not sufficient to elicit firing of the mirror neurons. An 
interaction between the agent, either a person or another monkey, and the object of 
the action is required to visually trigger mirror neurons. The actions most commonly
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represented by mirror neurons were grasping, manipulating and placing, and the most 
effective observed actions for triggering premotor neuron activity were performed by 
the hands or mouth Most mirror neurons showed a congruent relationship between 
the actions they fired to during observation and execution In around 30% of mirror 
neurons this congruence is extremely strict; the observed and executed actions 
correspond both in terms of type of action, such as grasping as opposed to reaching, 
and in terms of the specific manner in which the action is executed, for example a 
precision grip as opposed to a power grip. It has been proposed that these mirror 
neurons represent an action observation/execution matching system, which may play 
a role in the recognition and understanding of actions performed by others (Gallese et 
al., 1996;Rizzolatti et al., 1996a;Rizzolatti et al., 2001)..
Mirror neurons still fire when the action is hidden behind a screen as long as the 
monkey knows that there is an object behind the screen and thus can infer that a 
certain action, namely a hand grasping an object, is being performed (Umilta et al.,
2001). The response of the mirror neurons were recorded in two conditions: in one 
the monkey observed an entire action, e.g. a hand grasping an object, but in the 
second condition the monkey could only see the hand reaching behind a screen, 
while the hand actually grasping the object (the crucial part of the action) was hidden 
behind the screen. In this condition the monkeys knew that the object was behind the 
screen but they could not actually see the action. Nevertheless over half the recorded 
neurons still fired.
More recently neurons have been found in the monkey premotor cortex that fire 
when the monkey performs a specific action, e.g. breaking open a peanut, and when 
it hears the sound related to that action, e.g. the sound of the peanut cracking open 
(Kohler et al., 2002). Most of these neurons (22 out of 29 studied) also fired when 
the monkey observed another person carrying out the same action About 15% of F5 
neurons that fired to action execution and observation also responded to the sounds 
of the same actions. Thus, they appear to constitute a subclass of mirror neurons, 
termed audiovisual mirror neurons by the authors, which code actions irrespective of 
whether they are performed, observed or heard. These results suggest that mirror 
neuron activity correlates with action understanding, and a motor representation of 
the action, not simply the visual, or other specific sensory features of an action.
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There is growing evidence that a similar mirror system may also exist in humans that 
is activated by action execution, action observation and also by hearing action related 
sounds. MEG and EEG have shown that when a human observes hand actions being 
made by another person there is a desynchronisation of the motor cortex similar to, 
but weaker than, that occurring when the subject makes active hand movements, 
(Cochin et al., 1999;Hari et al., 1998). EEG and MEG have also shown that hearing 
piano tunes activates the motor cortex in piano experts (Bangert and Altenmuller, 
2003;Haueisen and Knosche, 2001) and also in novices undergoing piano training 
after just 20 minutes of practice, though the effect was enhanced after 5 weeks of 
training (Bangert and Altenmuller, 2003). When expert pianists listen to a familiar 
melody the location of the activation in their motor cortex was specific to the finger 
that would normally be used to play a particular note (Haueisen and Knosche, 2001).
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) experiments also support the existence of a 
mirror system in humans. Fadiga et al (1995) stimulated the motor cortex of subjects 
using TMS, and recorded the induced motor evoked potentials (MEPs) from various 
arm and hand muscles. Simultaneously, subjects watched various types of hand 
movements and control visual stimuli. The authors found that the threshold for MEPs 
recorded from the hand muscles involved in making a particular movement decreases 
during observation of the same hand movement, but not during observation of other 
non-action stimuli (Fadiga et al., 1995). This shows that action observation affects 
the peripheral motor system.
Similarly when subjects listen to or watch speech, muscle potentiation increases in 
the subjects’ own mouth muscles (Fadiga et al., 2002;Watkins et al., 2003). MEPs 
were recorded in subjects’ tongue muscles in response to TMS of left motor cortex, 
while they listened to speech sounds requiring different amounts of tongue 
movement (double ‘f , which requires slight tongue tip movement, compared to 
double ‘r’ which requires strong tongue tip movement). MEPs were greatest when 
listening to sounds that required greater tongue movements. This demonstrates that 
hearing phonemes, which require strong tongue muscle activation when produced, 
activates the listeners’ motor centres that control the tongue muscles (Fadiga et al.,
2002). In a similar study MEPs in the lip muscles, produced by TMS of the face area 
of the left motor cortex, were recorded while subjects heard speech sounds versus
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non speech sounds and watched speech related lip movements versus eye and brow 
movements (Watkins et al., 2003). These MEPs were greater while subjects listened 
to speech sounds compared to non-speech sounds, and when subjects saw lip 
movements compared to eye and brow movements. This demonstrates that speech 
perception, whether visual or auditory, enhances the excitability of the motor areas 
underlying speech production in the left hemisphere (Watkins et al., 2003).
Thus it appears that several neurophysiological experiments, using different 
techniques, demonstrate that observation of actions is correlated with activation of 
cortical areas normally associated with motor control in humans, suggesting that 
there is a mirror system in humans, analogous to that found in monkeys.
Brain imaging studies also provide evidence in favour of this idea. A number of brain 
imaging studies have found activation of the premotor cortex, the parietal lobe and 
the superior temporal sulcus, when subjects observe arm and hand actions (Grafton et 
al., 1996;Grezes et al., 2003;Rizzolatti et al., 1996b). A recent fMRI experiment 
showed that observing hand, mouth and foot actions led to activation of the premotor 
cortex in a somatotopic manner (Buccino et al., 2001). The premotor activation 
varied somatotopically in a pattern similar to that of the classical motor cortex 
homunculus, with the mouth represented ventrally and the foot dorsally, and the hand 
in between. This experiment provides strong evidence that action observation 
involves activation of the same functionally specific neural structures that are 
normally involved in the execution of action.
In addition speech perception has been shown to activate the premotor regions 
involved in speech production. Viewing silent articulatory mouth movements 
activates Broca’s area (Calvert and Campbell, 2003). Listening to speech sounds also 
activates premotor areas involved in speech production; 73% of voxels activated by 
listening to speech were also activated during speech production (Wilson et al.,
2004). More recently Skipper et al have replicated these findings and shown that 
observation of silently articulating faces, and listening to speech sounds activates a 
network of brain regions involved in speech production including the premotor 
cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, primary motor cortex and superior temporal sulcus 
(Skipper et al., 2005).
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Most recently Gazzola and colleagues have demonstrated activation of a temporo- 
parieto-premotor network during execution of hand and mouth actions and while 
subject’s listened to the sounds of the same actions (Gazzola et al., 2006). Activation 
in the premotor cortex was somatotopically organised in both the listening and 
execution conditions, with hand actions activating a dorsal cluster, while mouth 
actions activated a ventral cluster. A second study with the same subjects showed 
that most of this auditory mirror system was also activated by the sight of similar 
grasping hand actions, apart from the premotor region that responded selectively to 
mouth action execution and listening.
Thus it appears that, as in monkeys, the human motor system is intrinsically involved 
in action observation. The consistent activation of the motor system during the 
perception of actions, whether in the auditory or visual modality, suggests that we 
represent the actions of others by activating a motor representation of that action, 
rather than by representing the action in terms of its specific visual or other sensory 
features.
It has been proposed that the simulation of others’ actions by our mirror system 
underlies our ability to understand the actions of others, and allows us to infer the 
intentions of others on the basis of what our own intentions would be for that action 
(Blakemore and Decety, 2001;Rizzolatti et al., 2001). There is evidence that inferring 
intertions of others involves the mirror system. When actions are observed in a 
context that indicates the intention behind the actions (e.g. a hand grasping a mug in 
a context implying an intention to drink, or to clean up) activity in the mirror system 
is increased compared to when the action is observed outside of any context (i.e. on a 
blank background) and parts of the mirror system (inferior frontal region) show 
differential activation depending on the context (Iacoboni et al., 2005). This indicates 
that the mirror system is not simply an action recognition mechanism (i.e. that is a 
hand grasp) but is also involved in understanding the intentions/goals behind the 
actions of others.
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1.2.2 Predicting the actions of others
It has been proposed that the mirror system acts in a predictive manner, predicting 
and simulating the actions of others, on the basis of the current situation and prior 
knowledge, and using the internal forward model, normally used to predict the 
consequences of our own actions, to verify its prediction (Kilner et al. in 
submission). According to this hypothesis the observer anticipates the actions of the 
other, and simulates the predicted actions with their own motor system. The same 
internal forward model, that is used to predict the sensory consequences of our own 
actions, is used to predict the sensory consequences of the simulated actions. This 
prediction is transformed to give a prediction of the sensory consequences of the 
other’s action from the observer’s view point and then compared to the actual 
sensory feedback from the observed action. For example, if the observer anticipates 
that the subject will move their hand, their motor system simulates the movement of 
the observer’s own arm and the internal forward model predicts the visual 
consequences of this arm movement. This visual prediction can then be transformed 
to generate a prediction of the visual consequences of the same movement made by 
another person. The sensory prediction can then be compared to the actual sensory 
input received from the observed action and a prediction error is calculated. This 
prediction error is then used to modify the original prediction of what action the 
other person is performing, and new sensory prediction can be generated. By 
minimising the prediction error the most likely cause of the observed visual input can 
be inferred, allowing us to recognise what the other person is doing.
Kilner and colleagues propose that a predictive account of the mirror system can also 
account for our ability to infer the intention behind an observed action. They 
proposed that the observed movement is represented on a number of different levels 
arranged in a hierarchy: the visual representation of the movement, the motor 
representation of the action, the goal of the action, and the context in which it occurs. 
The observer predicts the goal of the actor on the basis of the context, and then 
predicts and simulates the appropriate action to achieve this goal within the context. 
As described above, an internal forward model then predicts the sensory 
consequences of the action and compares it to the actual consequences to generate a 
prediction error. The simulated action that minimises this prediction error can be
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compared to the action predicted on the basis of the predicted goal, and another 
prediction error is generated. By adjusting their representation of the goal of the 
other person so as to minimise this prediction error, the observer can infer the goal of 
the observed action. Thus, minimising the prediction error at all levels in this 
hierarchy allows us to recognise what actions others are performing and to infer the 
intentions of behind these actions.
There is increasing evidence that the mirror system actively predicts the actions of 
others, rather than simply responding to sensory input. A recent study has shown that 
75.6% of parietal mirror neurons that respond to the sight of a hand grasping an 
object respond differentially depending on the final goal of the action (Fogassi et al.,
2005). Of these, some responded preferentially when the hand grasped the object and 
put it in the experimenter’s mouth, and some responded when the hand grasped the 
object and placed it in a container next to the mouth. This differential activation was 
observed, not during the final part of the action when the object is placed in the 
mouth or in the container, but instead during the initial part of the action when the 
monkey sees the hand grasp the object, an action which is common to both 
conditions. Thus it appears that the parietal mirror neurons are able to predict the 
second part of the action. This prediction could be based on the type of object being 
grasped, a food object indicating grasping to eat, and also on the presence or absence 
of the container, which was only present in the grasping to place trials. Thus, in line 
with the predictive account of the mirror system, this study demonstrates that at least 
some parietal mirror neurons predict a subsequent action on the basis of the context 
in which the action is performed.
Further support for this idea comes from a previous study showing that mirror 
neurons in monkey F5 that respond to grasping hand actions still fire when a hand 
reaches to grasp an object hidden behind a screen, even though the monkey cannot 
actually see the hand grasp the object (Umilta et al., 2001). This suggests that the 
monkey’s mirror neurons are predicting that the hand will grasp the object from the 
knowledge that an object is behind the screen and the sight of the arm reaching for it.
In humans also, there is evidence of prediction by the mirror system during action 
observation. Using EEG, Kilner and colleagues have demonstrated activation of the
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motor system prior to the observation of a predicted movement (Kilner et al., 2004). 
Subjects were shown short video clips of a hand (the right hand). In half the trials the 
hand moved and grasped an object, and in half the trials it remained still. The colour 
of the object indicated whether the hand would move or not. A significant negative 
potential was observed contralateral to the observed action, starting around 500ms 
prior to the onset of the predictable hand movement. This negativity was comparable 
in timing and location to the movement readiness potential that was observed when 
subjects actually executed a movement with their own hand, and is typically 
observed prior to making any movement. According to the authors these results 
suggest that the mirror system sets up a predictive model of another person’s actions. 
This allows the brain to anticipate rather than merely react to another person’s 
actions.
Similarly, activation of the motor system has been demonstrated prior to hearing the 
sound of a predicted action with MEG (Haueisen and Knosche, 2001). When expert 
pianists listened to a familiar melody their finger related motor cortex was activated, 
and the location of the activation for each note was specific to the finger that would 
normally be used to play a particular note. Activity in response to notes usually 
played by the thumb was localized to an area inferior to activation in response to 
notes usually played by the little finger, consistent with the motor homunculus in 
Ml. The note specific activation in the motor cortex occurred 300ms prior to the 
onset of each note, thus demonstrating that the mirror system anticipates the 
unfolding melody and the associated action sequence.
There is also behavioural evidence of prediction during action observation. When 
watching predictable actions, a subject’s eye gaze lead the observed movement, 
demonstrating that gaze predicts rather than reacts to the observed action (Flanagan 
and Johansson, 2003). In our own visually guided actions eye movements lead hand 
movements and are crucial for planning and control. In Flanagan and Johansson’s 
study, subjects either executed a block moving task or observed another person doing 
the same task. The pattern of eye movements was the same in both conditions and 
preceded the hand movement. In comparison when the blocks alone moved without a 
hand visibly picking them up the subject’s eye movements followed the blocks, 
rather than anticipating the movement of the blocks.
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When observing actions whose target was unknown in advance subjects’ gaze 
nevertheless fixated ahead of the actor’s hand, i.e. gaze was still proactive not just 
reactive, however the gaze shifts occurred later when the observer did not know the 
goal in advance compared to when they were following their own actions (Rotman et 
al., 2006). In a separate task subjects were asked to guess the target of the action. The 
time at which subjects were able to correctly guess the target was very similar to the 
time at which they made the predictive gaze shift in the observation task. This 
suggest that subjects use the kinematics of the actor’s movements and knowledge 
about the rules of the task to predict the goal of the movement and as soon as they 
can tell where the hand is going to move to, they make a gaze shift to the target.
There is also evidence from fMRI studies that the mirror system is involved in 
predicting the actions of others (Ramnani and Miall, 2004). Subjects together with a 
training partner learned to make specific finger movements in response to simple 
visual cues. During scanning subjects did not actually observe their training partner 
executing a finger movement but viewed the learned visual cues and believed that 
their training partner was making the appropriate movement in the adjacent room In 
one condition the visual cue indicated precisely which finger movement the partner 
would make and then a second cue indicated when to make the movement. In another 
condition the initial visual cue merely indicated that an action would occur, but the 
precise finger movement was not cued in advance and subjects only knew which 
movement their partner would make when the second cue triggering the action 
appeared. Only in the first condition when the precise movement was cued in 
advance could the subjects predict which movement their training partner would 
have to make. In the control conditions the subject was instructed that a computer 
would be executing an action in response to the cues. Brain activity was examined in 
response to the first visual cue. Parts of the motor system, including the dorsal 
prefrontal cortex, the primary motor cortex, and Broca’s areas were activated when 
subjects anticipated the actions of other, as was the posterior superior temporal 
sulcus (STS). The posterior STS is not activated by action execution, however it is 
generally considered to be part of the human mirror system, as it responds to 
biological motion (Allison et al., 2000). This study supports the notion that the 
mirror system is involved in predicting others actions and is not merely activated in
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response to sensory stimuli (whether auditory or visual) that arise as a consequence 
of the actions of others.
The STS shows greater activity to unpredicted compared to predicted movements 
(Pelphrey et al., 2003;Pelphrey et al., 2004a). Subjects observed an avatar making 
gaze shifts in the presence of a visual target. A smaller haemodynamic response was 
evoked in the observer’s STS and IPS in response to gaze shifts directed towards the 
target, compared to gaze shifts to another location in the avatar’s visual field 
(Pelphrey et al., 2003). Similarly, reaching-to-grasp arm movements directed towards 
a target elicited less activation in the observer’s STS compared to arm movements 
directed away from the target (Pelphrey et al., 2004a). The authors propose that the 
STS is involved in predicting the actions of others, and that the prolonged activity 
seen when the actor does not look at or grasp the target, is due to violation of the 
observer’s expectations and the reformulation of the observer’s prediction. 
Alternatively the activation of the STS could reflect the prediction error. These 
findings fit well with Kilner’s predictive model of the mirror system, which includes 
the STS (Kilner et al. in submission).
In Chapter 6 ,1 will further investigate the effect of the observer’s expectation on the 
brain activity evoked by observation of another person making a gaze shift. I will 
compare the response to gaze shifts towards a visible target, with the response to 
gaze shifts away from a visible target. I will also modify the observer’s expectation 
by modifying the intention attributed to the person making the gaze shift.
1.2.3 Mirroring the sensory consequences of actions
In addition to there being evidence that we use our own motor system to monitor and 
predict the actions of others, there is evidence that action observation affects our 
sensory cortices, supporting the idea that we predict the sensory consequences of 
observed actions.
Several studies have demonstrated modulation of somatosensory activity during 
action observation Avikainen and colleagues recorded somatosensory evoked field 
potentials in response to medial nerve stimulation using MEG, during rest, while
37
subjects manipulated a small object or while subjects observed the experimenter 
manipulating a small object (Avikainen et al., 2002). SI signals were enhanced 
during both execution and observation of hand actions compared to rest, whereas SII 
signals were suppressed during action observation and execution, (except for when 
the right hand was mo\ed while right medial nerve stimulation was applied, in which 
case the opposite effect was found, i.e. decreased SI and increased SII). In a similar 
study Rossi and colleagues recorded somatosensory evoked potentials in response to 
stimulation of the right median nerve using EEG and MEG, while subjects executed, 
and observed hand actions, performed mental calculations and were at rest (Rossi et 
al., 2002). The amplitude of the N30 component of the somatosensory evoked 
potentials increased during action observation but decreased during action execution 
relative to rest. Likewise, the strength of somatosensory evoked fields (recorded by 
MEG) at 30ms in SI increased during action observation and decreased during action 
execution. The strength of the MEG signal in SII at 100ms decreased during both 
action observation and execution versus rest, but the effect was not quite significant 
p=0.058).
Similarly, activity in the mouth and hand areas of SI was recorded with MEG in 
response to tactile lip and electrical medial nerve stimulation respectively, during 
rest, while subjects listened to speech, while subjects viewed silent articulations, and 
while subjects executed lip protrusions. Mouth movements decreased the strength of 
mouth SI sources bilaterally. Viewing speech increased activation of mouth SI in the 
left hemisphere, but there was no clear effect in the right hemisphere. Listening to 
speech did not have any systematic effects on activity in SI in either hemisphere 
(Mottonen et al., 2005).
Modulation of somatosensory cortices has also been observed using fMRI. 
Observation of someone silently articulating speech has been shown to activate the 
auditory cortex (Calvert et al., 1997;Pekkola et al., 2005). It has also been 
demonstrated that observation of grasping hand actions activates the secondary 
somatosensory cortex (SII) in the parietal operculum (Grezes et al., 2003). The 
authors propose that this activation in SII consists of a representation of the sensory 
consequences of the action being observed that is associated with the motor 
representation of that action.
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Together these studies demonstrate that action observation modulates activation of 
sensory cortices. This may represent a prediction of the sensory consequences of the 
observed action on the basis of activation of the motor representation of the observed 
action. This would be in line with the proposal that the mirror system uses the same 
forward model used to predict the sensory consequences of our own action to predict 
the sensory consequences of the actions of others.
In Chapter 7 ,1 will investigate the neural systems involved in monitoring the sensory 
consequences (a tone) of our own actions (a button press) and those involved in 
monitoring the sensory consequences of the actions of another person, and whether 
the neural response to sensory stimuli caused by the actions of others is modified in 
the same way as the response to self-produced sensory stimuli.
In Chapter 8 ,1 will investigate whether in addition to representing actions of others 
in our own motor system, and representing the sensory consequences of these actions 
in our sensory cortices, we also represent the sensations experienced by others in a 
similar manner. Recently, a number of brain systems with ‘mirror’ properties have 
been described. Common regions are activated by the experience and mere 
observation of disgust (Wicker et al., 2003), emotional facial expression (Carr et al.,
2003), pain (Singer et al., 2004), and touch (Keysers et al., 2004). In the latter study, 
observing touch to someone else's legs activated similar regions in the secondary 
somatosensory cortex (SII) in the observer's brain as when the observer's own legs 
were touched. However, this SII activation was also found during the observation of 
touch to an object, and no primary somatosensory cortex activity was found in either 
condition (Keysers et al., 2004). In Chapter 8 ,1 will investigate the potential 
existence of a touch mirror system by comparing the neural response to the 
observation of touch to a human face, and touch to an object.
1.3 Development of action monitoring
1.3,1 Our own actions
There is evidence that infants as young as 3-5 months can distinguish between the 
perceptual consequences of self-induced versus externally-induced actions, on the
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basis of contingencies between their actions and sensory input. Five month old 
infants can distinguish between a live contingent video of their own legs moving and 
a non-contingent video of moving legs, either another infant’s or a previous 
recording of their own legs (Bahrick and Watson, 1985). Infants preferentially 
looked at the non-contingent feet, presumably making use of the contingency 
between the movements seen on the screen and proprioceptive feed back from their 
own legs (which were hidden from view). In contrast three-month old infants do not 
show any preference across the group, but when the data are examined more closely, 
looking times have a bimodal distribution, with approximately half preferring to look 
at their own feet and half preferring the non-contingent feet. Three month old infants 
viewing faces also show a significant preference for a contingent self-image (i.e. 
mirror image) over a non-contingent image of another child (Field, 1979).
Thus it appears that between 3 and 5 months of age there is a change in attentional 
preference from contingent to non-contingent, and that some of the 3 month olds in 
Bahrick and Watson’s study have undergone this transition while others are yet to do 
so. Bahrick and Watson suggest that up to 3 months infants seek out perfect 
contingency, while they leam about “self’, that at around 3 months a bias matures to 
the effect that perfect contingency is categorized as self and thereafter becomes less 
interesting than imperfect contingencies, which imply an external cause.
Bahrick and Watson’s findings have been replicated with 5 month old infants but 
with the infant’s hand exploring a hidden toy rather than their feet (Schmuckler,
1996). Again, infants preferentially looked at the non-contingent video. There is even 
evidence suggesting that infants aged 4 weeks and under can distinguish between 
external and self-stimulation (Rochat and Hespos, 1997). Newborns display 
significantly more rooting responses when touched on the cheek by the experimenter 
compared to when they touched their own cheek. Four week old infants show the 
opposite pattern.
Taken together these studies, and several others, suggest that infants from around 3 
months of age, or even younger, can detect contingencies between their actions and a 
stimulus and that by 5 months they can definitely distinguish between self-produced 
stimuli and externally generated stimuli as demonstrated by the differential responses
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they show to the two types of stimuli, i.e. by 3-5 months of age infants can recognise 
the consequences of their own actions.
1,3.2 The actions of others
Adults’ ability to understand the actions of others appears to be based on the 
involvement of their own motor systems during action observation, which provides a 
motor representation of the perceived actions. Evidence for the involvement of the 
motor system in action observation in young infants comes mainly from studies of 
imitation.
Imitation was first observed in very young infants by Meltzoff & Moore in 1977. 
Newborn infants between 12 and 21 days old observed adults making the following 
movements: lip protrusion, mouth opening, tongue protrusion, and opening and 
closing the hand. The infants’ hand and face movements were video taped and 
independent coders rated which movement they thought the infant was making (the 
coders did not know which action the infant was observing at the time). The judged 
behaviour of the infants matched the observed action (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977). 
For example the infants made significantly more tongue protrusions after they had 
seen the adult perform tongue protrusions. Meltzoff and Moore replicated this 
finding in new bom infants ranging from 42 minutes to 71 hours old. When infants 
observed the adult making tongue protrusions, the frequency and duration of the 
neonates’ tongue protrusions was greater than when they observed the adult making 
mouth openings and vice versa (Meltzoff and Moore, 1983). Another study 
demonstrated imitation of head movement as well as tongue protmsion in neonates 
(Meltzoff and Moore, 1989).
There is also evidence that infants imitate vocalisations. Infants, aged 12-20 weeks, 
listening to an adult speaker produce a particular vowel, /a/, /i/, or /u/, produced more 
vocalisations resembling that particular vowel (Kuhl and Meltzoff, 1996). More 
recently, it has been shown that new bom infants, aged from 1 to 7 days, make the 
appropriate mouth movement (mouth opening for /a/ and mouth clutching for /m/) in 
response to the speech sounds /a/ and /m/, both when they can see the speaker 
articulating and when their eyes are closed (Chen et al., 2004). This suggests that
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there is an innate connection between heard speech and the corresponding motor 
representation.
This ability of young infants to imitate actions, demonstrated by the above studies, 
provides strong evidence of early development of system for coupling the perception 
and production of actions. However, there is some controversy surrounding imitation 
by infants and alternative interpretations have been proposed to explain the findings 
described above, one such alternative being that the behaviours studied are relatively 
fixed action patterns that are similar in form to the visual stimuli releasing them 
(Anisfeld, 1979;Anisfeld, 1991;Anisfeld et al., 2001).
There is recent evidence that 12 month old infants can predict or anticipate the 
actions of others. When observing goal-directed hand actions, the eye movements of 
both adults and 12 month old infants anticipated the observed movement (Falck- 
Ytter et al., 2006). Such proactive eye movements have previously been 
demonstrated only in adults (Flanagan and Johansson, 2003). Both adults and 12 
month old infants shifted their gaze towards the goal of the action before the hand 
reached the goal In contrast, the gaze of 6 month old infants shifted to the goal after 
the hand reached the goal. However when observing the object moving in a self- 
propelled fashion without an arm movement, gaze did not shift to the goal of the 
movement significantly ahead of the moving object, demonstrating that predictive 
eye-movements depend on the presence of a human action, rather than mere 
predictability of the movement. This study shows that by 12 months of age infants 
are able to predict the actions of others, and the authors suggest that this ability is 
mediated by the mirror system.
It also appears that as well as being able to recognise the consequences of their own 
actions, infants can recognise the consequences of actions made by others from 2 
months of age, at least in the context of speech There is strong behavioural evidence 
that infants as young as 2 months of age can match observed articulatory mouth 
movements to the appropriate sound. When presented with two videos of faces 
articulating vowels, 4.5 month old infants spent significantly longer fixating the 
video that matched the auditory vowels they were played (Kuhl and Meltzoff, 
1982;Patterson and Werker, 1999). This finding has been replicated with 2 month old
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infants (Patterson and Werker, 2003). In an operant sucking paradigm, 4 month old 
infants will suck more to receive a face that matches the heard speech sound (Walton 
and Bower, 1993). So it seems that they can predict the precise sensory consequences 
of articulations. However the neural basis of this ability remains unknown. One 
possibility is that infants represent both seen and heard speech amodally in their 
motor system. Supporting this possibility is the fact that in adults both seeing and 
hearing speech has been shown to activate regions involved in speech production 
(Skipper et al., 2005;Wilson et al., 2004), and evidence that young infants imitate 
heard speech implying an early correspondence between speech perception and 
production (Chen et al., 2004;Kuhl and Meltzoff, 1996). In Chapters 9 and 10,1 will 
investigate the neural mechanism underlying infants’ ability to recognise the auditory 
consequences of observed articulatory movements.
1.4 Summary
In this thesis I will investigate the neural mechanisms underlying our ability to 
monitor our own actions and predict their sensory consequences, and our ability to 
understand and predict the actions of others. There is substantial evidence that our 
ability to monitor our actions and their consequences is based on the use of an 
internal forward model that predicts the consequences of an action on the basis of an 
efference copy of the motor command eliciting that action. This prediction appears to 
be used both for motor control, and to attenuate, cancel or compensate for the 
sensory consequences of our actions. In Chapters 4 and 5 ,1 will investigate the 
neural mechanism underlying sensorimotor cancellation during eye-blinks.
There is accumulating evidence that our ability to understand and predict the actions 
of others and their consequences is based on the same systems, including the internal 
forward model, that are involved in controlling and monitoring our own actions. In 
Chapters 6 and 7 ,1 will investigate the neural mechanisms underlying our ability to 
monitor and predict the actions of others and the consequences of these actions.
In Chapter 8 ,1 will investigate the possibility that, in addition to representing actions 
of other in our own motor system, and representing the sensory consequences of 
these actions in our sensory cortices, we also represent the sensations experienced by
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others in a similar manner. I will investigate the potential existence of a touch mirror 
system, equivalent to the action mirror system, by comparing the neural response to 
the observation of touch to a human face, and touch to an object.
In this thesis I will also begin to investigate the development of our ability to monitor 
the actions of others. There is strong behavioural evidence, mainly from studies of 
imitation, of early development of a system for coupling the perception and 
production of actions. There is also behavioural evidence that infants can recognise 
the consequences of the actions of others from an early age. 2 month old infants are 
able to match observed articulations with the appropriate speech sound. In Chapters 9 
and 10,1 will investigate the neural mechanism underlying this ability, one 
possibility being that infants represent both seen and heard speech amodally in their 
motor system, as is the case in adults.
44
CHAPTER 2: FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING
METHODS
2.1 Basis of fMRI signal
2.1.1 Physics of Magnetic Resonance Imaging
The physical basis of Magnetic Resonance Imaging lies in a property of protons 
called spin. Protons are positively charged and the spinning motion of the charge 
induces a local magnetic field. In the absence of a magnetic field these spins orient 
randomly and the material containing the protons has no net magnetisation. But in 
the presence of an external static magnetic field (Bo) the majority of spins will align 
with this field (See Figure 2.1). Some align against the field but the net magnetic 
field (Mo) of all the protons is in alignment with the external field. The spinning 
protons revolve, or precess, about the axis of the external magnetic field Bo (a bit 
like a spinning top) (see Figure 2.1). The frequency of this rotation is called the 
resonance frequency, and is proportional to the strength of the external magnetic 
field, Bo.
If a radio frequency (RF) pulse is then applied perpendicular to the main magnetic 
field, Bo at the resonance frequency the protons can absorb this energy. This changes 
the alignment of the magnetic moments of the protons, which causes the spins to 
move away from their equilibrium positions. The net magnetisation Mo now also 
aligns away from Bo, towards the new applied radio frequency magnetic field, Bi. 
This gives rise to a non-zero transverse magnetisation in the XY plane (Mxy), if we 
imagine that the original magnetic field, Bo, is aligned to the Z-axis. The duration of 
this new alignment and the angle from its original equilibrium direction inline with 
Bo, increases with the strength and duration of the RF pulse.
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Protons align with external The protons precess
Magnetic field (Bo) around axis of Bo
Figure 2.1 Protons in an external magnetic field (from www. simplyphvsics. com)
Once the RF pulse is turned off the spins gradually return to their equilibrium 
positions over several seconds, and absorbed RF energy is retransmitted at the 
resonance frequency. This is the MRI signal. Once the net magnetisation vector, Mo, 
has been tipped away from the Z axis by the RF pulse, it continues to rotate around 
the main external magnetic field, Bo, at the resonance frequency. The rotating 
magnetic fields produces electromagnetic radiation at the resonance frequency and 
these waves induce a signal voltage in a receiver coil surrounding the object being 
scanned (typically the subject’s brain).
The spins realign to their original positions in 2 ways simultaneously:
Longitudinal relaxation (Tl): The excited protons transfer energy to neighbouring 
molecules, and return to their original orientation aligned to Bo along the Z-axis.
This return to thermal equilibrium is called longitudinal or spin- lattice relaxation. It 
is an exponential process characterised by a time constant Tl. Tl is affected by the 
composition of the environment and thus is different in different tissues, a fact which 
can used to provide contrast between tissues.
Transverse relaxation (T2): When the spins are tilted towards the RF pulse magnetic 
field, Bi, they are initially all in phase, but as the protons move together their 
magnetic fields begin to interact with one another in a random manner, quickly 
causing them to become desynchronised so that they are no longer in phase with one 
another. As the protons dephase the magnetisation in the XY plane, M x y , decreases.
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This process, called transverse or spin-spin relaxation, is exponential and is 
characterised by a time constant T2.
T2 relaxation depends on random interactions between spins. If the main external 
magnetic field, Bo, is not homogeneous, as is usually the case in reality, this 
dephasing occurs faster than T2 would predict. Imperfections in the homogeneity of 
Bo can be caused by flaws in the magnet, or differences in the magnetic properties of 
tissues leading to distortion of the field at tissue boundaries, amongst other things. 
These imperfections mean that spins in difference parts of the objects will rotate at 
slightly different frequencies and thus dephase more rapidly. T2* relaxation is the 
sum of the relaxation caused by these fixed effects and T2 relaxation, which is 
caused by random interactions. Functional MRI sequences usually measure T2*.
2.1.2 Image formation
To create an image with MRI protons must be distinguishable according to their 
spatial location. The main external magnetic field Bo is homogeneous, and thus 
affects all protons in the sample in the same way, so the frequency of the emitted RF 
signals is not affected by location. Therefore a second magnetic field is applied, the 
frequency gradient field, that varies across the object, causing the resonant 
frequencies of the protons to vary according to their position. A particular resonant 
frequency (which depends on the strength and direction of the magnetic field) 
corresponds to a particular position in the sample, and the amplitude of the signal at 
that frequency depends on the number of protons in that particular location. Thus the 
gradient field allows the encoding of position in one dimension (along the x-axis) 
through frequencies, but a second type of variation in magnetic field is needed to 
encode position in a second dimension (along the y-axis) -  this is achieved by phase 
encoding. Resolution in the third dimension (along the z-axis) is created by exciting 
the sample one slice at a time, by combining the frequency gradient with an RF pulse 
of a particular frequency and bandwidth. Discrete increases in the frequency 
encoding and phase encoding gradients divide each slice into small cubes, called 
voxels (volume elements). All the protons in a voxel experience the same frequency 
and phase encoding, and the signal from a voxel is the sum of the signal for all the
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protons in that voxel. The protons within a voxel cannot be distinguished from one 
another.
Contrast in the image is created by the differences in signal intensity from different 
tissues. The largest contribution to the signal comes from protons in tissue water, and 
signal intensity depends in part on the density of these protons. But there is not much 
variation in proton density between different tissues so the contrast between them is 
not very large. Signal intensity is also determined by T1 and T2 relaxation times, the 
magnetic susceptibility of the tissue (determined by other protons and electron clouds 
in the tissue), and the characteristics of the RF pulse. Spins from solid tissues such as 
bone are not detectable by MRI because their relaxation times are so fast that they 
have returned to equilibrium before any signal is detected. Therefore MRI mainly 
detects protons present in biological fluids, such as blood. Differences between T1 
and T2 relaxation times can be used to increase image contrast. By choosing 
appropriate sequence parameters the scan can be tuned to detect differences in Tl,
T2 or T2* between different parts of the imaged object. Thus an image can be Tl, T2 
or T2* weighted.
2.1.3 Echo-planar imaging
Echo-planar imaging (EPI), invented by Mansfield in 1977 (Mansfield, 1977), allows 
extremely rapid acquisition of whole brain images. An image of a complete slice can 
be acquired in less than 100ms. The acquired data are Fourrier transformed from the 
time domain to the frequency domain. The transformed data are considered to lie in a 
two dimensional frequency space, called K-space. EPI sequences acquire data from 
all the lines of K-space after each RF pulse, whereas other MRI sequences can only 
acquire data from one line per RF pulse. This means that acquisition time is far lower 
for EPI, making it very suitable for recording dynamic information, like in fMRI. All 
the fMRI experiments in this thesis used EPI sequences.
2.1.4 BOLD signal
Neuronal activity and the associated increase in local glucose metabolism in an area 
are tightly coupled to a local increase in blood flow. fMRI aims to measure neural
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activity by detecting changes in blood flow as indicated by blood oxygenation levels. 
The MRI signal can be made sensitive to the oxygenation properties of blood (so 
called Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent contrast), because of the paramagnetic 
properties of haemoglobin. When haemoglobin has no oxygen bound to it, it has a 
net magnetic moment, but when oxygen binds this moment disappears. Thus the 
magnetic state of blood reflects its level of deoxygenation, with deoxyhaemoglobin 
being more paramagnetic than oxyhaemoglobin (Pauling and Coryell, 1936). It is this 
difference in paramagnetism that allows the oxygenation state of the blood to be 
detected by BOLD contrast fMRI. The more paramagnetic a substance the faster the 
transverse relaxation time of its protons, and the shorter its T2* time constant, 
resulting in the production of a reduced T2* weighted MRI signal. Thus 
deoxyhaemoglobin produces a smaller MRI signal than oxyhaemoglobin. This is 
what underlies the BOLD signal, as blood with more deoxyhaemoglobin will 
produce a reduced signal relative to highly oxygenated blood. This was first 
demonstrated in mice by Ogawa and colleagues in1990 (Ogawa et al., 1990) and in 
cats by Turner and colleagues in 1991 (Turner et al., 1991). It was subsequently 
demonstrated in 1992 in the human visual cortex by Kwong and colleagues (Kwong 
et al., 1992) and Ogawa and colleagues (Ogawa et al., 1992). They demonstrated an 
increase in the BOLD signal in the visual cortex following visual stimulation, 
indicating a decrease in the concentration of deoxyhaemoglobin during visual 
stimulation compared to rest.
BOLD contrast is determined by the balance between supply, determined by blood 
flow and blood volume, and demand, determined by the surrounding tissue's rate of 
glucose metabolism, and consumption of oxygen. Local increases in neural activity 
leads to an increase in glucose metabolism in the neurons and thus an increase in 
oxygen consumption (Hyder et al., 1997). This causes a relative deoxygenation of the 
blood in the surrounding blood vessels about 100ms after onset of neural activity 
(Vanzetta and Grinvald, 1999), coupled to vasodilation and an increase in blood flow 
to the area 500-1000ms after onset of neuronal activity (Villringer and Dimagl,
1995). This increase swiftly reverses the deoxygenation, resulting in an overall 
increase in blood oxygenation level in the area that lasts for several seconds. This 
overcompensation is what causes the increased BOLD signal. There is a 
disproportionate increase in the amount of oxygenated blood flow to an activated
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region, i.e. the rise in oxygen uptake is smaller than the rise in blood flow to 
activated brain regions (Fox and Raichle, 1986) thus the rise in BOLD signal during 
activation indicates, perhaps counter-intuitively, a decrease in the concentration of 
deoxyhaemoglobin in the area relative to rest.
The increase in BOLD contrast, caused by the decrease in deoxyhaemoglobin and 
measured in fMRI, is delayed in time with respect to the neural activity. Typically 
the BOLD signal peaks 4-6 seconds after the onset of neural activity. The rise and 
subsequent return to baseline of the BOLD signal is known as the Haemodynamic 
Response Function (HRF).
2.1.5 Neural basis of BOLD signal
The specific cellular and molecular mechanisms underlying the BOLD signal 
detected by fMRI have not yet been definitively determined. Many researchers 
believe that the cerebral blood flow monitored by fMRI corresponds to activity in the 
pre-synaptic axon terminal of neurons (Jueptner and Weiller, 1995). 85% of cerebral 
glucose is used by neurons, primarily for the maintenance of membrane potentials 
and restoration of ion gradients (Kageyama and Wong-Riley, 1986). Several studies 
indicate that glucose consumption by neurons mainly reflects presynaptic activity at 
the axon terminal (Kadekaro et al., 1985;Kadekaro et al., 1987;Nudo and Masterton, 
1986;Schwartz et al., 1979;Wree and Schleicher, 1988). However, the relationship 
between glucose consumption and neural activity may not be so straightforward. 
There is evidence for a central role for astrocytes in coupling presynaptic activity 
with energy consumption via the release of glutamate from the axon terminal and its 
reuptake by the surrounding astrocytes (Magistretti and Pellerin, 1999). The uptake 
of glutamate requires energy and thus glutamate stimulates glucose uptake by 
astrocytes, and its glycolysis resulting in the production of ATP, to power the 
glutamate uptake, and the release of lactate (Magistretti and Pellerin, 1997;Pellerin 
and Magistretti, 1997). This lactate may subsequently be oxidised by the adjacent 
neurons to meet their energy needs (Magistretti et al., 1999).
More recent research has shed doubt on the commonly held view that the BOLD 
signal is largely driven by energy use in the presynaptic terminals (Attwell and
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Iadecola, 2002). Instead Attwell and colleagues concluded, on the basis of the 
measured properties of individual ion channels and synapses, that most of the energy 
used during neuronal activity is expended on reversing the ion movements that 
generate excitatory post synaptic potentials in the post-synaptic terminal, with a 
smaller proportion being used to reverse the ion movements that underlie action 
potentials (Attwell and Laughlin, 2001). In primates, postsynaptic responses were 
predicted to account for 74% of energy usage, while action potentials were predicted 
to account for 10% of energy usage.
Another recent and highly influential study has examined how the BOLD signal 
correlates with activity simultaneously recorded from microelectrodes placed in 
monkey primary visual cortex (Logothetis et al., 2001). Both multi-unit activity 
(MUA) and local field potential (LFPs) were recorded. MUA represents the action 
potentials, i.e. the spiking activity, of multiple neurons near (~ 100pm) the electrode 
tip, while LFPs, are thought to be a weighted sum of the membrane potentials of the 
neurons surrounding the electrode tip. Such changes in membrane potential mainly 
reflect synaptic activity in the dendrites and soma of neurons, so LFP is thought to 
mainly reflect subthreshold integrative processes in these areas.
Both MUAs and LFPs were found to correlate with the BOLD response. However, 
LFPs were the slightly better predictor, giving better estimates of BOLD response 
than MUAs. Therefore the authors concluded that the BOLD signal “reflects the 
input and intracortical processing of a given area rather than its spiking output”. 
However, this may be an overstatement, because although the LFP mainly reflects 
dendritic and somatic membrane potentials arising from synaptic activity, action 
potentials can also contribute. LFPs thus do not simply reflect just inputs and cortical 
processing. Additionally, MUAs correlated well with BOLD activity, if not as well 
as LFPs. MUA does not necessarily reflect the only the output of an area, as around 
80% of cortical axons terminate on other neurons in the local population. Therefore 
LFPs and MUAs, and thus the BOLD signal, are likely to both reflect varying types 
of neural activity.
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Recent evidence suggests that the increase in regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) 
associated with neuronal activity may not be directly related to the energy 
requirements of the brain but is instead mediated by neurotransmitters (Attwell and 
Iadecola, 2002). Though the usage of oxygen and glucose and the production of CO2 
and Yf are correlated with an increase in rCBF, it appears that none of these directly 
bring about the changes in rCBF seen during neural activity (Astrup et al., 
1978;Mintun et al., 2001;Pinard et al., 1984). Instead it appears that the 
haemodynamic response may be driven by glutamate mediated signalling, leading to 
an influx of Ca+ in postsynaptic neurons. This leads to the production of NO, 
adenosine and arachionc acid metabolites, which in turn bring about vasodilation 
(Attwell and Iadecola, 2002). According to this theory the BOLD signal reflects 
neuronal signalling rather than energy usage (though the two will often be 
correlated). Therefore, in theory the BOLD signal could reflect a change in neural 
processing without a net change in energy usage, and conversely a change in spiking 
activity, which uses energy, but does not affect the signalling systems controlling 
rCBF could fail to generate a BOLD signal (Attwell and Iadecola, 2002).
2.1.6 Resolution
The limitations on the spatial and temporal resolution of fMRI are physiological and 
are imposed by the spatio-temporal properties of the haemodynamic response 
function. Spatial resolution is limited to 2-5mm and temporal resolution is limited to 
seconds (Friston et al., 1998). The BOLD signal originates in red blood cells in 
capillaries and veins surrounding the activated neural tissue, and thus is an indirect 
measure of tissue oxygenation and neural activation, thus the maximum spatial 
resolution obtainable with the BOLD signal is dependent on the local structure and 
density of the vasculature in a particular brain region.
2.2 fMRI Analysis
All fMRI data acquired during the experiments in this thesis were analysed with 
Statistical Parametric Mapping software, SPM2, developed at the Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). Analysis 
of data with SPM starts with a series of spatial transformations, to align the data and
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warp it into a standard anatomical space (e.g. a stereotactic space), so that data from 
several subjects can be combined and analysed together. A model of the expected 
BOLD signal changes during all conditions in the experiment is then created and the 
data are fitted to the model using the General Linear Model. Activation maps are 
created from the resulting parameter estimates, and tested for statistical significance.
2.2.1 Preprocessing
2.2.1.1 Spatial Realignment
Head motion during the scan causes changes in signal intensity of a voxel over time, 
due to movement of the head through the fixed field of view, a serious confound. 
Despite head restraints, most subjects will move their heads at least a few 
millimetres. Realignment involves applying an affine rigid-body transformation to 
align each scan with a reference scan (usually the first scan or the average of all 
scans) and resampling the data using tri-linear, sine or spline interpolation. The 6 
parameters of the rigid-body transformation, representing adjustments to pitch, yaw, 
roll, and in X, Y, Z position, are estimated iteratively to minimise the sum of squares 
difference between each successive scan and the reference scan (Friston et al., 1995). 
However, even after realignment some movement related signals persist. In extreme 
cases 90% of variance in the fMRI time-series can still be accounted for by 
movement affects after realignment (Friston et al., 1996). This is due to non-linear 
effects of movement which cannot be corrected using an affine linear transformation. 
These non-linear effects include movements between slice acquisitions, 
interpolation artefacts, nonlinear distortion of magnetic field and spin excitation 
history effects. These effects make the movement related signal in a particular scan 
and non-linear function of the displacement in that and previous scans. These non­
linear movement related effects can be estimated and subtracted from the original 
data by including the estimated movement parameters from the realignment 
procedure in the design matrix during the model estimation stage of the analysis 
(Friston et al., 1996).
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2.2.1.2 Spatial Normalisation
After realignment the mean functional image (created during realignment) is used to 
estimate the warping parameters that map this mean image onto a standard 
anatomical template image (Friston et al., 1995). The warping is modelled as a 12- 
parameter affine transformation, where the parameters constitute a spatial 
transformation matrix, or low frequency basis spatial functions (usually a cosine set 
or polynomials), where the parameters are the coefficients of the basis functions 
used. The parameters are estimated iteratively, within a Bayesian framework, to 
maximise the posterior probability of the parameters being correct, The posterior 
probability is the probability of getting the given data, assuming the current estimate 
of the transformation is true, times the probability of that estimate being true 
(Ashbumer et al., 1997). Finding this solution involves jointly minimising the sum- 
of-squares differences between the template and the deformed mean functional 
image (the likelihood potential), and the prior potentials, which are used to 
incorporate prior information about the likelihood of a particular warp. The estimated 
warp is then applied to all the functional images. Anatomical Tl weighted images 
can also be normalised in this way to fit the same EPI template used for functional 
images, allowing the functional data to be overlaid onto the structural image of the 
subject.
The template used for normalisation is that of the Montreal Neurological Institute.
The location of voxels is expressed using an XYZ coordinate system, where the 
origin (0,0,0) is located at the anterior commissure. The x-axis indicates distance to 
the left (negative) and right (positive) of the mid sagittal plane, the y-axis indicates 
distance posterior (negative) and anterior (positive) to the vertical plane through the 
anterior commissure, and the z-axis indicates distance below (negative) and above 
(positive) the inter-commissural line.
2.2.1.3 Spatial Smoothing
Normalised images are spatially smoothed with a three-dimensional isotropic 
Gaussian kernel of 5-10 mm full width at half maximum. There are several reasons 
for doing this:
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1) Smoothing the data makes the errors more normal ensuring the validity of 
parametric statistical test, which are based on the assumption that the errors 
are normally distributed.
2) Smoothing with a Gaussian kernel makes the data fit the assumptions of the 
Gaussian Random field model, which is used to make statistical inferences 
about regional effects, more closely (Adler R.J., 1981).
3) Smoothing ensures that the data from different subjects is assessed on a 
spatial scale at which homologies in functional anatomy are typically 
expressed among subjects. Smoothing compensates for any small variations 
in anatomy between subjects that still exist after normalisation, reducing the 
variation in the bcalisation of activations across subjects.
2.2.2 Statistical Parametric Mapping
2.2.2.1 Basic approach
The approach used by SPM for analysis of fMRI data is based on the conjoint use of 
the General Linear Model (GLM) and Gaussian random field (GRF) theory to test 
hypotheses and make inferences about spatially extended data through the use of 
statistical parametric maps. The GLM is used to estimate parameters for the variables 
that could explain the BOLD signal time series recorded in each and every voxel 
individually. The resulting statistical parameters are assembled into a three- 
dimensional image -  the statistical parametric map (SPM), which can then be 
contrasted with one another. Gaussian random field theory is used to resolve the 
problem of multiple comparisons that occurs when conducting statistical tests across 
the whole brain. The voxel values of the SPM are considered to be distributed 
according to the probabilistic behaviour of Gaussian fields, and ‘unlikely’ excursions 
of the SPM are interpreted as regionally specific effects, caused by the 
experimentally manipulated variables.
2.2.2.2 GLM
The general linear model is used in SPM to partition the variance in the observed 
neurosphysiological response into components of interest, i.e. the experimentally
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manipulated variables, confounds and error, and to make inferences about the effects 
of interest in relation to the error variance. For each voxel the GLM explains 
variations in the BOLD signal time series (Y), (where j  = timestamp) in terms of a 
linear combination of explanatory variables (x) plus an error term (e):
Y j  = X j \  Bi + 392B2 + ........+ Xjifii  + ............ + + e
The 6 parameters reflect the independent contribution of each independent variable, 
x, to the value of the dependent variable, Y, .i.e. the amount of variance in Y that is 
accounted for by each x variable after all the other x variables have been accounted 
for. The errors, e, are assumed to be identically and normally distributed. The GLM 
can also be expressed in matrix formulation:
Y  = XB + e
Where Y is a vector of J BOLD signal measurements (one per image volume) at a 
particular voxel (Y = [1.. .j... J]) and B is the vector of the parameters to be estimated 
(B=[ 61... Bj... fij]. X  is the design matrix containing the variables which explain the 
observed data. The matrix has J rows, one per observation, and L columns, one per 
explanatory variable (x) (also referred to as covariates or regressor).
The regressors, which form the columns of the design matrix (and have one value of 
x for each time point j), are created for each explanatory variable manipulated in the 
experiment (the experimental conditions) by placing delta functions at the time 
points corresponding to the events of interest and convolving this vector with the 
haemodynamic response function. The HRF is modelled in SPM with a multivariate 
Taylor expansion of a mixture of Gamma functions (Friston et al., 1998). Additional 
columns can be created in the design matrix where the delta function is convolved 
with higher order basis functions. Those most commonly used are the time derivative 
of the HFR, which indicates variation in the latency of the haemodynamic response, 
and the dispersion derivative of the HRF, which indicates the dispersion of the HRF. 
To weight events in a single regressor differently from one another parametric 
modulators can be entered into the design matrix. These can model time dependent 
changes, or can be trial-specific values.
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Movement parameters, calculated during realignment, can be including in the model 
as additional regressors to account for movement artefacts which are not corrected by 
realignment itself. Temporal confounds must also be eliminated from the data. Prior 
to fitting the model a high pass filter is applied to the data to eliminate drifts in the 
magnetic field and the effects of movement. A low pass filter is applied to eliminate 
the effects of biorhythms such as respiration or heart rate. The cut off of this filter is 
typically 128 seconds. Due to the serial acquisition of the fMRI data time-series 
successive time points will be correlated. To account for this temporal auto­
correlation an autoregressive model of order 1 + white noise is fitted to the data.
Figure 2.2 - A design matrix modelling the HRF for  7 conditions 
and realignment parameters
realignment psrameiete
The 13 parameters (often referred to simply as ‘betas’) for each voxel are then 
estimated by multiple linear regression so that the sum of the squared differences 
between the observed data and the values predicted by the model is minimised.
2.2.2.3 t and F-statistics
Inferences about the relative contribution of each explanatory variable (jc), each 
represented by one column in the design matrix, can be made by conducting T or F-
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tests on the parameter estimates. The null hypothesis that the parameter estimates are 
zero is tested by an F-statistic, resulting in an SPM(F). To compare the relative 
contribution of one explanatory variable compared to another one can contrast or 
subtract the parameter estimates from one another, and test whether the result is zero 
using a f-statistic, resulting in an SPM(f). The f-statistic is calculated by dividing the 
contrast of the parameter estimates by the standard error of that contrast. To make 
inferences about regionally specific effects the SPM(f) or SPM(F) is thresholded 
using height and spatial extent thresholds specified by the user.
2.2.2.4 Correction for multiple comparisons
When one has an anatomically constrained hypothesis about the effects of particular 
experimental conditions in a particular brain area, the uncorrected p-value associated 
with the magnitude of the t or F-statistic in that region can be used to test the 
hypothesis (Friston, 1997). However, if one does not have an a priori hypothesis, or 
if one has an anatomically open hypothesis (i.e. the null hypothesis that there is no 
effect anywhere in the brain) one must correct for multiple comparisons to avoid an 
excess of false positives. Gaussian Random Field theory provides a method of 
correcting the p-values for multiple comparisons while taking into account the fact 
that neighbouring voxels are not independent of one another, due to the anatomy of 
the brain (voxels in the same area are more likely to be activated together) and also 
due to the earlier spatial smoothing (Adler R.J., 1981;Friston et al., 1994b;Worsley et 
al., 1992;Worsley et al., 1996). Provided the data are sufficiently smooth the GRF 
correction will be less severe than a Bonferroni correction would be. Two 
assumptions underlie the use of the GRF correction. The error fields must be a 
reasonable lattice approximation to an underlying random field with a multivariate 
Gaussian distribution, which is ensured by smoothing, and these fields must be 
continuous, with a differentiable and invertible autocorrelation function. These 
assumptions are violated if the data is not smoothed or if the model is specified 
incorrectly such that the errors are not normally distributed.
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2.2,2,5 Random Effect Analysis
To draw inferences about fMRI data from a group of subjects that can be generalised 
to the population level one must conduct a Random Effects Analysis. A random 
effects analysis takes into account the variation in the activation effects from subject 
to subject. The term ‘random-effect’ indicates that the randomness of differential 
responses is taken into account by comparing the mean activation to the variability in 
activations from subject to subject. To conduct a random-effect analysis the contrasts 
of the parameter estimates from the ‘first-level’ analysis (described above) for each 
subject are entered into a ‘second-level’ analysis (the random-effect analysis). The 
second level design matrix can contain a single contrast (comparing the parameter 
estimates in different conditions) from each subject, and be used to conduct a simple 
t-test with the null hypothesis that the contrast is zero across subjects, i.e. there is no 
difference between conditions. Alternatively, more than one observation (one for 
each condition of interest) can be entered per subject into the second level design 
matrix and a repeated measures ANOVA can be conducted to compared conditions 
across subjects. In this way a single ANOVA can be used to test all contrasts of 
interest. In both cases the error variance is calculated using the subject to subject 
variability of the contrasts from the first level.
2.3 Retinotopic Mapping
To identify the boundaries of primary visual cortex (VI) and extrastriate retinotopic 
cortex (V2 and V3), I used standard retinotopic mapping procedures (Teo et al.,
1997). Checkerboard patterns, flickering at 8 Hz, covering either the horizontal or 
vertical meridian were alternated with rest periods for 16 periods of 20.8 s over a 
scanning run lasting 165 volumes.
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Figure 2.3 - Stimuli: horizontal (HM) and vertical (VM) meridians
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2.3.1 Imaging
A 3T Siemens ALLEGRA system was used to acquire gradient-echo echo-planar 
T2*-weighted images with blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) contrast. 
Each volume consisted of 32 2mm axial slices with in-plane resolution of 3x3mm, 
with a 1mm gap between slices, positioned to cover the occipital lobe with a 
repetition time (TR) of 2.08s. Imaging was performed in three scanning runs of 165 
volumes each. In each scanning run, five image volumes preceding presentation of 
the experimental conditions were discarded to allow for Tl equilibration effects. A 
Tl-weighted anatomical scan was also obtained for each subject
2.3.2 Segmentaion and Flattening
I used the segmentation software MrGray (Teo et al., 1997;Wandell et al., 2000) on 
each subject’s structural scan to identify the grey matter in the visual cortex, and find 
a surface at the boundary between the grey and white matter.
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Figure 2 .4 -  Segmentation o f occipital cortex in MrGray
MRGiay - le s t
te s t  (S ag itta l)
View Window Help
File Classification Overlays 3D
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£te Lining ijigHSgb* View Window Help
Sagittal view o f occipital cortex 3D visualisation of
Green = grey matte, Purple = white matter grey matter in occipital cortex
The cortical surface of the grey matter is then flattened using an unfolding tool, 
MrFlatMesh (by Alex Wade) (Wandell et al., 2000).
2.3.3 Statistical analysis
Data were analyzed with Statistical Parametric Mapping software (SPM2; Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The initial five 
volumes were discarded, and subsequent image volumes were then realigned and co­
registered to each subject’s structural scan (Friston et al., 1995). Voxels activated by 
the meridians were identified with a statistical model that comprised two delayed 
boxcar waveforms for each scanning run. These represented the mean activity 
evoked by the two meridian localizers: the vertical and horizontal meridians. High- 
pass filtering removed low- frequency drifts in signal, and global changes were 
removed by proportional scaling. Each component of the model served as a regressor 
in a multiple regression analysis, used to generate parameter estimates for each 
regressor at every voxel.
The functional data from each subject is then overlaid on the flat map of their visual 
cortex created by segmentation and cortical flattening (see above). Mask volumes for 
subregions (left and right, dorsal and ventral) o f each region of interest (VI, V2, and
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V3) were obtained by delineating the borders between visual areas with activation 
patterns from the meridian localizers.
Figure 2.5 -  Delineation o f  borders o f visual areas VI, V2 and VS
Meridians overlaid on a fla t map 
with visual areas delineated
VI, V2 and VS overlaid on SD 
visualisation o f grey matter
red = horizontal, green = vertical meridian red = VI, green = V2, blue = VS
These mask volumes could then be used to extract the regression parameter estimates 
generated by the analysis of the main experimental fRMI data from retinotopic visual 
cortex for each sub-region (left and right, dorsal and ventral) of the regions of 
interest (VI, V2, and V3) in each subject. The parameter estimates can then be 
analysed using t-tests to compare neural responses in each visual region of interest 
between conditions, across subjects.
2.4 Localisation of V5/MT
To identify V5/MT, I used a standard motion localizer, consisting of randomly 
moving low-contrast dots (moving at 47s) alternating with static dots for 16 periods 
of 20.8 s over a scanning run lasting 165 volumes (Dumoulin et al., 2000).
2.4.1 Imaging
A 3T Siemens ALLEGRA system was used to acquire gradient-echo echo-planar 
T2*- weighted images with BOLD contrast. Each wlume consisted of 32 2 mm axial
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slices with in-plane resolution of 3 _ 3 mm, with a 1 mm gap between slices, 
positioned to cover the temporo-occipital cortex with a TR of 2.08 s. Imaging was 
performed in a scanning run of 165 volumes. Five image volumes preceding 
presentation of the experimental conditions were discarded to allow for Tl 
equilibration effects.
2.4.2 Statistical analysis
Data were analyzed with SPM2. The initial five volumes were discarded, and 
subsequent image volumes were then realigned and co-registered to each subject’s 
structural scan (Friston et al., 1995). Voxels activated during the localiser were 
identified with a statistical model that comprised a delayed boxcar waveform. This 
represented the mean activity evoked by the motion condition. High-pass filtering 
removed low- frequency drifts in signal, and global changes were removed by 
proportional scaling. Each component of the model served as a regressor in a 
multiple regression analysis, used to generate parameter estimates for each regressor 
at every voxel.
The peak voxels activated by the motion localizer (revealed by the contrast moving 
dots -  static dots) in each hemisphere were identified for each subject. The 
regression parameter estimates generated by the analysis of the main experimental 
fMRI data at these voxels could then be extracted for each subject. The parameter 
estimates can then be analysed using t-tests to compare neural responses in V5/MT 
between conditions, across subjects.
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CHAPTER 3: ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY METHODS
In 1929 Hans Berger, a German physician, discovered that patterns of electrical 
activity could be recorded from the surface of the scalp (Berger, 1929). He recorded 
a rhythmic pattern of electrical oscillation using a primitive galvanometer with a 
surface electrode placed on his son’s scalp. This electrical activity at the scalp 
surface, known as the electro-encephalogram (EEG) is produced by electrical activity 
in neural cell assemblies.
The main advantage of EEG over fMRI is its high temporal resolution, which is in 
the order of milliseconds. The main disadvantage of EEG compared with fMRI is its 
poor spatial resolution. It is not possible to specify the exact location of the neural 
generators that give rise to EEG without the use of other sources of information as 
constraints, because there is no unique solution to the ‘inverse problem’, (see Source 
Localisation below for details).
3.1 Electrophysiological basis of EEG
The electrical currents recorded at the scalp are thought to mainly reflect excitatory 
post-synaptic potentials (EPSPs) generated in the apical dendrites of pyramidal cells 
(Allison et al., 1986). Currents associated with EPSPs are thought to be the source of 
most of the signals detected by EEG, rather than action potentials, because they last 
much longer than action potentials (Nunez, 1981).
When pyramidal neurons receive synaptic input from another neuron, excitatory 
post-synaptic potentials (EPSPs) are generated in their apical dendrites. The post- 
synaptic membrane becomes transiently depolarised. This causes an intracellular 
current to flow from the non-excited parts of the neuron to the depolarised apical 
dendritic tree (Gloor, 1985). The current loop is closed by extracellular currents 
flowing in the opposite direction through the extracellular matrix. The intracellular 
currents are known as the primary currents, and the extracellular currents are known 
as secondary, return, or volume currents. Both primary and secondary currents 
contribute to electric scalp potentials.
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Figure 3.1 -  Electrophysiological basis o f  EEG signal
a)Excitatory postsynaptic potentials (EPSPs) in the apical dendritic tree o f a 
pyramidal cell causes an intracellular current to flow from the non-excited parts o f 
the neuron to the apical dendritic tree within the dendritic trunk (primary current in 
blue. The current loop is closed by extracellular currents flowing through the 
extracellular matrix (secondary currents in red), b) Synchronous activation o f large 
assemblies o f cortical pyramidal nerve cells oriented parallel to one another and 
perpendicular to the local cortical surface are believed to be the main generators o f 
recordable EEG signals, c) The EEG recorded at the scalp reflects activity from 
many such pyramidal cell assemblies in multiple brain regions. 
(Illustration from (Baillet et al., 2001))
The current from a single cell will be undetectable at the scalp surface, but a group of 
neurons can produce an externally observable electrical potential if 3 conditions are 
met (Kutas and Dale, 1997):
1) The average distribution of currents flowing in and out of the neurons within the 
neurons in the patch is not radially symmetrical
2) The neurons are aligned in some systematic fashion.
3) The neurons are activated in a synchronised fashion.
Meeting these three conditions ensures that the arrangement of the neurons is such 
that the currents from each neuron can be summed without cancelling each other out. 
Neural configurations that meet these 3 conditions give rise to ‘open’ electric fields 
which can be observed and recorded externally (Wood, 1987).
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Figure 3 . 2 -  Open field configuration
4 " 4 " 4 -
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Neurons which are non-radially symmetric, spatially aligned and synchronously 
activated have dipoles that add up to produce externally observable electric 
potentials, e.g. neocorticalpyramidal cells (adapted from (Kutas and Dale, 1997))
When these three conditions are not met the configuration of the neurons is such that 
the electric potentials from the individual neurons cancel each other out. (See Figure
3.3 for example of such ‘closed’ field configurations). As electrical activity in closed 
fields sums to zero, such fields can not be measured at the surface and do not 
contribute to the scalp recorded EEG. Only open field configurations contribute to
Neurons which are radially symmetric, randomly oriented, or asynchronously 
activated do not produce externally observable electric potentials 
(adapted from (Kutas and Dale, 1997))
Assemblies of pyramidal cells in the neocortex satisfy all the requirements for 
generating an ‘open’ field. The neocortical pyramidal cells are organised into large
the EEG.
Figure 3 .3 - Closed-field configurations
radially symmetric neurons randomly oriented neurons asynchronously activated neurons
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assemblies of tens of thousands of neurons with their dendrites oriented parallel to 
one another and perpendicular to the local cortical surface. The potential produced by 
a single cortical pyramidal neuron is quite weak, but when these large assemblies of 
parallel pyramidal neurons are synchronously activated the net current flow can be 
detected even at a considerable distance. Such synchronous activation of these large 
pyramidal neuron assemblies is believed to be the main source of the EEG signals 
recorded at the scalp (Nunez and Silberstein, 2000). The scalp EEG reflects activity 
from many such pyramidal cell assemblies in multiple brain regions.
As well as depending on the properties and organisation of the neurons themselves, 
the amplitude of the electric field measured at the scalp is influenced by conductive 
properties of the intermediate tissues between the neurons and the scalp (e.g. neural 
tissue, blood, bone, skin). The tissues act as low-pass filters causing the field current 
to diminish with increasing distance from the neural source, and to be visible over 
broad areas of the scalp.
3.2 Measuring the EEG
The EEG consists of measurements of a set of electric potential differences between 
pairs of scalp electrodes. Electrodes are usually evenly distributed over the scalp and 
positioned in standard scalp locations to allow comparison across different EEG 
experiments. The sensors can either be directly glued to the skin at selected locations 
or fitted in an elasticated cap for rapid attachment with near uniform coverage of the 
scalp. For recording EEG from infants in the experiments described in this thesis (see 
Chapters 9 and 10) I used an elasticated Geodesic electrode cap, with 64 sponge 
electrodes, as rapid placement of the electrodes is necessary to minimise the risk of 
upsetting the infant (see Figure 3.4).
Typically the signal at each electrode is measured and recorded relative to a 
‘reference’ electrode to which all other electrodes are connected. The resulting 
measurement is the difference in voltage between each individual electrode and the 
reference. The reference can be another electrode, placed so that it records 
background noise but not the electrical activity of experimental interest coming from 
the brain (Coles and Rugg, 1995). For example the reference electrode can be placed
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on the mastoid bone. Alternatively, the reference can be a ‘virtual reference’. The 
average of the signal from all the recording electrodes can be used as a reference 
(average reference derivations) or the weighted average of the electrodes around the 
site of interest can be used as the reference (source derivation). The recorded signals 
depend on the positions of the individual electrodes, and the nature and location of 
the reference site.
The EEG signal is initially recorded as a continuous analogue signal but is then 
amplified and converted to a digital signal, by sampling at discrete time intervals.
The rate of conversion, i.e. the number of samples per second, determines the 
temporal resolution of the EEG.
3.3 Noise removal
As well as detecting field potentials from the brain, the electrodes also detect 
electrical activity from surrounding electrical equipment, such as the display monitor 
and the recording equipment. This background noise is generally greater than the
Figure 3.4 -Infant wearing an elasticated electrode cap with 64 electrodes
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electrical activity at the scalp and thus must be removed from the EEG recording. 
This is achieved by using a ground and differential amplifiers which cancel out any 
activity common to all scalp electrodes.
In addition, the analogue signal is filtered during amplification in order to further 
remove background noise, which can derive from surrounding electrical activity. 
Frequencies that are unlikely to be related to brain activity are removed. High 
frequencies, attributable to muscle activity, that may cause aliasing are removed, as 
are low frequencies (such as slow changes in the baseline) that might cause the 
amplified signal to exceed the amplitude range of, and therefore block, the analogue - 
to-digital converter (Picton et al., 2000).
3.4 Artefact detection
Artefacts, such as baseline drift, muscular activity and eye movements, that survive 
filtering can be detected and removed from the EEG signal. Artefacts relating to eye- 
movements and blinks can be monitored and removed by recording the electro­
oculogram (EOG), at the same time as the EEG, and rejecting any trials in which the 
EOG is above a certain threshold (Croft and Barry, 2000). Other artefacts can also be 
removed by rejecting any trials when the EEG exceeds a certain pre-specified 
threshold, which indicates excessive muscle activity or channel drift. The threshold 
used for artefact detection when studying infants is less stringent than when 
recording the EEG from adults, as one can not instruct infants to remain still, and it is 
hard to hold them completely still. Thus, if the threshold for detecting movement 
artefacts was as low as for adults, too many trials would be rejected. Thus data 
retained from infant EEG recordings is noisier than that retained from adult EEG 
data.
3.5 Event-Related Potentials
Event-related potentials (ERPs) are discrete epochs of the EEG wave form which are 
time-locked to a specific event. Since the evoked event-related potentials in response 
to a single stimulus at the scalp are quite small (5-10 microV) relative to the 
background activity (even after filtering and artefact detection), the ERPs epochs
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must be extracted from background EEG and averaged together over trials to 
increase the signal to noise ratio (Kutas and Dale, 1997). Three assumptions underlie 
the use of averaging (Glaser and Ruchkin, 1976):
1) the signal and noise must linearly sum to produce the EEG
2) the background noise must be random and equal across all trials
3) the signal must remain constant over time and across repeated trials of the 
same type
If these conditions are met then averaging enhances the signal and reduces what is 
random noise to nearly zero, thus improving the signal to noise ratio by a factor 
proportional to the square root of the number of trials (Picton et al., 1995).
Not all noise can be removed by averaging. Any artefacts that are time-locked to the 
stimulus event will overlap and summate when averaged, rather than cancel out, and 
will contaminate the ERP. Artefacts that produce very large signals in a few trials are 
also a problem, as for averaging to successfully increase signal to noise ratio the 
background noise must be similar from trial to trial (Picton et al., 1995). This is why 
filtering and artefact detection are carried out prior to averaging. Prior to comparing 
conditions the ERPs are baseline corrected so that the waveform amplitude for each 
condition is quantified relative to a pre-stimulus baseline.
3.6 Interpretation of ERPs
ERPs provide information regarding the time course, frequency, strength, and scalp 
distribution of neural activity associated with that specific event. It is generally 
assumed that the activity represented by the ERP is associated with specific cognitive 
processing, and that differences in the ERP between conditions reflect differences in 
cognitive processing between conditions (Otten and Rugg, 2004). ERP waveforms 
can be analysed in terms of their magnitude or in terms of their topography. Thus 
differences in ERP between experimental conditions fall into two main categories: 
quantitative and qualitative differences. Qualitative differences between conditions 
are usually taken as evidence that different cognitive processes are engaged in the 
different conditions, whereas quantitative differences are taken as evidence of 
differential engagement of the same cognitive process between conditions.
70
Quantitative effects consist of differences in the magnitude of the ERP waveform 
(i.e. the amplitude measured with respect to the pre-stimulus baseline) between 
conditions (but not differences in the distribution of the ERP across the scalp). The 
amplitude of the ERP waveforms in different conditions are compared either at a 
specific time point and electrode site, or the mean amplitude of the waveform can be 
calculated across a number of time points and/or electrode sites and then compared 
across conditions using t-tests or ANOVAs. A difference in the amplitude of an ERP 
signal between two conditions is generally presumed to reflect a difference in the 
level of activity in the same underlying neural generators between the two 
conditions, due to differences in the number of activated cells or differences in the 
level of synchrony between neurons. But a difference in amplitude could also appear 
if the strength of the signal is the same across conditions but the proportion of trials 
in which the signal occurs differs between conditions. In this case the averaged ERP 
reflects the probability that a particular cognitive process is engaged in different 
conditions, rather than the degree of engagement. A third possibility is that in one 
condition there might be greater variability in the latency of the response from trial to 
trial, which would give rise to an average ERP with a lower amplitude and a longer 
duration.
Qualitative effects consist of differences in the distribution of ERP waveforms over 
the scalp. The distribution of ERPs can be represented by topographic maps, which 
plot the EEG amplitude at each recording site at each time point. Data between 
electrode sites is interpolated. These topographic maps can be used to highlight any 
differences in the scalp distribution of ERPs between conditions. Such differences 
are thought to reflect changes in the configuration of neural generators activated 
between conditions. In other words differences in scalp distribution imply that the 
patterns of neural activity generating the ERPs differ between conditions. The 
differences could simply reflect the involvement of a different combination of neural 
generators in the different conditions, or differences in the relative contributions of 
the same set of neural generators (Otten and Rugg, 2004).
The advantage of EEG over fMRI is its high temporal resolution. Information about 
the timing of a cognitive process can be inferred from the latency of the
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corresponding ERP effect. The time at which ERP waveforms begin to differ 
between conditions can be used to infer the time by which the cognitive process that 
differentiates between the two conditions began. For example if the ERPs of two 
conditions start to differ 250ms after the stimulus onset, this means that the cognitive 
process distinguishing the two conditions began to differ by 250ms (Otten and Rugg, 
2004). Differences in scalp distributions of ERPs o\er time imply that different 
underlying neural sources are engaged over time, or that the contributions of the 
same set of underlying neural generators changes over time, and therefore that 
different cognitive processes are engaged over time. Note that the onset of an effect 
does not necessarily indicate the actual time at which a cognitive process was 
engaged, as it is possible that neural activity differed before this time but that the 
EEG was not immediately sensitive to the effect (see below for possible reasons).
The onset latency of an ERP effect merely represents an upper limit to the start of a 
cognitive process.
Significant differences in ERPs across conditions provide evidence of differences in 
cognitive processing between conditions, but strong conclusions cannot be drawn on 
the basis of a null result. A lack of difference in amplitude or scalp distribution 
between conditions does not mean there is no difference in cognitive processing 
between conditions for a number of reasons (Otten and Rugg, 2004). Firstly it is 
possible that the potential differences between conditions are too small to be detected 
at the scalp. The experiment may not have enough statistical power to bring out a 
small difference even when one exists. Secondly, the ERPs may not have been 
quantified or analysed in the best way. Lastly, only electrical activity from neurons 
with open field configurations can be measured at the scalp. Differences in cognitive 
processing that lead to changes in electrical activity in neurons with closed field 
configurations will never be detectable using EEG (Wood, 1987), but this does not 
mean that these differences do not exist.
3.7 Source localisation
The main disadvantage of EEG compared with fMRI is its poor spatial resolution. It 
is not possible to specify the exact location of the neural generators that give rise to 
EEG without the use of other constraining sources of information, because there is
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no unique solution to the ‘inverse problem’ of determining the locations, orientations 
and time-courses of the neural sources underlying the EEG signals recorded at the 
scalp (Kutas and Dale, 1997). The problem is that there is an infinite number of 
possible neuronal source combinations within the brain that can give rise to any 
particular pattern of EEG signals (Nunez, 1981). For this problem to be solved 
additional constraints must be placed on the solution.
One approach for solving the inverse problem is to model the generators of the EEG 
signal as a number of “equivalent current dipoles”, each representing activity in a 
particular brain area (Kutas and Dale, 1997). The precise anatomical locations, 
orientations, and strengths of the equivalent current dipoles can then be estimated 
iteratively using least-squares method to minimse the difference between the 
observed EEG recording and the predicted recording (Oostendorp and van Oosterom, 
1989). The parameters of the equivalent current dipoles can be constrained on the 
basis of information from neurosphysiological studies, neuroimaging studies, and 
neurological studies. In practice this method cannot be used to localise more than a 
few dipoles (Kutas and Dale, 1997). An additional problem is that it is impossible to 
know exactly how many dipoles to include in the model a priori.
An alternative approach is to model the neural generators as a continuous dipole 
distribution (Kutas and Dale, 1997). On the basis that most of the recordable EEG 
signal is generated by cortical pyramidal cells, this approach limits the dipole 
distribution to the cortical grey matter and assumes that the dipoles are oriented 
perpendicularly to the cortical sheet. This reduces the inverse problem to estimating 
the dipole strength over the folded cortical surface. However, the number of dipole 
patches need to represent the cortical surface is far greater than the number of 
electrodes used, even at the highest levels of spatial sampling, so multiple solutions 
can still be generated for the same EEG data. This problem is often dealt with by 
choosing the ‘weighted minimum-norm solution’ (Dale and Sereno, 1993;Smith et 
al., 1990), but there is no guarantee that this approach will produce the correct 
solution. Therefore, additional constraints based on biological information must be 
incorporated into the model (Dale and Sereno, 1993). A potentially useful source of 
such constraints is functional magnetic resonance imaging, which provides 
information about brain activity with a high spatial resolution.
73
3.8 Habituation paradigms
In Chapters 9 and 10 of this thesis I have used a habituation paradigm to examine 
whether the same neural representations are accessed by phonetic stimuli presented 
in different modalities. Habituation paradigms are based on a phenomenon known as 
repetition suppression. Repetition of a stimulus leads to decreased activity within the 
neural networks representing that stimulus, in both auditory (Miller et al., 1991) and 
visual (Ulanovsky et al., 2003) cortices. Scalp potentials evoked by a stimulus and 
measured with EEG also show decreased amplitude with repetition (Woods and 
Elmasian, 1986). This response habituation with repetition is abolished by 
presentation of a new or deviant stimulus, due to activation of new set of neurons by 
the deviant stimulus. Thus trials where a stimulus is repeated elicit a smaller 
response compared to when the stimulus changes. By manipulating what stimulus 
changes elicit a difference in the brain response (the ERP), it is possible to infer what 
counts as a ‘repetition’ for a particular neural network and thus the nature of the 
representation computed by the network. For example, a network encoding a 
phonetic representation should habituate to repetition of a phoneme irrespective of 
the speaker, and should show renewed activity to a phonetic change only. In infants 
the neuronal response to auditory phonetic stimuli decreases with repetition, even 
when different speakers are used, and presentation of anew phoneme restores the 
amplitude of the ERP (Dehaene-Lambertz and Baillet, 1998;Dehaene-Lambertz and 
Dehaene, 1994;Dehaene-Lambertz and Pena, 2001;Woods and Elmasian, 1986). This 
demonstrates that infants have a neural network dedicated to phonetic processing, 
that normalises across acoustical differences in the stimuli. In Chapters 9 and 10,1 
use a similar habituation paradigm to examine whether infants have a neural network 
that represents phonetic information across modalities, i.e. a network that is activated 
by both visual articulations and auditory speech.
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CHAPTER 4: TWO DISTINCT NEURAL EFFECTS OF BLINKING ON 
HUMAN VISUAL PROCESSING
4.1 Introduction
It has been proposed that animals use an efference copy (von Holst, 1954) of their 
motor commands sent from the motor areas controlling the actions, in parallel with 
the motor signals, to predict the sensory consequences of their actions. On the basis 
of this efference copy, a prediction of the sensory consequences of the action is 
generated by an internal forward model (Wolpert and Miall, 1996). This sensory 
prediction is known as a corollary discharge (Sperry, 1950). As initially proposed in 
the context of eye movements (Helmholtz, 1867;Sperry, 1950;von Holst, 1954), the 
sensory prediction, or corollary discharge, generated by the forward model can be 
used to cancel self-produced sensory stimulation.
Such a mechanism appears to operate during blinking. Humans blink every few 
seconds, yet remarkably these pronounced interruptions to visual input are rarely 
noticed. In contrast external darkenings of the visual field that have a similar 
duration and magnitude as the interruption to visual input caused by a blink are 
immediately apparent (Volkmann et al., 1980). During blinks neither the eyelid 
sweeping across the pupil nor the transient changes in brightness that occur at the 
beginning or end of the blink are usually perceived. Moreover, visual experience 
remains constant across the significant gap in visual input that results from eyelid 
closure. In this chapter, I will investigate the neural basis of these phenomena.
Both voluntary and spontaneous blinks have highly stereotyped kinematics. Each 
blink lasts between 200-400ms with the pupil being fully occluded by the eyelid for 
100-150ms (Riggs et al., 1981;Tsubota et al., 1996;VanderWerf et al.,
2003;Volkmann et al., 1980), causing a reduction in retinal illumination of 
approximately 2 log units (Volkmann et al., 1980). In addition to this loss of visual 
input, visual sensitivity is actively reduced during voluntary and involuntary eye- 
blinks, an effect known as blink suppression (Manning et al., 1983;Riggs et al.,
1981;Volkmann et al., 1980;Volkmann et al., 1982;Volkmann, 1986). Blink 
suppression mainly affects sensitivity to low spatial frequency visual stimuli (Ridder
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and Tomlinson, 1993) and reaches a maximum 30-40 ms before the eyelid begins to 
cover the pupil (Manning et al., 1983;Volkmann, 1986). It has been proposed that 
blink suppression may represent a neural mechanism associated with the blink motor 
command that has evolved to minimise the percept of the eyelid occluding the pupil 
(a low spatial frequency stimulus) and the transient changes in illumination that 
occur during the blink (Volkmann, 1986). The existence of blink suppression 
therefore implies an underlying neural mechanism by which blinks influence 
processing of visual stimulation. The behavioural phenomenon of blink suppression 
may be mediated by suppression of the neural response to visual stimulation. Thus 
any brain area whose activity reflects blink suppression should show a reduced 
response to visual stimulation when the subject is blinking, compared with the 
normal response to visual stimulation in the absence of blinks. Moreover, such 
response suppression to visual stimulation during blinks should be greater than the 
reduction in activity caused by the loss of visual input that results from eyelid 
closure. However the existence and neural manifestations of any mechanism 
mediating blink suppression associated with human blinking remain largely 
uninvestigated. Previous studies of blinking in humans have primarily investigated 
oculomotor control of blinking (Bodis-Wollner et al., 1999;Kato and Miyauchi, 
2003a;Schmidt et al., 2003;Tsubota et al., 1999).
Though blink suppression may account for the ability of eyelid closure to pass 
unnoticed it cannot account for the continuity of visual perception across the 
prolonged interruption to visual input caused by eyelid closure. Such phenomenal 
continuity across blinks suggests the existence of a short-term mnemonic signal 
associated with the blink motor command that maintains the previous percept across 
the loss of visual input caused by the blink, thus ensuring an uninterrupted visual 
experience. In contrast to the predicted effects of blink suppression, any brain area 
whose activity reflects a mnemonic signal involved in the maintenance of continuity 
across blinks should show the opposite pattern of responses. Specifically, activity 
evoked in such regions by blinking, should be greater when visual stimulation is 
present, compared with blinking in the absence of visual stimulation, as a greater 
neural effort may be required to maintain continuity across the interruption caused by 
a blink when the background level of visual stimulation is high. Such a response 
profile has been observed in the posterior parietal cortex adjacent to the parieto­
76
occipital sulcus using MEG (Hari et al., 1994). Blinking evoked magnetic signals in 
this region in the presence of a visual stimulus, but not in darkness.
Here, I sought to investigate the neural underpinnings of these two complementary 
behavioural effects of blink suppression and visual continuity in humans. Using 
functional MRI (fMRI), I investigated how the presence (versus absence) of 
voluntary blinking affects the cortical responses to the presence (versus absence) of 
visual stimulation. By manipulating these two factors independently, and examining 
the interactions between them, I investigated whether any brain areas showed the 
response profiles predicted from the consideration of blink continuity and blink 
suppression outlined above. One problem in interpreting cortical responses to visual 
stimulation during blinking is that any changes in brain activity evoked by an extra- 
retinal signal associated with the blink motor command are potentially confounded 
by the reduction in retinal illumination resulting from pupillary occlusion. In order to 
circumvent this problem, I created a control condition in which I dynamically 
generated external darkenings of the visual scene. These precisely matched the 
timing and duration of the interruptions to visual stimulation caused by each 
subject’s own voluntary blinks, which were recorded online. Each individual blink 
was matched by its own individual darkening. As changes in visual input were 
matched in the two conditions, any differences between the two conditions must 
reflect the presence of an extra-retinal signal associated with blinking and thus can be 
used to interpret the predicted interactions between blinking and visual stimulation 
outlined above. Specifically, areas mediating blink suppression should show a 
reduction in activity during blinks greater than any reduction in activity caused 
simply by the reduction in visual input as modelled by the darkening condition. In 
contrast areas mediating visual continuity should show greater activation during 
blinking than external darkenings, as during an external darkening there is no motor 
command, so an extra-retinal mnemonic signal associated with the blink motor 
command can not be produced.
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4.2 Materials and Methods
4.2.1 Subjects
Fourteen normal volunteers (8 male and 6 female, aged 1 8 -3 7 , mean 25, SD 4.9) 
gave written informed consent to participate in the study, which was approved by the 
Institute of Neurology and National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery Joint 
Ethics Committee.
4.2.2 Paradigm
Visual stimuli were presented on a small screen viewed by a mirror mounted on the 
head coil. During scanning, participants were asked to fixate on a small central grey 
cross that was presented on a black background. A blocked design was used with two 
factors manipulated independently: i) the presence (or absence) of voluntary 
blinking, and ii) the presence (or absence) of visual stimulation. The use of voluntary 
blinks allowed us to use a blocked design, which provides much greater power and 
sensitivity for this study than would an event-related design using spontaneous 
blinks. Moreover, blink suppression in humans has primarily been examined during 
voluntary blinks (Volkmann et al., 1980;Volkmann, 1986), and the psychophysical 
characteristics of blink suppression are virtually identical for all types of blink. 
Indeed, the same neural mechanism is believed to operate during both spontaneous 
and voluntary blinks (Manning et al., 1983;Volkmann, 1986). Prior to the start of 
each block, a visual cue indicated whether the impending block would require the 
subjects to blink, or merely maintain fixation. During ‘blink’ blocks, participants 
were required to blink binocularly at a fast regular rate. During ‘steady fixation’ 
blocks, subjects were simply required to maintain fixation, and were allowed to blink 
but asked to keep blinking to a minimum. Subjects were specifically instructed not to 
forcefully keep their eyes open, so that they did not inhibit spontaneous blinking. 
Independently of this factor, during some blocks a strong visual stimulus was 
presetted. This consisted of a high-contrast black (1 cd/m2) and grey (100 cd/m2) 
checkerboard subtending 10 degrees of visual angle contrast-reversing at 7.5 Hz on a 
black background. Though the relative phase of the cycle at the onset of each blink 
or darkening may affect the response of individual neurons this will not affect my
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results as the BOLD signal is a population response measure. The central 2.5 degrees 
of the checkerboard were blacked-out. All blocks lasted for 26 seconds. During the 
remaining blocks a small grey (100 cd/nf) fixation cross on a black background was 
presented. Throughout the experiment, background illumination in the scanner bore 
was 0.14 cd/nf.
During scanning, pupil diameter and eyelid position were monitored continually, 
using an ASL Eye-Tracking System (Applied Science Laboratories, Bedford) with 
remote optics (Model 504, sampling rate = 60 Hz, spatial error < 1° ) that was 
custom-adapted for use in the scanner. An on-line algorithm was used to identify the 
onset and offset of each blink during the ‘voluntary blink’ blocks. This information 
was used, on-line, dynamically to create a fifth ‘external darkening’ condition 
consisting of darkenings yoked to the subject’s own blinks in the previous blinking 
block. In this condition, subjects were cued to maintain steady fixation and the same 
high-contrast reversing checkerboard as described above was presented. However, 
during a block, the checkerboard disappeared and reappeared, resulting in a 
darkening, with a time course that was determined by the blink onsets and offsets 
recorded from the immediately preceding ‘voluntary blink during visual stimulation’ 
block. Thus each individual blink was modelled by its own individual darkening. 
Eyelid closure causes a reduction in the luminance of visual stimulation reaching the 
retina of 1.8 - 2 log units (Volkmann et al., 1980) so the luminance levels of the 
checkerboard and the black screen were calibrated to mimic this reduction during the 
darkenings. This ‘external darkening’ condition thus attempted to match the pattern 
of retinal stimulation during the previous ‘blinking with visual stimulation’ block, 
but in the absence of voluntary blinks. The experiment thus consisted of five 
conditions constituting a 2 x 2 factorial design plus a 5th control condition. Note that 
it is not possible to create a fully factorial design with external darkenings as a 





Voluntary Blinking BV BN
No Voluntary Blinking FV FN
External Darkenings DV
BV = Voluntary blinking during visual stimulation
FV = Fixation with no voluntary blinking during visual stimulation
BN = Voluntary blinking without visual stimulation
FN = Fixation with no voluntary blinking and no visual stimulation
DV = External darkenings during visual stimulation (control condition)
Conditions BV, FV, DV and BN were presented twice per scanning run; with 
condition FN presented four times, to allow subjects to rest their eyes. The order of 
conditions was randomly generated at the start of each session, with the restriction 
that each “darkening” block had to be preceded by a “blinking during checkerboard 
stimulation” block.
Retinotopic mapping was not conducted in this exploratory study because my 
intention was to carry out a random-effects analysis of the interaction between 
blinking and visual stimulation and of the differences between external darkenings 
and blinking over the whole cortex Indeed, the planned statistical comparisons 
examining the interaction between blinking and visual stimulation (see Introduction 
and Results) did not reveal any significant activation in the medial occipital cortex, 
for example along the calcarine sulcus, where most retinotopic areas are located.
4.2.3 Functional imaging
A 3T Siemens ALLEGRA system (Siemens, Erlangen) was used to acquire gradient- 
echo echo-planar T2* weighted images with Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent 
(BOLD) contrast. (See Chapter 2: fRMI Methods for details of BOLD signal 
detection). Each volume consisted of forty 2 mm axial slices with in-plane resolution 
of 3x3 mm, with a 1mm gap between slices, positioned to cover the whole cortex
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with a TR of 2.6 seconds. Imaging was performed in three scanning runs of 150 
volumes each. In each scanning run, six image volumes preceding presentation of the 
experimental conditions were discarded to allow for magnetic saturation effects. 
Finally, a T1 -weighted anatomical image was acquired from each subject.
4.2.4 Statistical Analysis
Data were analysed using Statistical Parametric Mapping software (SPM2;
Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The 
initial six volumes were discarded, and subsequent image volumes then realigned 
(Friston et al., 1995), spatially normalised (Ashbumer and Friston, 1999) to the 
standard space defined by the Montreal Neurological Institute template (Mazziotta et 
al., 1995) and smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 6 mm full-width half maximum, 
(see Chapter 2: fMRI Methods for details of realignment, normalisation and 
smoothing). Voxels activated during the experiment were identified using a statistical 
model that comprised five delayed boxcar waveforms for each scanning run. These 
represented the mean activity evoked in the five experimental conditions. High-pass 
filtering (cut-off 128 s) removed low-frequency drifts in signal, and global changes 
were removed by proportional scaling. Each component of the model served as a 
regressor in a multiple regression analysis. (See Chapter 2: fMRI Methods for details 
of statistical analysis). The resulting parameter estimates for each regressor at each 
voxel were then entered into a second level analysis where subject served as a 
random effect in a within-subjects ANOVA. The main effects and interactions 
between conditions were then specified by appropriately weighted linear contrasts 
and determined using the t-statistic on a voxel-by-voxel basis. A statistical threshold 
of p<0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons across the entire cortex, was used 
except for regions that were hypothesized a priori, where a threshold of p<0.001, 
uncorrected for multiple comparisons was used. Regions where I had a prior 
hypothesis of finding blink-related signal modification included the occipital lobe up 
to the parieto-occipital sulcus, as the occipital lobe is involved in visual processing, 
and thus if blinking affects visual processing I would expect to see changes in 
activity in this region. I also expected to find activation in oculomotor regions, 
including the frontal eye-fields (FEF) and supplementary eye-fields (SEF), as these 
regions are known to be involved in blink motor control and have been activated by
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Subjects blinked at a significantly greater rate during voluntary-blinking blocks 
compared with blocks with no voluntary-blinking (137.0 / minute versus 8.0 / 
minute; t(13) = 8.48, PO.OOl). Thus, subjects were able to comply with my 
behavioural instructions. There was no significant difference in blinking rate for the 
voluntary blinking or no voluntary blinking conditions between visual stimulation 
blocks compared with no visual stimulation blocks (comparing blinking with and 
without visual stimulation, p = 0.10; comparing no blinking with and without visual 
stimulation, p = 0.81).
4.3.2 Main effect of voluntary blinking
Comparison of the two conditions during which subjects blinked voluntarily, versus 
the two conditions where subjects did not, identified those loci where activity was 
significantly greater during voluntary blinking compared with fixation, (i.e. the 
comparison {BV+BN}-{FV+FN}, see Methods-Paradigm above). By revealing 
which brain structures are activated by voluntary blinking per se, this comparison 
provides an important replication of previous studies that have investigated the 
oculomotor control of blinking, as well as providing new information about any 
responses in visual cortex to voluntary blinks.
This comparison revealed activation of the pre-central gyrus, superior pre-central 
sulcus (corresponding to the frontal eye fields, FEF), and the superior frontal gyrus 
(corresponding to the supplementary eye fields, SEF) and parts of the cerebellum 
(see Table 4.1 for full listing of loci). These activated loci are consistent with those 
previously described for the motor control of blinks (Bodis-Wollner et al., 1999;Kato 
and Miyauchi, 2003a;Kato and Miyauchi, 2003b;Paus, 1996). In addition the 
cingulate gyrus adjacent to the SEF, the precentral sulcus, the lateral fissure, 
posterior lateral orbital gyrus, putamen, and inferior frontal gyrus were also 
activated. More posteriorly, widespread activation of occipital and parieto-occipital 
cortex was identified (displayed in Figure 4.1). This included superior occipital
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gyrus, the precuneus and cuneus, the anterior calcarine sulcus (i.e. VI) and the 
parieto-occipital fissure. Thus, the presence of voluntary blinks leads to activation of 
an oculomotor network previously associated with the control of eye movements and 
blinks (Bodis-Wollner et al., 1999;Kato and Miyauchi, 2003a;Kato and Miyauchi, 
2003b;Paus, 1996), together with large areas of occipital cortex.
Figure 4.1 - Effects o f  voluntary blinking and external darkening conditions
(a) Activity revealed by the contrast between conditions where voluntary blinking 
occurred with those where it did not, irrespective of the presence of checkerboard 
stimulation (i.e. (BV+BN)-(FV+FN) see Methods) thresholded atp < 0.001 
(uncorrected), overlaid on a sagittal and a coronal slice of the mean structural image 
obtained from all the subjects. The color scale reflects the t-value at each voxel. Blinking 
activates large parts of the occipital cortex (OC), the frontal eye-fields (FEF), the 
supplementary eye-fields (SEF), and the cerebellum (C). (b) Areas of activity revealed by 
the contrast external darkenings during checkerboard stimulation versus checkerboard 
stimulation with steady fixation (i.e. (DV-FV)). Darkenings activate large parts of the 
occipital cortex, as does voluntary blinking.
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Table 4.1 - Voluntary Blinking > fixation {BV+BN} - {FV+FN}
X y z p-FDR p-unc z
R cerebellum 9 -66 -21 0.000 0.000 7.7
L cerebellum -9 -69 -21 0.000 0.000 7.61
L parieto-occipital fissure 3 -75 18 0.000 0.000 inf
L parieto-occipital fissure -6 -75 9 0.000 0.000 inf
R occipital cortex 21 -69 12 0.000 0.000 7.12
L occipital cortex -21 -63 0 0.000 0.000 7.53
R superior precentral sulcus (FEF) 51 -6 42 0.000 0.000 7.1
L superior precentral sulcus (FEF) -51 -9 45 0.000 0.000 inf
R superior frontal gyrus (SEF) 6 -9 72 0.000 0.000 5.18
L superior frontal gyrus (SEF) -3 -6 63 0.000 0.000 7.32
R precentral sulcus 63 3 15 0.000 0.000 5.12
L precentral sulcus -60 0 18 0.000 0.000 6.62
R inferior frontal gyrus 66 -30 9 0.000 0.000 4.94
R putamen 24 3 6 0.000 0.000 5.3
L putamen -27 -9 6 0.000 0.000 6.23
In addition, the presence (versus absence) of voluntary blinks led to the deactivation 
of some areas in the more lateral and posterior parts of the occipital cortex, as 
revealed by the comparison {FV+FN} -  {BV+BN} (see Table 4.2).
Table 4.2 - Fixation > voluntary blinking {FV+FN} - {BV+BN}
X y z p-FDR p-unc z
R middle occipital gyrus 30 -93 -3 1.000 0.001 3.07
L middle occipital gyrus -33 -87 -15 1.000 0.002 3.54
L V5/middle temporal gyrus -45 -72 -9 1.000 0.000 3.29
R postcentral gyrus 48 -27 45 1.000 0.000 3.37
L postcentral gyrus -42 -33 63 1.000 0.000 3.54
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4.3.3 Interactions between voluntary blinking and visual stimulation
I hypothesised that any brain areas associated with the complementary behavioural 
effects of blink suppression and visual continuity across blinks would be associated 
with specific patterns of responses that reflected an interaction between blinking and 
visual stimulation with a checkerboard (see Introduction). In other words, I wished to 
examine how the neural correlates of visual stimulation are modulated by blinking, 
regardless of the effects of blinking and visual stimulation per se.
4,33.1 Interaction 1 -  blink suppression
First, I identified brain areas that showed a smaller response to the presence, versus 
absence, of visual stimulation with a checkerboard during the presence, versus 
absence, of voluntary blinking (i.e. conditions {FV-FN}-{BV-BN}). I hypothesised 
that such a pattern would be associated with brain areas involved in blink 
suppression, as this represents a reduced response, i.e. a loss of sensitivity, to visual 
stimulation during blinking. Cortical areas that showed such an effect were located 
mainly in the lateral parts of temporo-occipital cortex, including the inferior, middle 
and superior occipital gyri, the fusiform gyrus, the inferior and middle temporal gyri 
(see Figure 4.2), the lateral and anterior occipital sulci, the transverse/intra occipital 
sulcus, and the collateral sulcus, (see Table 4.3 for full listing of loci). Specifically, 
the activated cortical loci included locations consistent with V5/MT bilaterally (e.g. 
x,y,z = 45, -69, -9 and x,y,z = -54, -48, -9) (Watson et al., 1993). In addition, a 
similar pattern of activation was also revealed in parietal cortex, including the 
superior parietal gyms, postcentral gyms, and intraparietal sulcus, and in the superior 
temporal sulcus.
Figure 4.2 displays a representative selection of these cortical activated foci, 
including V5/MT, overlaid on an anatomical image. Note the strongly lateralised 
position o f the activated loci, and the failure to demonstrate any activation in more 
medial structures associated with retinotopic visual areas, VI,V2, and V3 (Hasnain et 
al., 1998). Activity from a representative cortical locus (right V5/MT, x,y,z = 45, -69, 
-9) is plotted for each of the five conditions (see Figure 4.2d) and clearly shows the 
interaction effect predicted. The difference between visual stimulation and no visual
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stimulation in the absence of blinking (compare condition FV to FN), is larger than 
the difference between visual stimulation and no visual stimulation during blinking 
(compare condition BV to BN). In other words the effect of visual stimulation is 
reduced in the presence of blinking. Activity is also reduced during the control 
external darkening condition (DV) compared with uninterrupted visual stimulation 
(FV) but to a lesser extent that during the blinking condition (BV) (see Discussion).
Figure 4.2 - Interaction I: Regions showing reduced activation to the presence (v. 
absence) o f visual stimulation during the presence (v. absence) o f  voluntary
blinking
(a-c) Areas of activity revealed by the contrast (FV-FN) -  (BV-BN), thresholded at p<0.001 
(uncorrected), overla id on sagittal, coronal and axial slices o f the mean structural image 
obtained from all subjects. The color scale represents the t-value at each voxel. These 
regions show a greater effect of the presence versus absence of visual stimulation, during 
steady fixation compared with voluntary blinking. The areas showing this interaction include 
more lateral parts of the occipital cortex, including V5/MT (Watson etal., 1993), and also 
parts of the parietal cortex, (d) Activity (percent BOLD contrast relative to fixation in the 
absence o f visual stimulation, i.e. condition FN), at a representative voxel at the 3- 
dimensional location ofV5/MT (Watson etal., 1993) (x,y,z = 45, -69, -9) undereach 
condition. BV = blinking during visual stimulation. FV = fixation during visual stimulation. 
DV= external darkenings during visual stimulation. BN = blinking without visual 
stimulation. FN = fixation without visual stimulation.
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Table 4.3 -  Interaction 1 {FV-FN} -{BV-BN}
x y z p-FDR p-unc z
R middle/superior occipital 
gyrus(V3a)
30 -72 18 0.001 0.000 5.58
L middle/superior occipital 
gyrus(V3a)
-30 -87 12 0.001 0.000 4.87
R middle temporal gyrus (V5) 48 -60 -15 0.002 0.000 4.59
L middle temporal gyrus (V5) -54 -48 -9 0.005 0.000 4.23
R post central gyrus/IPS 42 -27 42 0.006 0.000 4.16
L post central gyrus/IPS -42 -39 36 0.014 0.000 3.73
RIPS 33 -72 30 0.001 0.000 5.16
L superior parietal gyrus/IPS -27 -69 57 0.001 0.000 4.85
4,3.3.2 Interaction 2 -  visual continuity across blinks
Second, I identified areas where the response to the presence, versus absence, of 
voluntary blinks was greater during the presence, versus absence, of visual 
stimulation with a checkerboard (i.e. conditions {BV-FV}-{BN-FN}). I hypothesised 
that such a pattern would be associated with brain areas involved in establishing 
continuity across blinks (see Introduction). Only one region showed such an effect, 
located along the parieto-occipital fissure (see Table 4.4 for coordinates).
Table 4.4 -  Interaction 2 {BV-FV} - {BN-FN}
x y z p-FDR p-unc Z
R parietal-occipital fissure 6 -75 24 0.064 0.000 4.58
R parietal-occipital fissure -6 -75 9 0.098 0.000 3.86
Figure 4.3 illustrates the medial location of this activated area (‘PO’) and plots the 
response profile from a representative voxel within this region (x,y,z = 3,-75, 18). 
Note that this area is not activated by visual stimulation with a checkerboard per se 
(compare FV and FN i.e. presence versus absence of visual stimulation without any 
voluntary blinking in either condition), though it is activated when the visual 
stimulus is interrupted by blinking or darkenings. Similarly, comparison of all 
conditions where visual stimulation with a checkerboard occurred (BV + FV) with
all conditions where no such stimulation was present (BN + FN) failed to 
demonstrate significant activation of this region even at a greatly reduced threshold 
(P<0.01, uncorrected).
4.3.4 Control condition (external darkenings)
The external darkening condition (DV) consisted of dynamically generated external 
darkenings of the visual scene during visual stimulation with a checkerboard, in the 
absence of voluntary blinking (see Methods for details). Darkenings were modelled 
on each subject’s own blinks in the preceding BV block, where voluntary blinking 
occurred in the presence of checkerboard stimulation. Thus retinal input is matched 
on a per-participant and per-blink basis between this condition (DV) and condition 
BV. Comparison of these two conditions will therefore reveal any changes in activity 
specifically associated with an extra-retinal signal associated with blinking, and can 
be used to interpret the results of the two interactions between visual stimulation and 
blinking described above.
Table 4.5 -  Blinking during visual stimulation > external darkenings {BV-DV}
X y z p-FDR p-uncor z
R cerebellum 9 -66 -21 0.000 0.000 6.47
L cerebellum -9 -66 -21 0.000 0.000 6.24
R precentral sulcus 63 3 12 0.001 0.000 4.39
L precentral sulcus -60 3 9 0.000 0.000 6.34
R superior precentral sulcus(FEF) 45 -12 39 0.000 0.000 5.62
L superior precentral sulcus(FEF) -48 -15 42 0.000 0.000 6.26
cingulate gyrus/superior frontal 
gyrus(SEF)
0 -6 63 0.000 0.000 6.26
L Superior frontal gyrus (SEF) -6 0 45 0.000 0.000 5.25
R parietal-occipital fissure 3 -75 18 0.001 0.000 4.29
L parietal-occipital fissure -3 -75 12 0.001 0.000 4.48
R lateral fissure 45 6 0 0.001 0.000 4.18
R putamen 24 3 3 0.001 0.000 4.15
L putamen -27 -9 6 0.001 0.000 4.95
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Comparison of voluntary blinking during visual stimulation and matched external 
darkenings, (i.e. the comparison BV -  DV), revealed activation in oculomotor areas, 
including the FEF, SEF and cerebellum. (See Table 4.5). This is consistent with the 
presence of oculomotor signals that are produced during voluntary blinking but not 
during external darkenings. More importantly, this comparison also revealed a 
restricted region of the occipital cortex along the parieto-occipital fissure that shows 
greater activity during blinking in the presence of visual stimulation than during the 
external darkening condition. This parieto-occipital area precisely overlapped with 
the parieto-occipital area described above that showed an interaction between visual 
stimulation and blinking consistent with visual continuity. (See Figure 4.3). This is 
readily apparent in Figure 4.3d, where the condition-specific plot of activity for this 
parieto-occipital area shows that activity for voluntary blinking during visual 
stimulation (BV) is significantly greater than that for the control external darkening 
condition (DV). Note that this region also shows greater activity for voluntary 
blinking in the absence of visual stimulation (BN) than during the external darkening 
condition where visual stimulation was present (DV).
Areas showing significantly less activity during voluntary blinking than during 
matched external darkenings were identified, (by the comparison DV -  BV), in 
lateral and posterior occipital regions and parts of parietal cortex. These areas 
showed substantial overlap with areas described above that showed an interaction 
between visual stimulation and blinking consistent with blink suppression. This is 
apparent in Figure 4.2d, where the condition-specific plot of activity for area V5/MT 
shows that activity for voluntary blinking during checkerboard stimulation (BV) is 
significantly lower than that for the control external darkening condition (DV).
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Figure 4.3 - Interaction 2 - Parieto-occipital region hypothesized to be involved 
in maintaining visual continuity across voluntary blinks
(a) Activity revealed by the contrast of voluntary blinking during visual stimulation versus 
external darkenings (i.e. (BV-DV)), thresholded atp<0.001 (uncorrected), overlaid on a 
sagittal section of the Tl -weighted mean structural image of all subjects. The colour scale 
represents the t-value at each voxel. The SEF, FEF (not shown), the cerebellum (C), and a 
region along the parieto -occipital fissure (PO) all showed greater activity when blinking 
during visual stimulation than during the external darkenings condition (see Table 4.2). (b) 
Areas showing greater activation to the presence (versus absence) o f voluntary blinking 
during the presence (versus absence) of visual stimulation, (i.e. the contrast {BV-FV} -  {BN- 
FN}). Only one region along the parieto-occipital fissure (PO) showed a significant 
interaction effect (c) The previous two contrasts (shown in (a) and (b) overlaid on the same 
sagittal section of the mean Tl-weighted structural. Red areas are those activated by the 
comparison of voluntary blinking versus darkenings (see (a)). Green areas are those whose 
activity showed an interaction between voluntary blinking and visual stimulation (see (b)). 
Yellow areas represent the region o f overlap between areas revealed by these two contrasts. 
This shows that the same parieto-occipital region was revealed in each contrast, (d) Activity 
(percent BOLD contrast relative to fixation in the absence o f checkerboard stimulation, i.e. 
condition FN) at a single representative voxel (x,y,z = 3, -75, 18) in the region along the 
parieto-occipital fissure undereach condition.. BV = checkerboard stimulation, blinking. BV 
= blinking during visual stimulation. FV = fixation during visual stimulation. DV -  external 
darkenings during visual stimulation. BN = blinking without visual stimulation. FN = 
fixation without visual stimulation.
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I also compared the external darkening condition to visual stimulation in the absence 
of voluntary blinks or darkenings, (i.e. comparison of conditions DV and FV). This 
contrast revealed brain areas that responded to the reduction in visual input and the 
transient changes in luminance that were associated with darkenings. This 
comparison revealed activation of medial occipital cortex, in a location that closely 
overlapped the region activated by the presence (versus absence) of voluntary blinks 
(see Figure 4.1 and Table 4.6), together with deactivation of areas in more lateral and 
posterior parts of the occipital cortex, during external darkenings. (See Table 4.7 for 
details).
Table 4.6 - External darkenings > fixation during visual stimulation (DV -  FV}
X y z Z p-uncor p-FDR
R occipital cortex 6 -75 24 6.75 0.000 0.000
L occipital cortex -21 -63 0 7.03 0.000 0.000
R angular gyrus 48 -48 33 4.36 0.000 0.000
L angular gyrus -51 -60 33 3.44 0.000 0.010
Table 4.7 -  Fixation during visual stimulation > external darkenings {FV -DV}
X y z Z p-uncor p-FDR
L middle temporal gyrus -39 -48 -6 3.68 0.000 0.981
L middle occipital gyrus -45 -81 -9 3.11 0.001 0.981
R inferior temporal gyms 48 -57 -15 3.29 0.001 0.981
R intra parietal sulcus 33 -72 30 3.67 0.000 0.981
L superior parietal gyrus -18 -69 51 3.67 0.000 0.981
R post central gyrus 45 -27 42 4.12 0.000 0.981
L post central sulcus -63 -27 30 3.46 0.000 0.981
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4.4 Discussion
This study sought to characterise the effects of voluntary blinks on processing in the 
human visual system by manipulating visual stimulation and blinking independently. 
I hypothesised that the brain areas mediating the behavioural effects of blink 
suppression and visual continuity would show different response patterns. In order to 
distinguish the effects of extra-retinal neural signals associated with blinking from 
the effects of pupillary occlusion on visual input I compared the effects of blinking 
during visual stimulation to externally generated darkenings of the visual scene that 
closely mimicked the immediately preceding blinks produced by each subject.
Consistent with my hypothesis, I identified two distinct sets of regions showing 
opposite response patterns. I found an extensive set of lateral occipital areas that 
showed a smaller response to visual stimulation during the presence of voluntary 
blinks, consistent with a role in blink suppression. In addition, I identified a region of 
medial parieto-occipital cortex where activity evoked by blinking was greater when 
visual stimulation with a checkerboard was present, consistent with a role in the 
maintenance of visual continuity across blinks.
4.4.1 Effects of blinking and external darkenings in occipital cortex
Voluntary blinking, irrespective of the presence or absence of visual stimulation, was 
associated with strong and highly significant increases in activity throughout the 
occipital lobe (see Figure 4.1). These findings replicate earlier, and often 
unremarked, findings of activation of visual cortex in studies of human blinking (e.g. 
Fig 4 of Kato and Miyauchi, 2003a) that have focused primarily on frontal 
oculomotor control structures such as the FEF and SEF (Bodis-Wollner et al., 
1999;Kato and Miyauchi, 2003a;Kato and Miyauchi, 2003b;Schmidt et al., 
2003;Tsubota et al., 1999). The increases in visual cortex activity that I observed 
during blinking do not merely reflect the presence of an extra-retinal signal 
associated with the oculomotor command, as external darkenings (DV), (which by 
definition have no oculomotor component), also increased activity in the visual 
cortex, compared with continuous visual stimulation in the absence of darkenings 
and blinking (FV) (see Figure 4.1). Rather, such enhancement of activity is
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consistent with recent reports of a rectified positive response in human visual cortex 
to both increments and decrements in surface luminance (Haynes et al., 2004). 
Similarly, in monkey visual cortex a significant minority of neurons show strong 
transient increases in firing in response to the offset of visual stimulation caused by a 
blink or a darkening (Gawne and Martin, 2000;Gawne and Martin, 2002). The 
activation I observed during the presence of both voluntary blinks and external 
darkenings (compared with the absence of blinks and darkenings) may thus reflect 
transient responses to the frequent increases and decreases in luminance caused by 
both blinks and darkenings.
However I sought to examine the effects of blinking on visual processing beyond the 
simple effects of eyelid closure on visual input. By studying the interaction between 
blinking and visual stimulation and the differences between blinking and my control 
external darkening condition, I sought to uncover the neural correlates of blink 
suppression and of visual continuity across blinks.
4.4.2 Neural correlates of blink suppression -  Interaction 1
I identified a set of bilateral lateral temporo-occipital and parietal cortical loci that 
showed reduced activation to the presence of visual stimulation with a checkerboard 
during the presence of voluntary blinking. Strikingly, medially located visual areas, 
such as the calcarine sulcus (VI), did not show this pattern of activation (see Figure 
4.2), even at a reduced statistical threshold. Such an activation profile may indicate 
that voluntary blinking suppresses the normal response to visual stimulation in these 
lateral regions. Alternatively these regions may simply show a greater response to the 
presence of visual stimulation with a checkerboard, when the stimulus is visible for a 
greater uninterrupted period of time. Such a hypothesis predicts that both voluntary 
blinks and external darkenings should reduce activity in these regions equally, as 
both interrupt visual stimulation for the same period of time. Detailed examination of 
activity profiles in these regions, however, showed that external darkenings (DV) 
consistently reduced activity to a lesser extent than voluntary blinks (BV) (see Figure 
4.2d). I therefore conclude that the lower activity associated with the voluntary 
blinking during visual stimulation, compared with visual stimulation without
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voluntary blinking, reflects suppression of these lateral visual areas, mediated by an 
oculomotor signal associated with blinking.
I propose that this signal reflects a neural mechanism underlying blink suppression. 
The 3-dimensional location of these regions supports this hypothesis. Blink 
suppression primarily affects visual processing in the magnocellular pathway (Burr 
etal., 1994;Ridder and Tomlinson, 1993;Ridder and Tomlinson, 1995;Ridder and 
Tomlinson, 1997;Volkmann et al., 1978). Consistent with this, the regions I 
tentatively identify as mediating blink suppression included the magnocellular region 
V5/MT (see Figure 4.2 and Table 4.3) (Watson et al., 1993). In contrast the 3- 
dimensional location of V4 (Hasnain et al., 1998), a primarily parvocellular region, 
did not appear to show a suppressed response to visual stimulation with a 
checkerboard during blinking. The magnocellular pathway also provides the major 
input to parietal areas involved in visual attention (Ungerleider and Desimone, 
1986a;Ungerleider and Desimone, 1986b), consistent with the reduction in activity 
that I observed in regions of parietal cortex associated with voluntary blinking (see 
Table 4.2).
4.4.3 Visual continuity across blinks -  Interaction 2
Voluntary blinking (compared with no voluntary blinking) produced significantly 
greater activation in the presence of visual stimulation, than in the absence of visual 
stimulation, in only one locus in medial parieto-occipital cortex (Figure 4.3). I did 
not find activation to visual stimulation per se in this region (see Figure 4.3d, 
compare FV to FN) Rather, it was activated by blinking in a manner that was 
modulated by the level of visual stimulation. Such a response pattern has been 
observed before in this region with MEG (Hari et al., 1994). It was also activated 
during the external darkening control condition. Such a pattern of activation is 
consistent with the response properties of the human homologue of the macaque 
V6/V6A complex, area PO. This area is known to be preferentially sensitive to 
luminance stimuli rather than checkerboard stimuli (Dechent and Frahm, 2003;Portin 
et al., 1998). These properties of area PO are consistent with activation of my 
parieto-occipital region by blinks and external darkenings, presumably due to the 
changes in luminance that occur during both conditions, but not by my checkerboard
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stimulus. But activity in this area was significantly greater during voluntary blinks 
with visual stimulation compared with the external darkening condition though these 
were matched for retinal stimulation (see Figure 4.3b). The increased activation in 
the parieto-occipital fissure during blinks compared to darkenings may therefore 
represent a neural signal specifically associated with voluntary blinks.
An alternative possibility is that activity in this region simply reflected the magnitude 
of the changes in luminance that occurred during blinks and darkenings. The changes 
in luminance that occurred during blinking blocks were greater in the presence than 
in the absence of visual stimulation, which could account for the increased activity I 
observed in this region when blinking during visual stimulation, compared with 
blinking without visual stimulation. The checkerboard stimulus is extinguished by 
both blinks and external darkenings. However, background luminance in the scanner 
is not entirely eliminated by the external darkenings. Thus greater activity evoked by 
blinking during visual stimulation compared with external darkenings could be due 
to the slightly greater reduction in luminance caused by blinks than darkenings, 
though this is unlikely as blinks do not entirely eliminate back ground luminance 
either. Direct inspection of the activity profile of this region (see Figure 4.3d) rules 
out this possibility, as blinking in the absence of visual stimulation also activated this 
region more than external darkenings. Such a difference in activity cannot be 
explained by changes in luminance being greater when blinking in the absence of 
visual stimulation (compared with external darkenings that occur in the presence of 
visual stimulation), as the luminance changes were greater in the darkening 
condition. Therefore I conclude that activity in this region is likely to reflect an extra- 
retinal neural signal associated with blinking and was not simply a response to the 
changes in luminance caused by eyelid closure.
A final possibility is that activity in this area simply reflects differences in the nature 
of the transients associated with voluntary blinking and darkenings. Though these 
two conditions were closely matched for visual input, it is theoretically possible that 
minor differences may exist in the nature of the retinal transients produced by 
external darkenings and blinks because the eyelid sweeps across the pupil while 
darkenings occurred uniformly across the visual scene. However, such differences 
are unlikely to affect my findings for three specific reasons. Firstly, although the
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precise kinematics of darkenings and blinking differ, the overall effect on retinal 
illumination is very similar. This is because the eyelid is sufficiently close to the lens 
that it is not in focus, and so does not cause a sharp shadow to sweep across the 
retina as it closes (Gawne and Martin, 2000). Instead, eyelid closure causes a 
relatively uniform darkening. Secondly, the Stiles-Crawford effect (the peripheral 
pupil being less sensitive to light than the centre, (Stiles and Crawford, 1933)) means 
that only the time taken for the pupil to fully cover the central pupil (which can be < 
4ms) is critical when considering the changes in retinal illumination during blinking. 
Finally, the visual system is not sensitive to very short differences (< 15ms) in the 
detailed dynamics of visual stimulus onset (Gawne and Martin, 2000;Gawne and 
Martin, 2002). Therefore I conclude that differences in the nature of the visual 
transient between blinks and darkenings are unlikely to affect my findings.
I propose that my parieto-occipital region may represent the human homologue of 
area V6A (the posterior portion) of the macaque V6 complex, which is located on the 
anterior bank of the parieto-occipital sulcus. In macaques, V6 and V6A respond 
preferentially to luminance stimuli rather than checkerboard stimuli, as does the 
region found in this study. However V6A responds more weakly than V6, and, 
unlike V6, contains visually unresponsive cells that respond to oculomotor activity, 
such as saccades (Galletti et al., 1991;Galletti et al., 1996). Human area PO can also 
be divided into two functionally distinct regions; an anterior portion, below the 
junction with the calcarine sulcus, equivalent to V6 that responds strongly to 
luminance stimuli, and a posterior portion, equivalent to V6A that responds more 
weakly to luminance stimuli (Dechent and Frahm, 2003). Like macaque V6A, the 
human posterior parieto-occipital sulcus is activated by self-generated saccades in 
the dark (Law et al., 1998), suggesting that it also contains neurons that respond to 
oculomotor signals. The region of the parieto-occipital sulcus found in my study is 
located immediately posterior to the junction with the calcarine sulcus, and is 
activated by changes in luminance during blinks and darkenings, reflecting the 
activity of neurons that respond to luminance stimuli. It is also activated by blinking 
in the dark, reflecting the activity of neurons that respond to oculomotor signals, 
suggesting that it is indeed equivalent to macaque area V6A. The greater activation 
of this region by blinking compared with darkenings during visual stimulation, may
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reflect the activity of the non-visually responsive neurons in the part of human PO 
homologous to macaque V6A that respond to oculomotor signals.
V6A, and its human homologue are thought to be involved in the integration of 
visual and motor information, specifically oculomotor information, perhaps enabling 
guided hand-movements, and maintaining visual continuity during saccades (Galletti 
et al., 1995;Law et al., 1998). I propose that activity of non-visually responsive 
neurons in this region, putatively the human homologue of V6A, may reflect the 
active maintenance of visual continuity across blinks in response to a signal from the 
oculomotor system. Blink-related magnetic fields, localised to the posterior parieto­
occipital sulcus have previously been implicated in the maintenance of visual 
continuity across blinks (Hari et al., 1994). One possibility is that activity in this 
region may reflect a mnemonic signal associated with the maintenance of perception 
of the preceding visual stimulus across the interruption caused by a blink, thus 
establishing visual continuity. Regions of the posterior parietal cortex are associated 
with visual short term memory (Todd and Marois, 2004;Vogel and Machizawa, 
2004). I found that activity in this region reflected not just the presence of blink 
motor commands, but also depended on the level of background visual stimulation 
(i.e. presence versus absence of visual stimulation with a flickering checkerboard). 
Blinking caused greater activation of this region in the presence of visual stimulation. 
This is consistent with the notion that a short-term mnemonic signal is involved in 
maintaining perceptual continuity across blinks, as activity associated with visual 
short-term memory is strongly modulated by the amount of information being held in 
memory (Todd and Marois, 2004;Vogel and Machizawa, 2004). When blinks occur 
during visual stimulation with a checkerboard, the amount of information that needs 
to be retained across the blink is greater than during the absence of stimulation with a 
checkerboard. Greater activation to blinks is therefore expected during visual 
stimulation with a flickering checkerboard, as I observed. This visual short-term 
memory hypothesis suggests that future work should examine whether activity in this 
region scales with accuracy in a visual memory task carried out across a blink (for 
example, change detection before and after a blink).
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4.5 Conclusion
My findings suggest that the two behavioural phenomena, of blink suppression and 
visual continuity across blinks, are mediated by two corresponding neural 
mechanisms reflected by activity in two distinct sets of cortical loci. First, 
suppression of normal responses to visual stimulation in lateral occipital visual areas 
during blinking may reflect a specific effect of blinking on magnocellular processing. 
The functional correlate of such suppression may be to reduce perception of the 
eyelid passing over the pupil. Second, I found activation of a region in the parieto­
occipital fissure, putatively the human homologue of macaque area V6A, whose 
activity may reflect the active maintenance of visual continuity across blinks. I 
speculate that this may involve a mnemonic signal that bridges the interruption of 
visual activity caused by the reduction in visual input due to a blink, and by the 
suppression of lateral occipital areas.
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CHAPTER 5: BLINKING SUPPRESSES THE NEURAL RESPONSE TO 
UNCHANGING RETINAL STIMULATION
5.1 Introduction
My previous experiment (see Chapter 4) suggested that the two behavioural 
phenomena of blink suppression and visual continuity are mediated by two different 
neural mechanisms in distinct brain regions. First, I found that the normal response to 
visual stimulation was suppressed in lateral occipital areas during blinking, 
specifically in V5/MT and V3a. I suggest that this suppression may serve to reduce 
perception of the eyelid passing over the pupil. Second, I found activation of a 
parieto-occipital region, which I propose is the human homologue of macaque area 
V6A, and whose activity may reflect the active maintenance of visual continuity 
across blinking, perhaps via a mnemonic signal that bridges the interruption to visual 
stimulation that occurs during blinks.
These findings go a long way towards explaining why we do not notice our blinks 
despite the profound interruptions to visual stimulation they cause every few 
seconds. However, one problem in interpreting cortical responses to visual 
stimulation during blinking is that any changes in brain activity evoked by an extra- 
retinal signal associated with the blink motor command are potentially confounded 
by the reduction in retinal illumination resulting from pupillary occlusion. In the 
previous experiment, (Chapter 4), I created a control condition in which I 
dynamically generated external darkenings of the visual scene, in order to 
circumvent this problem. As changes in visual input were matched in the two 
conditions, any differences between the two conditions must reflect the presence of 
an extra-retinal signal associated with blinking. However, this experimental 
paradigm was not ideal as it was hard to precisely model the exact pattern of light 
falling on the retina as the eye is occluded by the eyelid during blinks.
In this second experiment I sought to directly distinguish the extra-retinal effect of 
blinking on neuronal activity, from the confounding effect of the loss of retinal 
stimulation caused by eyelid closure, without the need for an external-darkening 
control condition. This was achieved by employing a specially designed apparatus to
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stimulate the retina without light traversing the pupil (Volkmann et al., 1980) while 
brain activity was measured with fMRI. Retinal illumination therefore remained 
constant irrespective of whether the eyes were open or closed.
A fiber-optic light source was placed in the mouth of eight individual subjects while 
I measured their brain activity with fMRI. This apparatus could be used to trans- 
illuminate (through the palatine bone, which forms the posterior part of the roof of 
the mouth) both retinas with a flickering light source. Subjects additionally wore 
opaque light-proof goggles that prevented any light from entering the eye through the 
pupil. When the oral light source was switched on, retinal stimulation was produced 
by trans-cranial illumination that was completely unaffected by eyelid closure during 
blinks. I hypothesized that in such circumstances, any reduction in brain activity 
associated with blinking would represent a direct neural signature of blinking 
specifically associated with the blink motor command. Such a reduction would 
represent a decreased sensitivity to visual stimulation, thus potentially explaining the 
psychophysical phenomenon of blink suppression and why blinks go unnoticed.
Two factors were independently manipulated in a blocked design to test this 
hypothesis: the presence (or absence) of retinal illumination via my oral apparatus 
and the presence (or absence) of voluntary blinking. Functional MRI in combination 
with standard retinotopic mapping procedures (Teo et al., 1997) and cortical 
segmentation and flattening (Wandell et al., 2000) was used to functionally identify 
cortical areas VI-V3 in each individual subject, and the lateral geniculate nucleus 
(LGN) was localized with standard anatomical and functional criteria (Kastner et al., 
2004) (see Methods for full details). Area V5/MT was localized with a separate 
motion localizer (see Methods).
I proceeded to characterize the effects of blinking on neural activity in these 
functionally defined retinotopic visual areas and the LGN. Next, to determine 
whether any brain regions outside functionally defined retinotopic visual cortex also 
showed any neural signature of blink suppression, I conducted an unrestricted whole- 
brain analysis.
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5.2 Materials and Methods
5.2.1 Subjects
Eight normal volunteers (4 male and 4 female, mean age = 25, SD = 5) with normal 
or corrected to normal vision gave informed written consent to participate in the 
study, which was approved by the Institute of Neurology and National Hospital for 
Neurology and Neurosurgery Joint Ethics Committee.
5.2.2 Experimental Procedure
Two factors were independently manipulated in a blocked design: the presence (or 
absence) of retinal stimulation, and the presence (or absence) of voluntary blinking.
Prior to the start of each block, an auditory cue indicated whether the impending 
block would require the subjects to blink, or merely maintain fixation. During ‘blink’ 
blocks, participants were required to blink binocularly at a fast regular rate. During 
‘no blink’ blocks, subjects were required to maintain steady fixation, and were 
allowed to blink but asked to keep blinking to a minimum. Subjects were specifically 
instructed not to forcefully keep their eyes open, so that they did not inhibit 
spontaneous blinking.
Independently from the presence or absence of voluntary blinking, during half the 
blocks a visual stimulus was presented. Visual stimulation was delivered to the retina 
using an illumination technique that bypassed the normal optical path through the 
cornea and pupil (see Figure 5.1). A 6m long 8 mm diameter fibre optic cable 
(Pennine Radio Ltd), connected to a 250 W light source (Pennine Radio Ltd.) located 
in the scanner control room, was positioned against the roof of the mouth and used to 
deliver a bright flashing white light (6.66 Hz) to a region directly below the two eyes. 
A strong flashing light was used to maximise visual cortex activation and prevent 
adaptation.
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Figure 5.1 - Trans-palatine retinal stimulation apparatus
U pM tH y  through ™b|e ° P^  
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both retinas > m
Light proof v—s  f
goggles I  Flashing w W  
light (6.66Hz)
This illumination was perceived as a diffuse cloud o f flashing red light with two 
focal points in the left and right upper temporal visual fields, corresponding to the 
lower nasal retina of each eye. Subjects wore opaque light-proof goggles that 
prevented any other light from entering the eye through the pipil. This method of 
illumination resulted in retinal stimulation that remained constant whether the eyes 
were open or closed. Thus visual input was not affected by the presence or absence 
of blinks.
The experiment thus consisted of four conditions constituting a 2 x 2 factorial design:
Retinal stimulation 
Present Absent
Voluntary Blinking 1 3
No Voluntary Blinking 2 4
1) voluntary blinking during retinal stimulation
2) no voluntary blinking during retinal stimulation
3) voluntary blinking without retinal stimulation
4) no voluntary blinking without retinal stimulation
Each condition was presented four times per scanning run. The order of conditions 
was pseudo-randomly generated at the start of each session, with the restrictions that 
“retinal stimulation” and “no retinal stimulation” blocks had to alternate, and no 




A 1.5T Siemens SONATA system (Siemens, Erlangen) was used to acquire gradient- 
echo echo-planar T2* weighted images with Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent 
(BOLD) contrast. A 1.5T system was used because the larger bore size allowed 
sufficient room for the unconventional illumination apparatus. Each volume 
consisted of forty 2 mm slices with in-plane resolution of 3x3 mm, with a 1 mm gap 
between slices, positioned to cover the whole cortex with a TR of 3.6 seconds. 
Imaging was performed in three scanning runs of 112 volumes each. In each 
scanning run, six image volumes preceding presentation of the experimental 
conditions were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects. Finally, a T1 - 
weighted anatomical image was acquired from each subject.
5.2.4 Retinotopic mapping and V5/MT localisation
To identify the boundaries of primary visual cortex (VI) and extra-striate retinotopic 
cortex (V2 and V3), standard retinotopic mapping procedures were used (See 
Chapter 2: fMRI Methods -  Retinotopic Mapping). Checkerboard patterns, flickering 
at 8 Hz, covering either the horizontal or vertical meridian were alternated with rest 
periods for 16 epochs of 20.8 seconds over a scanning run lasting 165 volumes. To 
identify V5/MT, a standard motion localiser was used, consisting of randomly 
moving low contrast dots (moving at 47s) alternating with static dots for 16 epochs 
of 20.8 seconds over a scanning run lasting 165 volumes (Dumoulin et al., 2000). A 
3T Siemens ALLEGRA system (Siemens, Erlangen) was used to acquire gradient - 
echo echo-planar T2* weighted images with Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent 
(BOLD) contrast. Data were analysed using SPM2. Mask volumes for sub-regions 
(left and right, dorsal and ventral) of each region of interest (VI, V2, and V3) were 
obtained by delineating the borders between visual areas with activation patterns 
from the meridian localisers. I followed standard definitions of VI, V2 and V3 
(Sereno et al., 1995) together with segmentation and cortical flattening in MrGray 
(Teo et al., 1997;Wandell et al., 2000). The peak voxels activated by the motion 
localizer (revealed by the contrast moving dots -  static dots) in each hemisphere 
were identified for each subject. (See Chapter 2: fMRI Methods -  Retinotopic 
Mapping and Localisation of V5/MT for full details of procedures).
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5.2.5 Statistical Analysis
Data were analysed using Statistical Parametric Mapping software (SPM2;
Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spmy
5.2.5.1 Individual subject analyses
Analyses of the effects of blinking and retinal stimulation that used the retinotopic 
mapping data (see above) to functionally localise activations in retinotopic visual 
cortex were carried out on each subject individually. The initial six volumes of each 
functional scanning run of the main experiment were discarded, and subsequent 
image volumes then realigned (Friston et al., 1995), co-registered to each subject’s 
structural scan, and smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 6 mm full-width half 
maximum. Voxels activated during the experiment were identified using a statistical 
model that comprised four delayed boxcar waveforms for each scanning run. These 
represented the mean activity evoked in the four experimental conditions. Motion 
parameters defined by the realignment procedure were added to the model as six 
separate regressors of no interest. High-pass filtering removed low-frequency drifts 
in signal, and global changes were removed by proportional scaling. Each component 
of the model served as a regressor in a multiple regression analysis, used to generate 
parameter estimates for each regressor at every voxel.
To extract activity from retinotopic visual cortex, I used the mask volumes for sub- 
regions (left and right, dorsal and ventral) of each region of interest (VI, V2, and V3) 
that were created by the retinotopic mapping analyses, described above. The 
regression parameter estimates generated by the analysis of the main experimental 
fMRI data, were extracted for the maximally activated voxel (comparing visual 
stimulation with darkness in the no-voluntary blinking conditions) in each sub-region 
(left and right, dorsal and ventral) of the regions of interest (VI, V2, and V3) in each 
subject.
Parameter estimates were also extracted for the LGN. The location of the LGN in 
each subject was first identified using an anatomical and radiological brain atlas to 
identify anatomical landmarks close to the LGN on each subject’s high-resolution
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structural scan. Next, the functional data co-registered to each structural scan was 
used to locate visually responsive voxels within the previously defined anatomical 
boundaries, using the statistical contrast of retinal stimulation without voluntary 
blinking versus no retinal stimulation without voluntary blinking.
For each visual region of interest, the parameter estimates were averaged across 
subjects, yielding a plot of BOLD signal for each experimental condition in V3, V2, 
VI and the LGN across subjects. Averaging across all visually responsive voxels in 
VI, V2 and V3 produced qualitatively the same pattern of results, confirming that the 
pattern of responses was consistent over each region of interest.
5.2.5,2 Whole cortex analysis
In addition to the retinotopic analyses, I also conducted an unrestricted whole cortex 
random-effects analysis across subjects to examine the effects of blinking on visual 
processing outside retinotopic visual cortex. The realigned functional image volumes 
for each subject were spatially normalised (Ashbumer and Friston, 1999) to the 
standard space defined by the Montreal Neurological Institute template (Mazziotta et 
al., 1995) and then smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 6 mm full-width half 
maximum. Voxels activated during the experiment were again identified using the 
same statistical model as for the retinotopic analysis that comprised four delayed 
boxcar waveforms for each scanning run. These represented the mean activity 
evoked in the four experimental conditions. Motion parameters defined by the 
realignment procedure were added to the model as six separate regressors of no 
interest. High-pass filtering removed low-frequency drifts in signal, and global 
changes were removed by proportional scaling. Each component of the model served 
as a regressor in a multiple regression analysis. The resulting parameter estimates for 
each regressor at each voxel were then entered into a second level analysis where 
subject served as a random effect in a within-subjects ANOVA. The main effects and 
interactions between conditions were then specified by appropriately weighted linear 
contrasts and determined using the t-statistic on a voxel-by-voxel basis. A statistical 
threshold of P<0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons across the entire cortex, and 




Comparison of all conditions in which there was retinal stimulation with those 
without retinal stimulation confirmed activation of LGN and VI-V3 by the trans- 
cranial retinal illumination stimulus, but I found no reliable activation of V5/MT. 
Perhaps V5/MT was not strongly activated by my visual stimulus because it responds 
best to moving stimuli with high contrast, whereas my stimulus, although flashing, 
was static and phenomenally relatively diffuse and weak.
Having confirmed that my visual-stimulation device activated retinotopic visual 
cortex, I next proceeded to characterize the effects of blinking on neural activity in 
these regions. In the presence of retinal stimulation, activity was strongly and 
significantly reduced by blinking in retinotopic area V3 (t[8] = 2.974, p = 0.018) (see 
Figure 5.2A). Thus, even when input to the visual system is held constant, blinks can 
modulate activity in retinotopic visual areas. Blinking also reduced activity during 
retinal stimulation in LGN and V2, but this difference did not reach statistical 
significance (LGN t[8] = 1.036, p = 0.335; V2t[8] = 1.462, p = 0.182) (see Figure
5.1 A). In VI, there was no significant difference between blinking and no blinking in 
the presence of visual stimulation (t[8] = 0.642, p = 0.539).
In the absence of retinal stimulation, a different pattern of responses to blinks 
emerged. In contrast to the reductions in activity associated with blinking in the 
presence of retinal stimulation, blinking (compared to no blinking) in the absence of 
retinal stimulation significantly increased activation in both LGN (t[8] = -4.533, p = 
0.003) and retinotopic areas VI (t[8] = -3.422, p = 0.009), V2 (t[8] = -5.454, p = 
0.001), and V3 (t[8] = -5.501, p = 0.001) (see Figure 5. IB). The effects of blinking 
therefore differed in the presence and absence of retinal stimulation. Whereas 
blinking strongly suppressed the response to retinal stimulation in retinotopic area 
V3, in the absence of any retinal stimulation blinking resulted in an enhanced signal 
in early cortical areas and the LGN.
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Figure 5.2 - Modulation of responses in human early visual cortex by blinking 
A - Retinal Stimulation



















|  No voluntary blinking 
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(A and B) BOLD contrast responses in human V3, V2, VI, and LGN during no blinking 
(black) and blinking (gray) conditions in (A) the presence of retinal stimulation through the 
roof of the mouth and (B) the absence of retinal stimulation. Data are taken from individual 
retinotopic analyses, and BOLD signal is plotted as a function o f condition and averaged 
across all eight subjects (error bars ± 1SEM; see Methods for full details). The asterisk (*) 
denotes statistical significance (p < 0.05) in a two-tailed t test between conditions. (A) V3 
shows significantly reduced BOLD signal when blinking in comparison to not blinking 
during retinal stimulation (tm = 2.974, p = 0.018). Activity in V2 follows the same trend as 
V3 but does not reach significance (t[8j = 1.462, p = 0.182). (B) All four retinotopic areas, 
V3-LGN, show a significant increase in activity during blinking in comparison to no 
blinking conditions in the dark (V3 t[8] = -5.501, p = 0.001; V2 t[8] = - 5.454, p  = 0.001; VI 
t[8] = 3.422, p = 0.009; andLGNt[8] = -4.533, p  = 0.015).
5.3.2 Whole Cortex Analysis
To determine whether the neural responses to retinal stimulation in any brain regions 
outside the functionally defined retinotopic visual areas considered above were also 
affected by blinking, I conducted an unrestricted whole-brain analysis. When retinal 
stimulation was present, there were highly significant (p < 0.05 false discovery rate 
[FDR] corrected) reductions in activity during blinking (versus no blinking) in
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several regions of parietal and prefrontal cortices (see Figure 5.3; see Table 5.1 for 
full list of loci), mainly in the right hemisphere.
Table 5.1 -  Retinal stimulation without voluntary blinking > retinal 
stimulation with voluntary blinking
X y z p-FDR Z
Right inferior frontal sulcus 42 36 27 0.006 5.08
Right inferior frontal gyrus 48 6 3 0.045 3.81
Left inferior frontal gyrus -48 6 21 0.028 4.20
Right cingulate sulcus 0 24 54 0.009 4.90
Right superior frontal gyrus 9 27 63 0.010 4.82
Right head of caudate nucleus 21 24 6 0.013 4.72
Left head of caudate nucleus -12 27 9 0.035 3.97
Right putamen/intemal capsule 18 12 3 0.026 4.25
Right insula 33 27 6 0.019 4.56
Left short insular gyri -39 6 -6 0.024 4.31
Left circular insular sulcus -30 18 15 0.048 3.76
Right pre-central gyrus 15 -36 63 0.019 4.52
Right pre-central sulcus 33 -3 60 0.035 4.09
Right superior pre-central sulcus 21 -12 60 0.019 4.46
Right post-central gyrus 30 -36 45 0.035 4.03
Left post-central gyrus -30 -42 54 0.035 3.94
Right superior parietal gyrus/IPS 21 -69 57 0.020 4.43
Left superior parietal gyrus/IPS -21 -66 60 0.050 3.70
Right intra-parietal sulcus 30 -51 42 0.035 3.95
Right angular gyrus/IPS 57 -39 39 0.023 4.33
Right supramarginal gyrus 63 -30 33 0.035 4.11
Cortical loci where voluntary blinking reduced activity associated with retinal stimulation. 
Shown in the table are the locations, stereotactic coordinates in the space defined by the 
Montreal Neurological Institute template, Z scores and corresponding P value (corrected for 
multiple comparisons across the volume examined). A statistical threshold ofP<0.05, 
correctedfor multiple comparisons across the entire brain volume, and a spatial extent
threshold of 5 voxels, was used.
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Figure 5.3 - Areas showing a reduced response to 
retinal stimulation when blinking
Left lateral, right lateral, and superior views of a standard Tl weighted image rendered in 
the standard space defined by the Montreal Neurological Institute template, with loci 
showing reduced responses to retinal stimulation when blinking in comparison to not 
blinking shown superimposed in red on the rendered images (p < 0.001 uncorrected and 
spatial extent threshold of 5 voxels for display purposes). Oculomotor regions showing 
greater activation when blinking in comparison to no blinking, across retinal-stimulation 
conditions, are shown superimposed in green on the rendered images (p < 0.05 FDR- 
corrected and spatial extent threshold of 5 voxels for display purposes). The main 
oculomotor regions controlling blinking, that is, the frontal eye-fields (FEF) and 
supplementary eye-field (SEF), are labelled (see Table 5.2) for full list of loci). Note the lack 
of overlap between these oculomotor structures (in green) and the regions suppressed by
blinking (in red).
The locations of these parietal and prefrontal regions, which were suppressed by 
blinking, are clearly spatially distinct from oculomotor structures such as the 
supplementary and frontal eye fields (Bodis-Wollner et al., 1999;Kato and Miyauchi, 
2003a;Kato and Miyauchi, 2003b;Paus, 1996), which were strongly activated by the 
reverse comparison of blinking versus no blinking conditions collapsed across retinal 
illumination conditions (see Figure 5.3; see Table 5.2 for full list of loci). Non- 
oculomotor regions of parietal and prefrontal cortex therefore show a reduction in 
activity during blinking in the presence of retinal stimulation.
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Table 5.2 -  Voluntary blinking > no voluntary blinking (with and without 
reintal stimulation)
x y z p-FDR Z
Cerebellar vermis 9 -66 -12 0.001 5.5
Right middle frontal gyrus 33 39 -21 0.009 4.8
Right inferior temporal gyrus 66 -18 -21 0.011 4.69
Right superior precentral sulcus (FEF) 54 -3 45 0.011 4.64
Left superior precentral sulcus (FEF) -45 -12 45 0.024 4.05
Right superior frontal gyrus (SEF) 3 -6 63 0.011 4.61
Anterior cingulate 0 6 -9 0.011 4.56
Left lingual gyrus -24 -66 9 0.012 4.52
Right inferior temporal gyrus 60 -9 -15 0.014 4.45
Right orbital gyrus 6 36 -21 0.018 4.23
Left superior occipital gyrus -36 -81 39 0.018 4.22
Left superior temporal gyrus -57 0 6 0.020 4.22
Right subcallosal gyrus 15 6 -12 0.022 4.15
Right cerebellar hemisphere 27 -63 -21 0.023 4.11
Right cerebellar hemisphere 30 51 -39 0.025 4.02
Left angular gyrus -51 -69 33 0.026 3.96
Left cerebellar hemisphere -6 -75 -15 0.026 3.95
Medial frontal gyrus 9 66 9 0.035 3.68
The locations, stereotactic coordinates in the space defined by the Montreal Neurological 
Institute template, Z scores, and corresponding p value (corrected for multiple comparisons 
across the volume examined) for the regions activated by blinking versus no blinking. A 
statistical threshold ofp < 0.05, correctedfor multiple comparisons across the entire brain 
volume and a spatial extent threshold of 5 voxels, was used.
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5.4 Discussion
The neural mechanisms underlying blink suppression have always been challenging 
to study because of the confounding effects of the visual-input loss caused by eyelid 
closure; these effects potentially mask any direct extra-retinal effects of blinking on 
brain activity. For example, activity of single neurons in monkey early visual areas 
VI, V2, V3V, and V4V decreases during blinks, demonstrating that visual continuity 
across blinks does not depend on the maintenance of continuous neural activity in 
early visual cortex (Gawne and Martin, 2000;Gawne and Martin, 2002). However, 
these reductions in activity may simply result from the dramatic loss of retinal 
illumination associated with eyelid closure during blinks, rather than reflecting an 
active top-down suppression of visual cortical activity. External darkenings of the 
entire scene also result in a decrease in neuronal activity in all these early visual 
areas (Gawne and Martin, 2002), although in VI the rate of decay of average activity 
is slightly slower, and the overall reduction is smaller than during blinks, suggesting 
that some degree of top-down suppression may occur during blinks (Gawne and 
Martin, 2000).
Here, I successfiilly dissociated the extra-retinal effects of blinking on neural activity 
from its mechanical or optical effects, and I have demonstrated active suppression of 
neuronal activity during blinking, despite continuous visual input. I observed a strong 
and highly significant V3-activity reduction that was associated with blinking (versus 
no blinking) in the presence of retinal stimulation (see Figure 5.2a). This represents a 
reduction in sensitivity to visual stimulation in this region during blinks and, thus, 
could represent a neural mechanism underlying the psychophysical phenomenon of 
blink suppression. The suppression of the response to visual stimulation during 
blinking in this experiment is consistent with the results of my previous experiment 
which revealed a reduced response to visual stimulation in lateral occipital regions 
including V3a (see Chapter 4). However, unlike in my first experiment, this 
experiment did not reveal any suppression of the response to visual stimulation in 
V5/MT because my trans-cranial retinal stimulus failed to significantly activate 
V5/MT.
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Blinking did not significantly suppress the responses to retinal stimulation in the 
LGN and cortical areas VI and V2. This is consistent with the results of my first 
experiment, which likewise did not reveal a reduced response to the presence of 
visual stimulation during blinking in medial occipital regions (see Chapter 4). 
Therefore, it appears that, as in monkeys, activity in the LGN, VI, and V2 may 
reflect visual input during blinks (which here remained continuous) (Gawne and 
Martin, 2002), and any extraretinal modulation of visually evoked activity in these 
areas is modest (Gawne and Martin, 2000). However, note that a positive signal was 
consistently observed in association with blinking in darkness in these areas (see 
Figure 5.2b). This may represent a motor signal that, if also present during retinal 
stimulation, could lead to underestimation of any direct suppressive effect of blinks 
on sensory processing.
Whereas it might have been supposed that blink suppression is a purely low-level 
visual phenomenon, mediated solely by retinotopic visual areas, my whole-brain 
analysis surprisingly revealed that activity evoked by retinal stimulation in parietal 
and frontal cortices was also suppressed by blinking (see Figure 5.3). Similar parietal 
regions also showed a reduced response to visual stimulation during blinking in my 
first experiment (see Chapter 4, Table 4.3). In this study, these regions cannot merely 
be responding to a change in retinal illumination because retinal illumination was not 
affected by eyelid closure during blinks. My special stimulation apparatus and the 
use of opaque goggles ensured that retinal illumination remained constant whether 
the eyes were open or closed. The reduction in activity seen during blinks is therefore 
likely to be related to an extra-retinal neural signal associated with the blink motor 
command from the non-overlapping oculomotor regions (see Figure 5.3; see Table
5.2 for full list of loci).
Activation of parietal and prefrontal cortices has been consistently associated with 
fluctuations in the contents of consciousness, (Rees et al., 2002), for example as 
occurs during binocular rivalry (Lumer et al., 1998), when viewing ambiguous 
figures (Kleinschmidt et al., 1998), or during conscious detection of changes in the 
visual scene (Beck et al., 2001). Loci activated in those studies have similar spatial 
locations to those demonstrating suppressed activity when blinking in the present 
study. Thus, one possible interpretation of my findings is that the observed
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suppression of these parietal and prefrontal regions during blinking represents a 
neural mechanism underlying the lack of awareness of the changes in visual input 
that normally occur during a blink. Specifically, it may account for the lack of 
awareness of the percept of the eyelid descending across the pupil and the resulting 
reduction in retinal illumination.
In contrast to the suppression of activity during retinal stimulation by blinks in both 
retinotopic V3 and parietal and prefrontal cortices, I also observed, in the LGN and 
early visual areas V1-V3, a positive signal associated with blinking in the absence of 
retinal stimulation (Figure 5.IB). Because retinal stimulation was entirely absent in 
these particular conditions, I propose that these activations represent a motor signal 
associated with blinking in visual cortex. This finding replicates earlier, and often 
unremarked, findings of visual cortex activation in darkness during blinking (e.g., 
Figure 4 of (Kato and Miyauchi, 2003a)) in studies that have focused primarily on 
frontal oculomotor control structures (Bodis-Wollner et al., 1999;Kato and Miyauchi, 
2003a;Kato and Miyauchi, 2003b;Tsubota et al., 1999). These observations, plus the 
contextual dependence of blink-associated signals on retinal illumination 
demonstrated here, run strikingly parallel to recent observations of a similar 
dependence of saccadic responses in these brain areas on the presence (or absence) of 
retinal stimulation (Sylvester et al., 2005). When saccades are made in the dark, a 
positive (motor) signal is seen in LGN and VI, whereas during retinal illumination, 
saccades result in a reduction in visually evoked activity in these areas. Taken 
together, these findings may represent some preliminary evidence that blink 
suppression and saccadic suppression share some common neural mechanisms, as 
previously predicted on purely theoretical grounds (Ridder and Tomlinson, 
1997;Volkmann, 1986). Indeed, although any eye movements during a blink are very 
small (Bour et al., 2000;Evinger et al., 1984;Riggs et al., 1987), blinks themselves 
can change the kinematic properties of horizontal saccades (Rambold et al., 2002), 
suggesting that the motor signals associated with blinking and the saccadic premotor 
circuit can interact. Currently, there is good physiological evidence in monkeys for 
the existence of a corollary discharge pathway from the superior colliculus to the 
frontal eye-fields (FEF), during saccades, which may serve to coordinate sequential 
saccades and stabilize vision across saccades (Sommer and Wurtz, 2004a; Sommer 
and Wurtz, 2004b;Wurtz and Sommer, 2004). I speculate that a similar corollary
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discharge pathway may operate during blinks to attenuate their sensory 
consequences.
In this experiment, I did not see any blink related activation in the region along on 
the parieto-occipital fissure (PO) found in the previous experiment (see Chapter 4). 
In Chapter 4 ,1 hypothesized that this parieto-occitial region is the human homologue 
of macaque area V6A and that its activity reflected the maintenance of visual 
continuity across the interruption of visual input cause by a blink. In the previous 
experiment, activity in this region reflected not just the presence of blinking but also 
level of background visual stimulation, with greater activation occurring in the 
presence versus absence of visual stimulation. I proposed that this reflects the 
amount of visual information that needs to be maintained across the interruption 
caused by the blink (See Chapter 4, Discussion). Thus, it is not suprising that this 
region was not activated by blinking in this experiment, as my retinal illumination 
apparatus ensured that visual input was not interrupted by blinks.
115
5.5 Conclusion
In summary, my data demonstrate that responses to retinal illumination are 
suppressed by blinking in retinotopic visual area V3 and in parietal and prefrontal 
cortices, whereas in the absence of retinal stimulation, I identified a positive blink- 
related signal in early visual areas LGN-V3.1 propose that these findings represent a 
neural signature of blinking associated with the blink motor command and may go 
some way toward explaining both the neural mechanisms underlying the visual- 
sensitivity loss, known as blink suppression that occurs during blinks, and why they 
go unnoticed. My findings parallel recent observations of saccade-related changes in 
activity in visual cortex during saccades, suggesting that blink suppression and 
saccadic suppression may indeed share common neural mechanisms. However, the 
precise neural mechanisms relating the blink motor command to the neural 
suppression that I observed here remain to be explored.
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CHAPTER 6: SOCIAL INTERACTION MODIFIES THE NEURAL 
RESPONSE TO GAZE SHIFTS
6.1 Introduction
As described in the General Introduction to this thesis, it has been proposed that the 
mirror system acts in a predictive manner, predicting and simulating the actions of 
others, and then using the internal forward model to predict the sensory 
consequences of these actions (Kilner et al. in submission). The sensory prediction 
can then be compared to the actual sensory feedback and the prediction error used to 
modify the original prediction of what the other person is doing. There is increasing 
evidence that the mirror system does indeed actively predict the actions of others 
rather than simply responding to sensory input (Flanagan and Johansson, 
2003;Fogassi et al., 2005;Haueisen and Knosche, 2001;Kilner et al., 2004;Ramnani 
and Miall, 2004;Rotman et al., 2006;Umilta et al., 2001).
Two recent studies have found that the posterior STS, shows greater activity to 
unpredicted compared to predicted movements (Pelphrey et al., 2003;Pelphrey et al., 
2004a). A smaller haemodynamic response was evoked in the observer’s STS in 
response to gaze shifts directed towards the target, compared to gaze shifts to another 
location in the avatar’s visual field (Pelphrey et al., 2003). Similarly, reaching-to- 
grasp arm movements directed towards a target elicited less activation in the 
observer’s STS compared to arm movements directed away from the target (Pelphrey 
et al., 2004a). This suggests that the STS is sensitive to the goal directedness or 
intentionality of actions. The authors propose that the STS is involved in predicting 
the actions of others, and that the prolonged activity seen when the actor does not 
look at or grasp the target, is due to violation of the observer’s expectations and the 
reformulation of the observer’s prediction. Alternatively the activation of the STS 
could reflect the prediction error. These findings fit well with Kilner’s predictive 
model of the mirror system, which includes the STS (Kilner et al. in submission).
In this chapter, I sought to investigate further the effect of the observer’s expectation 
on the brain activity evoked by observation of another person making a gaze shift. In 
addition to modulating expectation via the presence of a visible target, I will also
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modify the observer’s expectation by changing the social context of the gaze shift 
and thus the intention attributed to the person making the gaze shift.
Gaze is an important social stimulus that indicates the direction of attention of an 
individual. This information is particularly important for social interactions as the 
direction of attention of other individuals can reveal their intentions and future 
actions. In everyday life, it is intuitively apparent that whether an individual is 
socially interacting with us (or not) will affect the significance of their gaze direction 
and thus the importance of determining their direction of gaze. Here I sought to 
examine whether the neural response to gaze shifts was modulated by the intention 
attributed to the person making the gaze shift. I therefore modified an established 
gaze perception paradigm (Pelphrey et al., 2003) to include a social context, and 
studied behavioural responses and brain activity in two linked behavioural and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments.
On each experimental trial, two faces were always presented on screen either side of 
central fixation; but only one was socially relevant (see Figure 6.1). This was 
achieved by ensuring that at the start of each trial one face gazed directly at the 
subject (the ‘social’ face) while the other’s gaze was averted (the ‘unsocial’ face). 
Direct gaze is a more salient and engaging stimulus than averted gaze (Gibson and 
Pick, 1963;Von Grunau and Anston, 1995) and can signal, amongst other types of 
social interaction, the intention to communicate (Kampe et al., 2003). A target then 
appeared on screen (c.f. Pelphrey et al 2003) between the two faces, and one of the 
faces made a gaze shift. This gaze shift could be either towards the target, which I 
termed a ‘correct’ gaze shift, or towards another location in space which I termed an 
‘incorrect’ gaze shift. The gaze shift could be made by either the ‘social’ or the 
‘unsocial’ face, so I could thus manipulate the social context in which a gaze shift 
occurred while controlling for the presence of direct and averted gaze per se. Two 
factors were thus modulated independently in a factorial design: the social context of 
the gaze shift, and the goal directedness of that gaze shift. To ensure that my results 
could not be due to differences in eye movements between conditions, subjects were 
instructed to fixate centrally throughout and their eye-movements were monitored 
with long-range eye tracking.
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I hypothesised that the neural response to gaze shifts would be modulated by the 
feeling of involvement in a social interaction and the perceived communicative 
intention of the gaze shift. Such a feeling of personal involvement in a social 
interaction, mediated by direct versus averted gaze, has previously been shown to 
modulate activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) (Schilbach et al., 2005). In 
addition to seeing increased activation in the STS to ‘incorrect’ compared to ‘correct’ 
gaze shifts (Pelphrey et al., 2003), I hypothesised that the communicative intent 
attributed to the ‘social’ face would give rise to the expectation that this face would 
make a gaze shift, leading to greater STS activation when this prediction is violated 
by the ‘unsocial’ face making the gaze shift, if, as has been proposed, the STS is 
indeed involved in predicting actions (Ramnani and Miall, 2004) and shows greater 
activation when these predictions are violated (Pelphrey et al., 2003).
Gaze perception activates a fronto-parietal network of regions, plus the occipito­
temporal cortex, including the STS (Grosbras et al., 2005). This fronto-parietal 
network is also activated by execution of eye movements and by shifts of spatial 
attention (Corbetta et al., 1998;Grosbras et al., 2005;Kato et al., 2001;Nobre et al.,
1997), suggesting that attentional and oculomotor processes are closely related at the 
neuronal level (Corbetta et al., 1998). Activation of common areas by eye 
movements and gaze perception therefore indicates the existence of an oculomotor 
“mirror system” (Grosbras et al., 2005), which could account for automatic 
reorienting of spatial attention in response to gaze (Driver et al., 1999;Langton and 
Bruce, 1999). If as proposed by Kilner and colleagues the mirror system acts in a 
predictive manner, then I would expect to see increased activation in this fronto­
parietal network in response to the ‘incorrect’ and ‘unsocial’ conditions, compared to 
the ‘correct’ and ‘social’ conditions respectively. Such increased activation in this 
front-parietal network could reflect either a reformulation of the observer’s 
prediction or the prediction error in these two conditions when the observer’s 
expectation is violated in the ‘incorrect’ and ‘unsocial’ conditions, as would the 
predicted increased activation of the STS in these conditions. I also hypothesised that 
the salience of the social face might lead to enhancement of the effects of goal 
directedness (i.e. ‘correct’ versus ‘incorrect’ gaze shifts) on the response to gaze 
shifts, due to greater attention being paid to the gaze shifts made by the social face.
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6.2 Materials and Methods
6.2.1 Behavioural experiment
Prior to scanning I conducted a behavioural experiment to verify that the face with 
direct gaze was indeed more engaging than the face with averted gaze, and to see 
whether the subject’s spatial attention was attracted to the target prior to being 
shifted in the direction of gaze.
6.2.1.1 Subjects
Ten normal volunteers (5 male and 5 female, aged 18 to 41, mean=27.1, SD=8.2) 
gave written informed consent to participate in the study, which was approved by the 
Institute of Neurology and National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery Joint 
Ethics Committee.
6.2.1.2 Stimuli and paradigm
Visual stimuli were presented on a computer screen, using Cogent 
(http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.Uk/Cogent/T Stimuli consisted of video clips of two 
people, one male and one female, presented side by side, from the neck upwards.
One of the faces, the ‘social’ face, looked directly towards the subject, and the other 
face, the ‘unsocial’ face had its gaze averted. The faces appeared on screen at the 
start of each trial, and after 1.5 seconds a target, consisting of a red and white 
flickering bull’s eye, appeared at one of three possible locations between the two 
faces, within each character’s field of view; at eye level, above eye level, and below 
eye level. 500ms after target appearance one of the faces shifted their gaze towards 
the target, a ‘correct’ gaze shift, or towards one of the two other locations at which 
the target could have but did not appear, an ‘incorrect’ gaze shift.
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The experiment thus consisted of four conditions (See Figure 6.1):
1. SC ‘Social’ face makes a ‘correct’ gaze shift to target
2. SI ‘Social’ face makes an ‘incorrect’ gaze shift to empty location
3. UC ‘Unsocial’ face makes a ‘correct’ gaze shift to target






In each trial two faces appeared on screen, one o f which looked directly at the subject (the 
‘social’ face), and the other with averted gaze (the ‘unsocial ’face). After 1.5 seconds a 
target appeared at eye level between the two faces at one of three possible positions. 500ms 
later one of the faces then made a gaze shift, which could either be towards the target 
( ‘correct’gaze shift) or towards an empty location (‘incorrect’ gaze shift). Thus there were 
four possible conditions: ‘social’ face makes a ‘correct’ gaze shift (SV); ‘social’ face makes 
an ‘incorrect’gaze shift (SI); ‘unsocial’face makes a ‘correct’gaze shift (UV); ‘unsocial’ 
face makes an ‘incorrect’gaze shift (UI). There was also a baseline condition in which
neither face’s eyes moved (NM).
Figure 6.1 - Stimuli
Target appears End of gaze shift
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The gaze shifts lasted 100ms; the eyes then remained in their final positions, and the 
target remained on screen until the end of the trial. The size of the gaze shift made by 
the face was the same for each condition, and consisted of a 71° shift in the direction 
of gaze of the face, either from the centre to the side for the ‘social’ face, or between 
different locations around the face for the ‘unsocial’ face. A small white fixation 
cross was presented in the centre of the screen, (at eye level between the two faces), 
throughout the experiment and subjects were instructed to fixate this cross.
Subjects were instructed to indicate whether the face which made the gaze shift 
looked at the target or not by pressing a button. They were told to respond as quickly 
as possible and reaction times were recorded. The next trial began 1 second after the 
subject pressed the button.
Each trial type was presented 48 times, with a total of 192 trials being presented to 
each subject, and trial order was randomised.
6.2.1.3 Statistical analysis
The mean of the reaction times was calculated for each condition for each subject, 
and a repeated measures ANOVA was used to examine the effects of sociability of 
the face making the gaze shift (‘social’ face versus ‘unsocial’ face), and direction of 
the gaze shift (‘correct’ versus ‘incorrect’ gaze shifts) on reaction times.
6.2.2 fMRI experiment
6.2.2.1 Subjects
Twelve normal volunteers (4 male and 8 female, aged 18 to 40, mean=24.73, 
SD=6.42) gave written informed consent to participate in the study, which was 
approved by the Institute of Neurology and National Hospital for Neurology and 
Neurosurgery Joint Ethics Committee.
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6.2.2.2 Stimuli and paradigm
Visual stimuli were presented on a screen viewed by a mirror mounted on the head 
coil, using Cogent (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/). The same stimuli were 
used as in the behavioural experiment (see above), plus an additional baseline 
condition in which neither face made a gaze shift (NM) (see Figure 6.1).
As in the behavioural study the gaze shifts lasted 100ms. The eyes then remained in 
their final positions, and the target remained on screen until the end of the trial 2 
seconds later. Trials were separated by a four second interval during which a blank 
screen was presented. A small white fixation cross was presented in the centre of the 
screen, (at eye level between the two faces), throughout the experiment and subjects 
were instructed to fixate this cross. Subjects were instructed to indicate whether the 
face which made the gaze shift looked at the target or not, or whether there had been 
no gaze shift, by pressing a button They were instructed to wait until the appearance 
of the blank screen at the end of the trial before answering the question.
Each trial type was presented 48 times, with a total of 240 trials being presented to 
each subject, and trial order was randomised.
6.2.23 Imaging
A 3T Siemens ALLEGRA system (Siemens, Erlangen) was used to acquire gradient- 
echo echo-planar T2* weighted images with Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent 
(BOLD) contrast. Each volume consisted of forty 3mm axial slices with in-plane 
resolution of 3x3 mm positioned to cover the whole brain with a TR of 2.6 seconds. 
Imaging was performed in one scanning run of 780 volumes. In each scanning run, 
six image volumes preceding presentation of the experimental conditions were 
discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects. Eye movements were monitored 
continually during scanning using an ASL Eye-Tracking System (Applied Science 
Laboratories, Bedford) with remote optics (Model 504, sampling rate = 60Hz) that 
was custom-adapted for use in the scanner. Finally, a T1-weighted anatomical image 
was acquired from each subject.
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6.2.2,4 Statistical analysis of fMRI data
Data were analysed using Statistical Parametric Mapping software (SPM2;
Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spmy The 
initial six volumes were discarded, and subsequent image volumes then realigned, 
(Friston et al., 1995) spatially normalised (Ashbumer and Friston, 1999) to the 
standard space defined by the Montreal Neurological Institute template (Mazziotta et 
al., 1995) and smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 6mm full-width half maximum. 
Voxels activated during the experiment were identified using a general linear model 
that included the five experimental conditions. The gaze shifts were modelled as 
events with duration 120 ms, and the no gaze shift condition was modelled as an 
event with 120 ms duration at the time a gaze shift would normally have occurred. 
High-pass filtering removed low-frequency drifts in signal, and global changes were 
removed by proportional scaling. Each component of the model served as a regressor 
in a multiple regression analysis. The resulting parameter estimates for each 
regressor at each voxel were then entered into a second level analysis where subject 
served as a random effect in a within-subjects ANOVA. The main effects and 
interactions between conditions were then specified by appropriately weighted linear 
contrasts and determined using the t-statistic on a voxel-by-voxel basis.
6.2.2,5 Statistical analysis of eye-tracker data
Eye-movement data were analysed using custom made Matlab scripts to ensure that 
subjects maintained fixation and that there were no differences in eye movements 
between conditions. The total length of scan path was compared across conditions. I 
also compared the mean distance between the eye position at each time point and the 
average eye position (a measure of fixation) across conditions.
I also compared average eye position during each trial for different target locations, 
for the different locations (left or right side of screen) of the ‘social’ face, whether or 
not it made the gaze shift, for the different locations (left or right side of screen) of 
the face making the gaze shift, whether it was the ‘social’ or ‘unsocial’ face, and for 




Reaction times were significantly faster (F(i)9)=44.0, p<0.000) when the gaze shifts 
were made by the ‘social’ face (mean RT = 710ms) rather than the ‘unsocial’ face 
(mean RT = 793ms). In addition reaction times were significantly faster (F(i,9)= 18.1, 
p = 0.002) for ‘correct’ gaze shifts (mean RT = 711ms) compared to ‘incorrect’ gaze 
shifts (mean RT = 792ms; see Figure 6.2). There appeared to be an interaction 
between direction of gaze shift (‘correct’ v. ‘incorrect’) and face making the gaze 
shift (‘social’ vs. ‘unsocial’), such that the effect of direction on reaction time is 
greater for the ‘social’ face than for the ‘unsocial’ face, and this interaction tended 
towards significance (F(i,9 )= 4.08, p=0.074).




Mean reaction time averaged across subjects for each of the four conditions: 'social ’face 
makes a ‘correct’gaze shift (SV); ‘social’face makes an ‘incorrect’gaze shift (SI); 




6.3.2.1 All types o f  gaze shift minus no eye-movement
The main effect of observing gaze shifts, i.e. all conditions with a gaze shift -  no 
eye-movement condition (thresholded at p<0.05 FDR-corrected), revealed bilateral 
activation in a large region of the occipito-temporal cortex, from the posterior 
horizontal segment of the superior temporal sulcus to the inferior occipital sulcus 
(see Figure 6.3).
Figure 6.3 - Regions activated by observation of gaze shifts
all gaze shift > no eye movement
Saggittal, coronal, and axial views of maximum intensity projections o f a statistical 
parametric map showing activation (p<0.001 uncorrected with a spatial extent threshold of 
3 voxels) during the observation of gaze shifts in all conditions containing a gaze shift 
compared with the no eye movement condition. Observation o f gaze shift activated large 
bilateral regions of the temporo-occipital cortex, from the posterior horizontal segment of 
the superior temporal sulcus to the inferior occipital sulcus, and several bilateral clusters in 
the parietal cortex, mostly located around the intra-parietal sulcus. A large region in the left 
frontal cortex in the precentral gyrus and middle frontal gyrus, around the junction o f the 
inferior precentral sulcus and the inferior frontal sulcus, and in a cluster in the left orbital 
gyrus were also activated by observation of gaze shifts.
Several clusters in the parietal cortex, mostly located around the intra-parietal sulcus, 
were also activated bilaterally. Observing gaze shifts also activated a large region in 
the left frontal cortex in the precentral gyrus and middle frontal gyrus, around the 
junction of the inferior precentral sulcus and the inferior frontal sulcus, and a cluster 
in the left orbital gyrus. The left parahippocampal gyrus was also activated, as was a 
cluster in the right lateral fissure.
126
6.3.2.2 ‘Incorrect’gaze shift minus ‘correct’ gaze shifts (see Figure 6.4)
Conditions where the person made an ‘incorrect’ gaze shift, i.e. shifted their gaze but 
not to the target location, were compared to conditions where the person made the 
‘correct’ gaze shift, i.e. shifted their gaze towards the target, at p<0.001 uncorrected. 
This revealed areas in the parietal and frontal cortices that showed greater activation 
to the perception of ‘incorrect’ gaze shift than to ‘correct’ gaze shifts.
I had hypothesised that regions activated by gaze shifts would show greater 
activation to ‘incorrect’ gaze shifts compared to ‘correct’ gaze shifts. Therefore I 
examined the contrast ‘incorrect -  correct’ at a threshold of p<0.05 uncorrected, 
masked by ‘gaze shift -  no movement’ at a threshold of p<0.01 uncorrected (see 
Table 6.1 a). This revealed the regions that respond to gaze shift that also showed a 
greater response to ‘incorrect’ gaze shifts. These areas included a network of regions 
in the parietal and frontal cortices. Parietal regions revealed were mostly located 
around the intra-parietal sulcus bilaterally, and the main frontal area was a large 
cluster around the left pre-central gyrus and the middle frontal gyrus. Areas in the 
occipito-temporal lobe also showed greater activation to ‘incorrect’ gaze shifts.
These included an area around the anterior part of lateral occipital sulcus, the 
superior part of the middle occipital gyrus, and parts of the posterior horizontal 
segment of the STS. (See Table 6.1a for lull details of activated loci).
6,3.23 ‘Unsocial’gaze shifts minus ‘social’gaze shifts (see Figure 6.4)
Conditions where the gaze shift was made by the ‘social’ face were compared to 
conditions where the gaze shift was made by the ‘unsocial’ face. The contrast 
‘unsocial -  social’ (p<0.05 uncorrected), masked by ‘gaze shift -  no eye-movement’ 
(p<0.01 uncorrected), revealed regions activated by gaze shifts that showed greater 
activation to gaze shifts made by the ‘unsocial’ face than to gaze shifts made by the 
‘social’ face (see Table 6.1b). These areas included the several clusters in the 
superior parietal cortex bilaterally, and the left posterior horizontal STS. The lateral 
occipital sulcus, and the middle occipital gyrus, and the left inferior pre-central 
sulcus areas also showed this pattern of activation, as did the left anterior thalamic 
nucleus. (See Table 6.1b for lull details of activated loci).
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Figure 6.4 -  Fronto-parietal attention network showing greater activation to 
‘incorrect’gaze shifts and to gaze shifts made by the ‘unsocial’ face
Superior view of a standard Tl weighted image rendered in the standard space defined by 
the Montreal Neurological Institute template, with loci showing a greater response to 
‘incorrect’ compared to ‘correct’ gaze shifts (I-V (p<0.05 uncorrected) masked by GS- 
NM(p<0.01 uncorrected), with spatial extent threshold of 3 voxels) shown superimposed in 
red on the rendered image. Regions showing a greater response to gaze shifts made by the 
‘unsocial’ compared to the ‘social’face (U-S thresholded atp<0.05 (uncorrected) masked 
by GS- NM, thresholded atp<0.01 (uncorrected)) with spatial extent threshold of 3 voxels) 
are shown superimposed in green on the rendered image. Regions o f overlap, which show a 
greater response to ‘incorrect ’ gaze shifts and to ‘unsocial ’ gaze shifts are shown in yellow).
6.3.2.4 Areas activated by ‘incorrect’ gaze shifts and ‘unsocial’ gaze shifts
I examined whether the regions that show a significant response to ‘incorrect’ versus 
‘correct’ gaze shifts, were also activated more strongly when gaze shifts were made 
by the ‘unsocial’ than the ‘social’ face. The contrast ‘unsocial -  social’ (p<0.05) 
masked by ‘incorrect -  correct’ (p<0.01) revealed areas in the parietal, occipital and 
frontal cortices that show greater activation to ‘incorrect’ versus ‘correct’ gaze shifts, 
that also show a greater response to gaze shifts made by the ‘unsocial’ compared to 
the ‘social’ face. The parietal areas showing this pattern of activation included the 
right superior parietal gyrus, the right junction of the traverse and intra parietal sulci,
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the right supramarginal gyrus, and the left IPS. In the occipital lobe the region 
around the left lateral occipital sulcus was revealed by this contrast. In the frontal 
cortex the areas showing this pattern of activation included the right middle frontal 
gyrus, and the left inferior frontal sulcus. (See Table 6.1c and Figure 6.4).
Table 6.1 -  Regions activated by incorrect gaze shifts & unsocial gaze shifts
X y z p-unc z
a) Incorrect > correct (p<0,05 uncor)masked by GS>NM (p=0.011itncor)
TPS / SPG / IPS 12 -69 54 0 3.81
TPS/SPG/IPS -18 -69 51 0.027 1.93
IPS / supramarginal / angular gyrus -33 -45 39 0 3.5
supramarginal gyrus / IPS 48 -33 48 0.001 3.07
posterior lateral fissure -48 -42 27 0.002 2.9
IPS -24 -69 33 0 3.47
pSTSh / angular gyrus / superior MOG 39 -75 33 0.001 3.25
pSTSh (and MOG) -39 -81 30 0.008 2.43
pSTSh 48 -60 9 0.016 2.14
STG 63 -39 18 0.003 2.78
LOS -48 -66 0 0.004 2.68
LOS 60 -63 -6 0.006 2.51
postcentral gyrus / inferior postcentral sulcus 51 -21 36 0.003 2.72
precentral gyrus / IPCS / MFG / IFS -39 0 39 0.002 2.96
MFG / inferior frontal sulcus -45 21 33 0.003 2.75
MFG -36 -6 66 0.006 2.52
superior precentral sulcus -45 3 54 0.016 2.14
superior frontal sulcus 27 -3 51 0.003 2.72
superior frontal sulcus -21 -6 54 0.009 2.36
Superior frontal gyrus -24 -9 75 0.012 2.26
short insular gyri -33 21 0 0.015 2.17
Abbreviations: middle occipital gyrus (MOG); lateral occipital sulcus (LOS); middle 
temporal gyrus (MTG); superior temporal gyrus (STG); horizontal segment of posterior 
superior temporal sulcus (pSTSh); intra-parietal sulcus (IPS); superior parietal gyrus 
(SPG); traverse parietal sulcus (TPS); middle frontal gyrus (MFG); superior frontal gyrus 
(SFG); inferior frontal sulcus (IPS); inferio r precentral sulcus (IPCS);
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Table 6.1 cont -  Regions activated by incorrect gaze shifts & unsocial gaze
shifts
X y z p-unc z
b) Unsocial > social (p«0,05 uncor) masked by GS> NM (p=0.01 uncor)
TPS/SPG/IPS 12 -69 54 0.002 2.96
IPS -24 -72 36 0.007 2.43
supramarginal gyrus 48 -33 48 0.008 2.4
angular gyrus -36 -81 33 0.026 1.95
pSTSh -42 -69 15 0.025 1.97
sulcus lunatus/MOG/pSTSh -36 -81 18 0.004 2.69
MOG (between pSTSh and LOS) 39 -81 24 0.01 2.31
Inferior MOG/LOS -42 -69 -3 0.002 2.91
LOS 48 -54 -3 0.005 2.57
Inferior precentral sulcus -54 9 27 0.005 2.55
anterior thalamic nucleus -9 -3 6 0.01 2.32
c) Unsocial > social (p<0.05 uncor) masked by incorrect > correct (p=0.01 uncor)
TPS/SPG/IPS 12 -69 54 0.002 2.96
IPS -24 -72 36 0.007 2.43
supramarginal gyrus 51 -33 48 0.007 2.45
MFG 45 15 45 0.004 2.63
Inferior MFG 48 33 30 0.014 2.2
IFS -42 21 27 0.02 2.05
LOS -45 -66 -3 0.017 2.11
63,2,5 ‘Correct’ gaze shifts minus ‘incorrect’ gaze shifts
The contrast o f ‘correct’ gaze shifts and ‘incorrect’ gaze shifts (p<0.001 uncorrected) 
revealed regions that showed greater activation to ‘correct’ gaze shifts than 
‘incorrect’ gaze shifts, largely in the medial frontal cortex. These areas include the 
cingulate gyrus bilaterally, the medial superior frontal gyrus bilaterally, the left 
posterior orbital gyrus, the right ffonto-polar gyrus, the left medial orbital gyrus and 
olfactory sulcus, and the gyrus rectus bilaterally. The left middle temporal gyrus and 
the right fusiform gyrus also showed greater activation for ‘correct’ compared to 
‘incorrect’ gaze shifts. (See Table 6.2a for full details of activated loci).
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6.3.2.6 ‘Social’gaze shifts minus ‘unsocial’gaze shifts
The contrast ‘social -  unsocial’ (p<0.05), masked by ‘gaze shift -  no eye-movement’ 
(p<0.05), revealed regions that are activated by gaze shifts that show a greater 
response to gaze shifts made by the ‘social’ face, than to gaze shifts made by the 
‘unsocial’ face, mainly in the frontal and occipital cortices. The frontal regions 
included the superior frontal gyrus bilaterally, the lateral orbital gyrus bilaterally, and 
the left superior pre-central sulcus, while the occipital areas included the left 
calcarine sulcus, the middle occipital gyrus and lateral occipital sulcus bilaterally. 
Parts of the temporal lobe also showed this pattern of activation including the middle 
temporal gyrus bilaterally, and a cluster in right superior temporal gyrus/sulcus. The 
right hippocampus/parahippocampal gyms also showed greater bilateral activation to 
gaze shifts made by the ‘social’ face. The only parietal region showing this pattern of 
activation was a cluster in the angular gyms. (See Table 6.2b for full details of 
activated loci).
Table 6.2 -  Regions activated by correct gaze shifts & correct gaze shifts
a) Correct > Incorrect (p<0.001 uncorrected)
X y z p-unc z
cingulate gyrus 9 30 -12 0 4.17
cingulate gyrus -6 33 -9 0 3.59
medial superior frontal gyms -6 63 21 0 4.05
superior frontal gyms 15 48 21 0 3.41
posterior orbital gyrus -30 36 -12 0 3.7
medial orbital gyms/olfactory sulcus -12 45 -15 0 3.49
frontopolar gyri 3 60 0 0 3.49
gyms rectus -3 42 -21 0 3.42
circular insular sulcus -33 -15 27 0 3.31
MTG -66 -24 -6 0 4.34
middle occipital gyms 42 -87 0 0 3.7
fusiform gyms 36 -69 -12 0 3.34
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Table 6.2 cont- Regions activated by correct gaze shifts & social gaze shifts
X y z p-unc z
b) Social > unsocial (p<0.05 uncor) masked by GS > NM (p=0.01 uncor)
calcarine sulcus -18 -63 3 0 3.74
parahippocampal gyrus/hippocampus 30 -36 -3 0.003 2.8
lateral orbital gyrus -39 42 -15 0.004 2.67
lateral orbital gyrus/orbital sulcus 33 39 -9 0.015 2.17
MTG -57 -42 -6 0.004 2.63
MTG 51 -42 0 0.009 2.36
MOG -48 -81 3 0.009 2.37
MOG 48 -75 0 0.023 1.99
Inferior MOG -48 -81 -6 0.013 2.22
LOS/inferior MOG 48 -72 -9 0.008 2.41
LOS 39 -69 6 0.008 2.4
superior frontal gyrus -12 -9 78 0.011 2.28
superior frontal gyrus 15 -24 78 0.012 2.27
superior precentral sulcus -45 12 45 0.014 2.21
superior temporal gyrus/next to STS 66 -33 6 0.027 1.92
angular gyrus between pSTSh and IPS 33 -69 27 0.04 1.75
c) Social > unsocial (p<0.05 uncor) masked by correct > incorrect (p=0.01 uncor)
medial precuneus/cingulated gyrus 0 -51 30 0.001 2.97
medial precuneus 3 -60 18 0.013 2.21
supraorbital sulcus/SFG/cingulate sulcus -3 48 -3 0.002 2.96
SFG 9 54 24 0.003 2.75
SFG/frontopolar gyri -6 63 9 0.011 2.29
SFG -12 39 45 0.012 2.27
gyrus rectus 0 30 -30 0.009 2.39
gyrus rectus 0 48 -24 0.018 2.09
H-shaped orbital sulcus -27 33 -9 0.011 2.3
Inferior temporal gyrus/sulcus 45 0 -33 0.005 2.58
MTG -66 -21 -9 0.02 2.05
anterior MTG -60 -3 -18 0.015 2.16
lingual gyrus -3 -84 -3 0.014 2.19
intra/traverse occipital sulcus -27 -87 3 0.026 1.94
132
6.3.2.7 Areas activated by ‘correct' gaze shifts and ‘social'gaze shifts
I examined whether the regions that showed a greater response to the ‘correct’ than 
to ‘incorrect’ gaze shifts, were also activated more strongly when gaze shifts were 
made by the ‘social’ than the ‘unsocial’ face. The contrast ‘social -  unsocial’ 
(p<0.05) masked by ‘correct -  incorrect’ (p<0.01) revealed areas that showed this 
pattern of activation. Several clusters in the medial prefrontal cortex showed this 
pattern of activation. (See Figure 6.5 and Table 6.2c for full details of activated loci). 
The medial precuneus, close to the posterior cingulate gyrus and parieto-occipital 
fissure also showed this pattern of activation, as did two clusters in the left middle 
temporal gyrus, a cluster in the traverse-occipital sulcus, and a cluster in the right 
inferior temporal gyrus/sulcus.
Figure 6.5 -  Medial prefrontal cortex and medial precuneus show a greater
response to ‘correct' gaze shifts and to gaze shifts made by the ‘social' face
Activity revealed by the contrast between conditions where the gaze shift was made by the
atp<0.05 uncorrected, masked by the contrast between ‘incorrect’ and ‘correct ’ gaze shifts 
(i.e. I -  V), thresholded at p<0.01 (uncorrected), overlaid on a Saggittal and a coronal slice 
o f the standard Tl weighted structural image in the standard space defined by the Montreal 
Neurological Institute template. The colour scale reflects the t value at each voxel. Regions 
revealed by this contrast showed greater activation to ‘correct ’ compared to ‘incorrect ’ gaze 
shifts and also show greater activation to gaze shifts made by the ‘social ’ compared to 
‘unsocial ’face. These regions include the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the medial
MPFC




I hypothesised that the effects of goal directedness (i.e. ‘correct’ versus ‘incorrect’ 
gaze shifts) on the response to gaze shifts might be greater for gaze shifts made by 
the ‘social’ face than for gaze shifts made by the ‘unsocial’ face due to the greater 
salience of the social face. Therefore I looked for areas showing an interaction 
between the direction of the gaze shift and the face making the gaze shift within the 
regions showing an effect of the goal directedness of the gaze shift, such that this 
effect was greater for the social face.
Areas showing a greater increase in response to ‘incorrect’ compared to ‘correct’ 
gaze shifts for ‘social’ than for ‘unsocial’ faces were revealed by masking the 
interaction contrast ‘(SI-SC)-(UI-UC)’ (p<0.05 uncorrected) with ‘incorrect -  
correct’ (p<0.01 uncorrected). A few small clusters showing this pattern of 
activation were found located in the right superior parietal gyrus where the intra and 
traverse parietal sulci meet, the supramarginal gyrus bilaterally, the right inferior 
frontal sulcus, and the right precentral gyms, all of which are part of the fronto­
parietal attentional network.
Areas showing a greater increase in response to ‘correct’ compared to ‘incorrect’ 
gaze shifts for ‘social’ than for ‘unsocial’ faces were revealed by masking the 
interaction contrast ‘(SC-SI)-(UC-UI)’ (p<0.05) with ‘correct -  incorrect’ (p<0.01). 
One region located around the right middle frontal gyms and superior frontal sulcus 
showed this pattern of activation.
6.3.3 Eye-tracker data analysis
There were no significant differences between experimental conditions on length of 
scan path, mean distance between the eye position at each time point, and average 
eye position. Subject’s therefore fixated equally well in all conditions. There was no 
effect of target location, of the location of the ‘social’ face, nor of the position of the 
face making the gaze shift on average eye position. There was also no effect of gaze 
shift end position on eye position. Differences in eye movements between conditions 




As hypothesised, I found a significant effect of both the direction of the gaze shift 
and of the sociability of face making the shift on reaction times (see Figure 6.2). 
Faster reaction times in the ‘correct’ condition suggest that the appearance of the 
target acted as an exogenous cue that directs attention covertly towards the target 
location. Consequently subjects were able to detect gaze shift towards this location 
more quickly and accurately than gaze shifts towards another location. Faster 
reaction times in the ‘social’ condition suggests that subjects’ attention was covertly 
attracted to the ‘social’ face, thus enabling faster detection of the direction of gaze 
shifts made by the ‘social’ face. This supports my hypothesis that subjects would be 
engaged more by the ‘social’ face than the ‘unsocial’ face, and the notion that direct 
gaze is a strongly engaging social stimulus (Von Grunau and Anston, 1995).
6.4.2 fMRI experiment
Observation of gaze shifts activated large regions of the temporo-occipital cortex, 
from the posterior horizontal segment of the superior temporal sulcus to the inferior 
occipital sulcus, plus several bilateral clusters in the parietal cortex, mostly located 
around the intra-parietal sulcus (see Results and Figure 6.3). Observing gaze shifts 
also activated a large region in the left frontal cortex in the precentral gyrus and 
middle frontal gyrus, around the junction of the inferior precentral sulcus and the 
inferior frontal sulcus, and a cluster in the left orbital gyrus. Thus, the regions 
activated by observing gaze shifts in my study included the fronto-parietal network 
of regions that is activated by shifts of spatial attention (Corbetta et al.,
1998;Grosbras et al., 2005;Kato et al., 2001;Nobre et al., 1997) and by making eye- 
movements (Grosbras et al., 2005). The posterior STS was also activated by gaze 
perception in my study. Activation of these regions by gaze shifts is consistent with 
the results of several other studies of gaze perception including a meta analysis of 
eight other studies (Grosbras et al., 2005;Hoffrnan and Haxby, 2000;Hooker et al., 
2003;Pelphrey et al., 2003;Pelphrey et al., 2004b;Puce et al., 1998;Wicker et al.,
1998). Thus, my findings are consistent with the notion that gaze perception involves
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the face responsive region in the STS and the spatial attention network in the parietal 
and frontal cortices (Haxby et al., 2002).
Activation of the occipito-temporal lobe, including the middle temporal gyrus, is 
most likely a simple response to the motion (of the eyes) in the gaze shift condition, 
as my baseline lacked any such motion. This region of activation is consistent with 
the location of area V5/MT, which responds to visual motion (Zeki et al., 1991).
I sought to examine whether the neural response to gaze shifts was modulated by two 
factors: the social context of the gaze shift (i.e. whether it was made by the socially 
engaging face or by the ‘unsocial’ face); and the goal directedness of the gaze shift 
(i.e. whether it was towards the target or not). I was specifically interested in 
examining modulation of gaze-perception related activity in the STS, as the STS has 
already been shown to respond to the perceived intentionality of actions (Pelphrey et 
al., 2004a), and to have a greater response to gaze shifts when these are not made 
towards a visible target (Pelphrey et al., 2003). In addition, I identified two different 
networks that were modulated by these factors in different ways: first, a fronto­
parietal network involved in gaze perception, eye movements and shifts of attention 
described above; second, a network consisting of a set of medial prefrontal regions, 
and a region in the posterior parietal/cingulate cortex.
6,4,2.1 Superior temporal sulcus
Bilateral regions of the posterior horizontal segment of the STS, and adjacent middle 
occipital gyrus, showed a greater response to ‘incorrect’ compared to ‘correct’ gaze 
shifts (p<0.05 un-corrected masked by ‘gaze shift -  no eye movement’ at p<0.01). 
This is consistent with the results of Pelphrey et al. (Pelphrey et al., 2003), who 
found that activity in the STS lasted significantly longer for gaze shifts towards 
empty locations in space than for gaze shifts towards a target. The posterior STS is 
involved in predicting the actions of others (Ramnani and Miall, 2004) and Pelphrey 
and colleagues propose that prolonged activation of the STS observed for ‘incorrect’ 
gaze shifts reflects violation of the observer’s prediction (Pelphrey et al., 2003). The 
observer predicts that the face will look towards the target when it appears, and when 
this occurs their expectations are met. However, when the face shifts its gaze to
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another location, the observer’s prediction is violated, leading to increased STS 
activity, perhaps due to reformulation of the observer’s expectations about the 
other’s behaviour, or due to the prediction of a second gaze shift from the empty 
location to the target (Pelphrey et al., 2003). The increased activity in the STS could 
also reflect the prediction error between the observer’s prediction of what the actor is 
going to do and the actual action observed. This effect appears to be less strong in 
my experiment than for Pelphrey and colleagues (2003), perhaps because the 
maximum distance between the target and the end point of an ‘incorrect’ gaze shift 
was 90° in my study, whereas in Pelphrey’s experiment the target and the end point 
of an ‘incorrect’ gaze shift could be as much as 180° apart. A greater discrepancy 
between the target and the gaze shift could cause even greater activation in the STS.
The left posterior horizontal segment of the STS, and the bilateral middle occipital 
gyrus, just below the STS, also showed greater activation to gaze shifts made by the 
‘social’ face versus the ‘unsocial’ face. As with the increased activity for ‘incorrect’ 
gaze shifts this increase in activity for the ‘unsocial’ face can be explained in terms 
of expectation violation. Eye-contact can signal the intention to communicate 
(Kampe et al., 2003;Saxe, 2006) and as such the observer might expect the face 
looking at them to indicate the presence of the target by looking at it, more than they 
expect the ‘unsocial’ face to do so. When the ‘social’ face makes the eye movement 
this expectation is met, but when the ‘unsocial’ face makes the gaze shift the 
expectation is violated leading to increased activity in the STS, which could either 
reflect the generation of new predictions or the prediction error.
The increased activation of the STS during the ‘unsocial’ and ‘incorrect’ conditions 
is consistent with Kilner’s predictive model of the mirror system, which includes the 
STS (Kilner et al. in submission).
6.4.2.2 Fronto-parietal network
Activity in a network of parietal and frontal regions, mainly located around the intra 
parietal sulcus and the precentral gyrus and sulcus, was greater in response to 
‘incorrect’ gaze shifts, than to gaze shifts that correctly acquired the target (‘correct’ 
gaze shifts) (p<0.05 uncorrected masked by ‘gaze shift -  no eye movement’ at
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p<0.01). This is consistent with Pelphrey et al. (2003) where a greater response was 
found in the intra parietal sulcus to ‘incorrect’ versus ‘correct’ gaze shifts. A similar 
network of fronto-parietal regions also showed greater activation for gaze shifts 
made by the unsocial, compared to the ‘social’ face (p<0.05 uncorrected masked by 
‘gaze shift -  no eye movement’ at p<0.01).
This fronto-parietal network is also activated by execution of eye movements, and is 
thought to be part of an oculomotor “mirror system” (Grosbras et al., 2005). It 
therefore appears that this oculomotor mirror system showed a greater response to 
‘incorrect’ gaze shifts, and greater activation to gaze shifts when they were made by 
the ‘unsocial’ face (though to a lesser extent than for ‘incorrect’ gaze shifts) (see 
Figure 6.4). If as proposed by Kilner and colleagues the mirror system acts in a 
predictive manner, the increased activation in this front-parietal network could reflect 
either a reformulation of the observer’s prediction or the prediction error when the 
observer’s expectation is violated in the ‘incorrect’ and ‘unsocial’ conditions, as does 
the increased activation observed in the STS in these conditions.
However, many studies have also shown that this fronto-parietal network is involved 
in shifting spatial attention (Corbetta et al., 1998;Grosbras et al., 2005;Kato et al., 
2001;Nobre et al., 1997). (See Figure 6.3). Thus, the difference in activation seen in 
this attentional network between the different conditions can simply be accounted for 
by the number of shifts of attention that occur in each condition.
In both ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ conditions the subject’s covert attention was 
exogenously shifted to the target location by the appearance of the target (see 
behavioural results). Gaze automatically induces reflexive shifts in spatial attention 
in the direction of gaze, thus the gaze shift that follows the appearance of the target 
will automatically shift the subject’s attention in the direction of the gaze shift 
(Driver et al., 1999;Langton and Bruce, 1999). In the ‘correct’ condition, the gaze 
shift directs the subject’s attention towards the target location, but ‘incorrect’ gaze 
shifts direct attention away from the target. Thus the ‘incorrect’ condition involves a 
second reallocation of attention, which could account for the increased activity seen 
in the spatial attention network.
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Some parts of the fronto-parietal attentional network also showed an interaction 
between the effects of gaze shift direction and the face making the gaze shift, such 
that the increase in activity seen during ‘incorrect’ compared to ‘correct’ gaze shifts 
is greater when the gaze shifts are made by the ‘social’ face. The social face is an 
extremely salient stimulus, thus it is likely that gaze shifts made by the social face 
attract the subject’s attention more strongly that gaze shifts made by the unsocial 
face, leading to a stronger reallocation of attention from the target location in the 
direction of the gaze shift, in the social condition, and thus a greater increase in 
activation in these attentional areas.
The increased activation to gaze shifts made by the ‘unsocial’ face, compared to the 
‘social’ face, that I observed, may also be accounted for by a difference in the 
number of shifts of attention occurring in the two conditions. The direct gaze of the 
‘social’ face is a very salient stimulus and attracts attention (Von Grunau and 
Anston, 1995), regardless of which face makes the gaze shift (as demonstrated by my 
behavioural data). The subject’s attention is then attracted by the gaze shift. In the 
‘unsocial’ condition this involves a shift of attention from the ‘social’ to the 
‘unsocial’ face, but when the ‘social’ face makes the gaze shift this additional 
attentional shift does not occur as attention is already on the ‘social’ face. 
Reallocation of attention from the ‘social’ to the ‘unsocial’ face could account for the 
increased activity seen in areas involved in spatial attention in response to gaze shifts 
made by the ‘unsocial’ face.
Unfortunately, in this experiment, it is not possible to distinguish between these two 
alternative explanations for the increased activity seen in the fronto-parietal 
occulomotor network during the ‘incorrect’ and ‘unsocial’ gazeshifts.
6,4,23 Medial prefrontal cortex
It has been proposed that the medial prefrontal cortex is involved in representing 
shared attention and goals, and more specifically “triadic relations between Me, You, 
and This”, i.e. the subject, a second person, and an object (Saxe, 2006). The only 
relevant neuroimaging study to date found that joint attention is associated with 
activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (Williams et al., 2005). Activation of a medial
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prefrontal network by ‘correct’ (compared to ‘incorrect’) gaze shifts in my 
experiment is consistent with this region’s involvement in joint attention, because 
during the ‘correct’ conditions the attention of both the subject and the face stimulus 
were directed towards the target, so the subject experiences joint attention with the 
face. This joint attention is covert as the subjects maintained fixation and did not 
move their eyes towards the target. In contrast, in the ‘incorrect’ condition the 
subject’s attention was attracted to the target but then the face stimuli shifted their 
eyes, and by implication their attention, to a different location. Thus, in this situation, 
the subject did not experience joint attention, so activity in the medial prefrontal 
cortex might not be expected.
Similar regions were activated by ‘correct’, compared to ‘incorrect’, gaze shifts and 
by gaze shifts made by the ‘social’ versus the ‘unsocial’ face. These included areas in 
the medial prefrontal cortex and also a cluster in the medial precuneus (see Figure 
6.5). Like the medial prefrontal cortex, the medial precuneus was also activated by 
joint attention in the experiment described above (Williams et al., 2005). Thus is 
appears that the network of areas involved in joint attention were activated when the 
face made ‘correct’ gaze shifts and also when gaze shifts were made by the ‘social’ 
face.
Such modulation of prefrontal activity by the sociability of the face is consistent with 
a previous experiment where virtual characters on a screen looked at the subject or at 
an imaginary other, and made socially relevant, for example a smile, or arbitrary 
facial movements (Schilbach et al., 2005). The facial movements made by the 
character looking at the subject, the equivalent to the ‘social’ face in my experiment, 
elicited greater activation in the anterior dorsal medial prefrontal cortex than 
movements made by the face with averted gaze, equivalent to my ‘unsocial’ face. 
Thus activation in the medial prefrontal cortex appears to reflect the feeling of 
personal involvement.
Direct gaze is a very salient and engaging social stimulus (Von Grunau and Anston, 
1995) and it indicates that you are the object of another’s attention. Direct or mutual 
gaze is a case of joint attention, involving just the two individuals, (dyadic attention), 
and often signals the intention to communicate, leading to triadic joint attention
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(Saxe, 2006). Thus, perhaps the direct gaze of the ‘social’ face in my experiment 
makes the gaze shifts made by that face feel like intentional communicative gestures 
(Kampe et al., 2003), enhancing the feeling of joint attention, whereas when the 
‘unsocial’ face makes a gaze shift there is no apparent intention to communicate. 
Perhaps the greater activity in the medial prefrontal cortex for gaze shifts made by 




I have demonstrated that both behavioural and neural responses to gaze shifts are 
modulated by the social context and the goal directedness of that gaze shift. Reaction 
times were significantly faster in response to ‘correct’ and ‘social’, compared to 
‘incorrect’ and ‘unsocial’, gaze shifts respectively. I found significantly greater 
activation in the fronto-parietal network, and in parts of the posterior STS, in 
response to ‘incorrect’ and ‘unsocial’, compared to ‘incorrect’ and ‘social’, gaze 
shifts respectively. I suggest that the increased STS activity occurs because the 
‘incorrect’ and ‘unsocial’ gaze shifts are unexpected, and that it reflects a 
reformulation of the observer’s prediction or the prediction error, consistent with the 
proposal that the mirror system acts in a predictive manner. The increased activity in 
the fronto-parietal network may also reflect the prediction error or the generation of 
new predictions. Alternatively, the increase fronto-parietal activation may simply 
have occurred because ‘incorrect’ and ‘unsocial’ gaze shifts induce additional shifts 
of attention compared to ‘correct’ and ‘social’ gaze shifts. Further work will be 
needed to distinguish between these two possible explanations. Conversely I found 
greater activation in the MPFC and precuneus, in response to ‘correct’ and ‘social’ 
compared to ‘incorrect’ and ‘unsocial’ gaze shifts respectively. I suggest that this 
activity reflects the experience of joint attention elicited by ‘correct’ and ‘social’ 
gaze shifts. By having both the ‘social’ and the ‘unsocial’ face on screen at all times, 
I was able to control for the presence of direct and averted gaze, and specifically 
examine the effects of social context on the response to gaze shifts.
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CHAPTER 7: THE SAME BRAIN AREAS ARE INVOLVED IN 
MONITORING THE CONSEQUENCES OF YOUR OWN AND ANOTHER
PERSON’S ACTIONS
7.1 Introduction
As described in the Introduction, there is much evidence animals use an efference 
copy of their motor commands sent from the motor areas controlling the actions, in 
parallel with the motor signals, to predict and attenuate the sensory consequences of 
their own actions and to distinguish the sensory consequences of their own actions 
from externally produced sensory stimuli (Wolpert and Miall, 1996). As well as 
being able to predict the consequences of their own actions and thus recognise and 
attenuate self-produced sensory stimuli, animals should also be able to monitor and 
predict the actions of others, and the sensory consequences of these actions. Such an 
ability would serve to distinguish them from sensory stimuli with an environmental 
cause, as events caused by others will have different implications to events with an 
environmental cause. In this study I therefore sought to examine whether the same 
neural systems are involved in monitoring the sensory consequences of our own 
actions and in monitoring the sensory consequences of another’s actions. I also 
sought to examine whether the response to sensory stimuli differed depending on 
whether the stimulus is self- generated, generated by another person, or externally 
generated.
Subjects performed a task in which they had to monitor the relationship between an 
auditory stimulus and an action, namely a button press, which was either performed 
by themselves or another person (the experimenter). The degree of temporal 
contingency between the button press and the sound was manipulated. Subjects were 
asked to judge whether the sounds they heard, in a block of 10 trials, were contingent 
upon the timing of the button press, i.e. were the sounds predictable on the basis of 
the timing of the button press. There were three levels of predictability/contingency: 
‘predictable’, ‘partially predictable’, and ‘unpredictable’. To control for the effects of 
contingency/predictability per se, subjects were also presented with blocks of 
externally-generated sounds, where they had to judge the degree of contingency 
between the sounds and the disappearance of a white dot on screen. Thus, my
143
experiment consisted of a 3 x 3 factorial design, with 2 independently manipulated 
factors: agency and contingency/predictability, enabling us to examine effects of 
self- and other-generated actions on the response to sensory stimuli beyond any 
effect of stimulus predictability, and to examine the effects of stimulus 
predictability/contingency per se, and to examine interactions between the two.
Observation of the actions of others is known to activate the same brain regions 
involved in action execution (Buccino et al., 2001;Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004), 
and there is also evidence that the action control system is involved in anticipating or 
predicting the actions of others (Kilner et al., 2004;Ramnani and Miall, 2004). In 
addition, several studies have demonstrated modulation of sensory activity during 
action observation (Avikainen et al., 2002;Grezes et al., 2003;Mottonen et al., 
2005;Pekkola et al., 2005;Rossi et al., 2002). Therefore, I hypothesised that the 
regions involved in monitoring our own actions and their sensory consequences, 
would also be engaged when monitoring the sensory consequences of the actions of 
others.
Several studies have demonstrated attenuation of the response to self-produced 
auditory stimuli (Curio et al., 2000;Martikainen et al., 2005;Numminen et al.,
1999; Schafer and Marcus, 1973). Thus, I hypothesised that activation of the auditory 
cortex would be greater in response to externally generated tones compared to self­
generated tones. There is evidence that the degree of attenuation depends on the 
closeness of the match between the sensory consequences of the action predicted by 
the internal forward model and the actual sensory feedback from that action. 
Blakemore and colleagues found that the perceived intensity of tactile stimulation 
increased as the discrepancy, in time and space, between an action and its sensory 
consequences increased (Blakemore et al., 1999a). Thus I hypothesised that auditory 
cortex activation would vary with the degree of contingency between the button 
press and the tone, when the subject pressed the button. There is also evidence that 
the attenuation of the response to self-generated sensory stimuli is due in part to 
stimulus predictability (Blakemore et al., 1998a;Schafer et al., 1981). Any 
attenuation due to stimulus predictability per se should be equally present in the self­
generated, other-generated, and externally generated conditions.
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I had no prior hypothesis about the auditory response to other-generated stimuli. 
Previous studies have demonstrated modulation of the activity in sensory cortices by 
action observation in the absence of sensory stimulation (Avikainen et al., 
2002;Grezes et al., 2003;Mottonen et al., 2005;Pekkola et al., 2005;Rossi et al., 
2002), supporting the idea that the mirror system uses the same forward model used 
to predict the sensory consequences of our own action to predict the sensory 
consequences of the actions of others (Kilner et al. in submission). (See General 
Introduction for a review). However, these studies did not directly address how this 
sensory prediction may modulate the response to other-generated stimuli. It may be 
that sensory stimuli generated by the actions of others is of greater significance than 
externally generated stimuli, perhaps because they may be caused by predators or 
prey or potential mates, in which case the response to stimuli caused by others may 
be enhanced, rather than attenuated. Or it may be that sensory stimuli caused by 
others that I can predict is attenuated in a similar way to self-generated sensory 
stimuli, enabling us to concentrate our attention on unexpected sensory stimuli.
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7.2 Materials and Methods
7.2.1 Subjects
Fourteen normal volunteers (7 male and 7 female, aged 19 to 31, mean 24.7, SD 3.7) 
gave written informed consent to participate in the study, which was approved by the 
Institute of Neurology and National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery Joint 
Ethics Committee.
7.2.2 Paradigm
Two experimental factors were manipulated independently in a blocked design: 1) 
the predictability of the tone; and 2) agency, i.e. whether the subject, another person, 
or no one made a self generated movement.
Each block consisted of 10 trials. At the start of each trial a white dot appeared and 
remained on the screen for up to 1 second. During this time either the subject 
(‘subject’ condition), or the experimenter (‘other’ condition), were required to make 
a self-generated button press, or no one made a button press (‘no agent’ condition). 
The experimenter sat next to the subject in the scanner room, and their hand rested 
next to the subject’s hand on a tray-table positioned over the subject’s body. The 
subject was able to see both their own hand and the experimenter’s hand at all times 
during the experiment. In the ‘subject’ and ‘other’ condition the white dot 
disappeared following the button press. In the ‘no agent’ condition the white dot 
would spontaneously vanish at a random time up to 1 second after its appearance. 
There was then a 800ms time window, before the end of the trial, during which a 
sound was presented. The sound heard consisted of 0.2 seconds of Gaussian noise 
with a frequency of44100 Hz (created in Matlab from a normal distribution with 
mean zero, variance one and standard deviation one).
The predictability of the timing of the sound relative to the button press/ 
disappearance of the white dot varied between blocks. The sound could be totally 
predictable (‘predictable’ blocks), in which case it occurred exactly 400 ms after the 
button press in the ‘subject’ and ‘other’ conditions, or the disappearance of the white
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dot in the ‘no agent’ conditions. Or the sound could be unpredictable to a varying 
degree: in some blocks (partially predictable blocks) the sound occurred 200 -  
600ms (fixed distribution) after the button press or the disappearance of the white 
dot, and in some blocks (unpredictable blocks) the sound occurred randomly at any 
time up to 800 ms after the button press or the disappearance of the white dot. There 
was then a pause and the next trial began 3 seconds after the onset of the previous 
trial.
Figure 7.1 -  Trial Structure
a Predictable Trial
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The experiment thus consisted of nine conditions constituting a 3 x 3 factorial:
Aeencv
Predictability of Sound 
Predictable (P) Partially (PP) Unpredictable (U)
Subject (S) SP SPP SU
Other (O) O P O PP OU
No Agent (N) N P N PP NU
Each type of block was presented twice per scanning run. At the end of each block of 
ten trials, subjects were asked, in a forced choice task, whether or not the sounds in 
the block had been contingent on the button press, in the ‘subject’ and ‘other’
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conditions, or on the disappearance of the white dot in the ‘no agent’ conditions. 
Subjects responded by pressing ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on a keypad, and their responses were 
recorded.
7.2.3 Imaging
A 1.5T Siemens ALLEGRA system (Siemens, Erlangen) was used to acquire 
gradient-echo echo-planar T2* weighted images with Blood Oxygenation Level 
Dependent (BOLD) contrast. (See Chapter 2: fRMI Methods for details of BOLD 
signal detection). Each volume consisted of forty 2 mm axial slices with in-plane 
resolution of 3x3 mm, with a 1mm gap between slices, positioned to cover the whole 
cortexn with a TR of 3.6 seconds. Imaging was performed in three scanning runs of 
150 volumes each. In each scanning mn, six image volumes preceding presentation 
of the experimental conditions were discarded to allow for magnetic saturation 
effects. Finally, a T1-weighted anatomical image was acquired from each subject.
7.2.4 Statistical analysis
Data were analysed using Statistical Parametric Mapping software (SPM2;
Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The 
initial six volumes were discarded, and subsequent image volumes then realigned 
(Friston et al., 1995), spatially normalised (Ashbumer and Friston, 1999) to the 
standard space defined by the Montreal Neurological Institute template (Mazziotta et 
al., 1995) and smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 6 mm full-width half maximum. 
(See Chapter 2: fMRI Methods for details of realignment, normalisation and 
smoothing). Voxels activated during the experiment were identified using a general 
linear model that included the nine experimental conditions and the question at the 
end of each block. The sounds were modelled as events with duration 200 ms. The 
question was modelled as a boxcar waveform of a few seconds in length (the exact 
length depended on the subject’s response time). Voxels activated during the 
experiment were identified using a statistical model that comprised ten delayed 
boxcar waveforms for each scanning run. These represented the mean activity 
evoked in the nine experimental conditions, and the mean activity during the 
question at the end of each block. High-pass filtering (cut-off 128 s) removed low-
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frequency drifts in signal, and global changes were removed by proportional scaling. 
Each component of the model served as a regressor in a multiple regression analysis. 
(See Chapter 2: fMRI Methods for details of statistical analysis). The resulting 
parameter estimates for the nine regressors, representing the nine block types, at each 
voxel were then entered into a second level analysis where subject served as a 
random effect in a within-subjects ANOVA. The main effects and interactions 
between conditions were then specified by appropriately weighted linear contrasts 
and determined using the t-statistic on a voxel-by-voxel basis. A statistical threshold 
of p<0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons across the entire brain volume, was 
used except for regions that were hypothesized a priori, where a threshold of 




In a forced-choice task at the end of each block subjects were asked to say whether 
the sounds they heard were contingent upon the button press or the disappearance of 
the white dot, i.e. whether the sounds were predictable or not. Subject’s had to 
answer either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ using a key pad and their answers were recorded.
Table 7.1 -  Proportion of times (%) each type of block was rated as 
‘contingent upon button press or disappearance of white dot9 i.e. as 
predictable, by the subject, (i.e. proportion of times subjects answered ‘yes’).
Sub.
No.








1 100 100 100 50 83 100 0 0 0
2 100 100 100 75 75 75 0 0 25
3 100 100 25 0 50 25 0 0 50
4 100 100 67 67 67 67 17 67 50
5 75 75 50 0 75 25 25 0 0
6 100 100 100 33 67 50 0 17 0
7 67 100 67 50 33 67 17 50 0
8 100 75 100 100 75 50 50 0 25
9 100 100 83 33 50 67 17 33 50
10 100 83 67 83 67 33 33 50 50
11 100 100 100 67 83 33 17 33 50
12 83 100 83 0 17 83 17 17 17
13 83 50 100 83 33 33 0 33 17
14 100 67 33 33 67 17 17 0 17
mean 93 89 77 48 60 52 15 21 25
mean 86.5 53.4 20.4
‘Predictable’ blocks, where the sound occurred exactly 400ms after the button press 
or disappearance of the white dot, were rated as contingent/predictable on 86.5% of 
occasions (SD = 19.9%). In contrast ‘unpredictable’ blocks, where the sound
150
occurred anytime up to 800ms after the button press or the disappearance of the 
white dot, were rated as contingent/predictable on 20.4% of occasions (SD=19.9%). 
‘Partially predictable’ blocks, where the sound occurred between 200 and 400 ms 
after the button press or the disappearance of the white dot, were rated as 
contingent/predictable on 53.4% of occasions (i.e. at chance level) (SD=26.5%). A 3 
x 3 ANOVA showed a significant effect of predictability on the proportion of times 
each block type was rated as ‘contingent/predictable’ (F=103.73, p = 0.000). These 
behavioural results show that my manipulation of the predictability of the sound 
within a block, by varying the time delay between the sounds and the button 
press/disappearance of white dot, worked as expected. The same 3 x 3  ANOVA 
revealed no significant effect of agency on contingency rating (F=1.14, p=0.33), nor 
any significant interaction between predictability and agency (F=1.68, p = 0.19).
7.3.2 fMRI results
7.3.2.1 Effects of agency
7.3.2.1.1 Subject > no agent
Comparison of the conditions when the subject pressed the button to trigger the 
sound, with the ‘no agent’ conditions, when neither the subject nor the experimenter 
pressed the button, and the white dot spontaneously disappeared, revealed several 
regions showing significantly (p<0.05 FDR-corrected) greater activation during the 
‘subject’ versus ‘no agent’ conditions. The main areas showing this pattern of 
activation were motor regions including the right primary motor cortex (Ml), the 
right premotor cortex (PMC), the bilateral supplementary motor area (SMA), and the 
cerebellum (mostly medially). The left insula, dorsal medial preffontal cortex 
(dMPFC) (the anterior superior frontal gyrus), the right temporal pole, the right 
lateral orbital gyrus, the caudate, and the left post central gyrus also showed greater 
activation during the ‘subject’ conditions compared to the ‘no agent’ conditions. (See 
Table 7.2 for full details of all activated loci). The opposite contrast revealed no 
regions that showed significantly greater activation during the ‘no agent’ conditions 
than during the ‘subject’ conditions, even when the threshold was lowered to 
p<0.001 uncorrected.
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Table 7.2 - Subject > No Agent (p<0.05 FDR-corrected)
X y z p-FDR p-unc z
cerebellum (lateral) -36 -51 -33 0.019 0 4.1
precentral gyrus (PMC) 39 -12 51 0.022 0 4
precentral gyrus (PMC) 27 -15 51 0.027 0 3.91
precentral gyrus (PMC) 45 -18 63 0.045 0 3.63
precentral gyrus/central sulcus (Ml) 36 -27 57 0.027 0 3.91
posterior superior frontal gyrus (SMA) -3 -3 54 0.012 0 4.82
cerebellum (medial) 3 -69 -12 0.007 0 5.16
cerebellum -21 -57 -15 0.03 0 3.85
cerebellum -33 -69 -24 0.037 0 3.73
cerebellum 42 -54 -30 0.048 0 3.58
cerebellum -12 -42 -36 0.05 0 3.53
insuka -36 0 15 0.015 0 4.6
superior frontal gyrus (dMPFC) 9 60 27 0.017 0 4.3
superior frontal gyrus (dMPFC) -3 42 48 0.022 0 4.01
superior frontal gyrus ( near cingulate 
sulcus) 12 48 18 0.04 0 3.7
inferior temporal gyrus(temporal pole) 45 6 -42 0.017 0 4.22
middle temporal gyrus(temporal pole) 54 9 -36 0.04 0 3.69
precuneus (subparietal sulcus) 15 -51 39 0.042 0 3.67
central sulcus/post central gyrus -54 -24 45 0.017 0 4.19
superior post central sulcus 24 -45 63 0.033 0 3.79
angular gyrus 45 -51 42 0.038 0 3.72
lateral orbital gyrus 42 48 -6 0.019 0 4.09
hippocampus -33 -33 -6 0.029 0 3.87
caudate 18 3 21 0.035 0 3.76
pulvinar 24 -30 3 0.039 0 3.71
7.3.2.1.2 Subject > Other
Comparison of the conditions, when the subject pressed the button, compared to the 
conditions when the experimenter pressed the button, revealed regions that showed 
greater activation during the ‘subject’ versus ‘other’ conditions. The main regions
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showing this pattern on activation included the SMA (i.e. the posterior superior 
frontal gyrus, down to the cingulate sulcus), the right primary (Ml) and pre-motor 
cortex (PMC), the cerebellum, the pars opercularis of inferior frontal gyrus 
bilaterally, and the insula bilaterally.
Table 7.3 - Subject > Other (p<0.05 FDR-corrected)
X y z p-FDR p-unc z
posterior superior frontal gyrus (SMA) -3 -6 57 0.001 0 5.64
posterior superior frontal gyrus (SMA) 9 -6 75 0.048 0 3.58
precentral gyrus (central sulcus) (Ml) 48 -12 57 0.014 0 4.13
precentral gyrus (PMC) 33 -18 69 0.015 0 4.07
inferior frontal gyrus (vPM) 60 12 12 0.010 0 4.28
inferior frontal gyrus (vPM) -60 3 12 0.080 0.001 4.04
cerebellum (medial) 3 -66 -12 0.001 0 5.08
cerebellum (medial) 21 -60 -21 0.001 0 4.99
cerebellum -24 -57 -30 0.040 0 3.69
cerebellum -48 -54 -36 0.050 0 3.56
circular insular sulcus -51 0 3 0.014 0 4.1
short insular gyri 51 3 -3 0.016 0 4.05
central sulcus (post central gyrus) 33 -27 57 0.005 0 4.51
supramarginal gyrus 63 -33 45 0.033 0 3.78
parahippocampal gyrus/hippocampus 21 -6 -36 0.040 0 3.69
cuneus 0 -84 18 0.044 0 3.64
putamen 33 3 0 0.050 0 3.57
7,3,2.13 Subject > Other and Subject > No Agent (see Figure 7.2a & b)
Similar regions were revealed by the contrasts ‘subject’ -  ‘other’ and ‘subject’ -  ‘no 
agent’ ,thus I specifically looked for areas that showed significantly greater 
activation to ‘subject’ compared with ‘other’ conditions and to ‘subject’ compared 
with ‘no agent’ conditions as revealed by the contrast [(‘subject’ -  ‘other’) masked 
by (‘subject’ - ‘no agent’)]. The main regions showing this pattern of activation were 
the cerebellum, the insula bilaterally, the SMA (i.e. the medial posterior superior
153
frontal gyrus), and the right premotor and primary motor cortex. (See Table 7.4 for 
full details of activated loci).
Table 7.4 - Subject - Other (p<0.001 uncor) masked by Subject -  No Agent 
(p<0.01 uncor)
X y z p-FDR p-unc z
posterior superior frontal gyrus (SMA) -3 -6 57 0.001 0 5.64
posterior superior frontal gyrus (SMA) 9 -6 75 0.048 0 3.58
central sulcus (Ml) 33 -27 57 0.005 0 4.51
central sulcus (Ml) 45 -24 63 0.032 0 3.79
precentral gyrus (PMC) 48 -12 57 0.014 0 4.13
precentral gyrus (PMC) 33 -18 69 0.015 0 4.07
cerebellum (medial) 3 -66 -12 0.001 0 5.08
cerebellum 21 -60 -21 0.001 0 4.99
cerebellum -24 -57 -30 0.04 0 3.69
cerebellum 48 -51 -36 0.051 0 3.56
cerebellum -9 -51 -18 0.076 0 3.32
cerebellum -9 -66 -30 0.081 0.001 3.28
insula -51 0 3 0.014 0 4.1
Short insular gyri 51 3 -3 0.016 0 4.05
supramarginal gyrus 63 -33 45 0.033 0 3.78
parahippocampal gyrus/hippocampus 21 -6 -36 0.04 0 3.69
7.3.2.1.4 Other > No Agent
Areas showing greater activation in the ‘other’ condition compared to the ‘no agent’ 
condition were revealed by the contrast [‘other’ -  ‘no agent’]. Large areas of the 
occipito-temporal cortex showed this pattern of activation bilaterally, including the 
middle occipital gyrus, the lateral occipital sulcus, the middle temporal gyrus, the 
superior temporal sulcus and the posterior calcarine sulcus. Other regions showing 
greater activation during the ‘other’ condition, than during the ‘no agent’ condition, 
included a large cluster in the medial precuneus, several clusters in the parietal lobe, 
the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) (the anterior prefrontal gyrus) and the 
cerebellum. (See Table 7.5 for full details of activated loci.)
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Table 7.5 - Other > No Agent (p<0.05 FDR-corrected)
X y z p-FDR p-unc z
middle occipital gyrus/los 51 -78 0 0 0 6.37
middle occipital gyrus 30 -93 9 0.002 0 4.44
middle occipital gyrus/los -54 -66 18 0 0 5.75
middle occipital gyrus -18 -99 21 0 0 5.28
superior occipital gyrus 24 -90 33 0.001 0 4.78
superior occipital gyrus -15 -87 42 0.005 0 4.17
calcarine sulcus/gyrus descendens(V3) 12 -87 3 0.002 0 4.49
gyrus descendens/calcarine sulcus (V3) -9 -96 0 0.007 0 3.99
lingual gyrus 12 -78 -12 0.001 0 4.91
lingual gyrus -12 -87 -15 0.013 0 3.67
collateral sulcus/fusiform gyrus 27 -69 -6 0.002 0 4.49
collateral sulcus/fusiform gyrus -27 -69 -3 0.025 0 3.34
fusiform gyrus/cerebellum -42 -54 -21 0.008 0 3.93
Cerebellum 6 -75 -24 0.009 0 3.88
Cerebellum 48 -63 -27 0.009 0 3.87
Cerebellum -24 -87 -24 0.007 0 3.95
superior parietal gyrus/ips 12 -63 66 0.003 0 4.34
ips/superior parietal gyrus -36 -45 60 0.003 0 4.27
superior parietal gyrus -30 -54 66 0.009 0 3.88
angular gyrus 51 -69 42 0.01 0 3.83
angular gyrus 33 -78 36 0.034 0.001 3.18
pSTS/angular gyrus 57 -60 18 0.005 0 4.16
superior temporal sulcus 60 -36 3 0.009 0 3.84
middle temporal gyrus -54 -30 -6 0.005 0 4.14
STS (temporal pole) -39 3 -24 0.006 0 4.07
STG (temporal pole) 30 18 -33 0.015 0 3.61
precuneus/subparietal sulcus 3 -63 42 0.001 0 4.78
superior frontal gyrus (dMPFC) 3 57 21 0.007 0 3.97
superior frontal gyrus (dMFPC) 3 48 36 0.011 0 3.77
superior frontal gyrus 12 39 54 0.003 0 4.34
superior frontal gyrus 15 15 66 0.018 0 3.51
cingulate gyrus 0 -21 42 0.009 0 3.84
subcentral gyrus 51 -21 21 0.011 0 3.77
middle frontal gyrus 42 3 57 0.025 0 3.35
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The opposite comparison revealed a few regions which showed less activation during 
the ‘other’ compared to ‘no agent’ conditions. These clusters were found in the 
cuneus, the inferior frontal gyrus and the post central gyrus. However these clusters 
were not significant at p<0.05 FDR corrected.
7.3.2.1.5 Other > Subject
Large areas of the occipito-temporal cortex bilaterally showed significantly greater 
activation to the ‘other’ compared to ‘subject’ conditions (as revealed by the contrast 
[‘other’ - ‘subject’]), including the middle occipital gyrus, superior occipital gyrus, 
lateral occipital sulcus, lingual gyrus, collateral sulcus, middle temporal gyms, and 
the superior temporal sulcus. Several parietal regions also showed this pattern of 
activation bilaterally, including the parieto occipital fissure, superior parietal gyms, 
the angular gyms, and the intra-parietal sulcus. (See Table 7.6 for full details of 
activated loci).
7.3.2.1.6 Other > Subject and Other > No Agent (see Figure 7.2a)
Similar regions were revealed by the contrasts ‘other’ - ‘no agent’ and ‘other’ -  
‘subject’, thus I specifically looked for areas that showed significantly greater 
activation to ‘other’ compared with ‘subject’ conditions and to ‘other’ compared ‘no 
agent’ conditions as revealed by the contrast [(‘other’ -  ‘subject’) masked by (‘other’ 
- ‘no agent’)]. This contrast revealed large bilateral regions of the occipito-temporal 
cortex, largely around the middle occipital and posterior middle temporal gyri, which 
showed this pattern on activation. Several clusters in the parietal cortex also showed 
this pattern of activation bilaterally. (See Table 7.7 for full details of activated loci).
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Table 7.6 - Other > Subject (p<0.05 FDR-corrected)
X y z p-FDR p-unc z
middle occipital gyrus (V5) 48 -75 3 0 0 5.74
middle occipital gyrus (V5) -48 -72 6 0 0 5.48
middle occipital gyrus -45 -75 -9 0.02 0 3.69
middle occipital gyrus 30 -93 12 0.001 0 5.15
middle occipital gyrus -24 -99 6 0.001 0 5.14
middle occipital gyrus -30 -84 18 0.03 0 3.48
superior occipital gyrus 24 -93 27 0.003 0 4.61
parieto-occipital fissure -21 -72 36 0.001 0 4.96
gyrus descendens/calcarine sulcus(V3) -12 -102 3 0.001 0 5.04
lingual gyrus 18 -102 -12 0.006 0 4.19
lingual gyms 30 -84 -15 0.004 0 4.37
lingual gyrus -24 -84 -18 0.014 0 3.84
collateral sulcus/fusiform gyrus 27 -69 -6 0.009 0 4.04
collateral sulcus/fusiform gyms -24 -75 -6 0.034 0 3.41
middle temporal gyms -54 -30 -6 0.004 0 4.53
middle temporal gyrus 48 -51 6 0.025 0 3.57
pSTS/STG -60 -54 24 0.009 0 4.03
pSTS 42 -57 21 0.015 0 3.82
middle occipital gyms/pSTSh -45 -78 21 0.032 0 3.44
superior temporal sulcus 48 -3 -18 0.046 0.001 3.26
superior parietal gyms/ips 27 -60 63 0.006 0 4.27
superior parietal gyrus -30 -57 66 0.005 0 4.34
ips/superior parietal gyms -27 -57 51 0.006 0 4.2
superior parietal gyrus -18 -51 54 0.046 0.001 3.27
ips/angular gyrus -36 -45 57 0.009 0 4.06
superior parietal gyrus/precuneus 12 -60 69 0.003 0 4.64
precuneus/subparietal sulcus 6 -51 42 0.01 0 4.01
middle frontal gyrus/superior frontal
sulcus -30 -6 54 0.018 0 3.74
superior frontal sulcus /gyms -24 -9 63 0.02 0 3.68
Cerebellum -42 -78 -18 0.021 0 3.67
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Table 7.7 - Other - Subject (p<0.001 uncor) masked by Other -  No Agent
(p<0.01 uncor)
X y z p-FDR p-unc z
middle occipital gyrus (V5) 48 -75 3 0 0 5.74
middle occipital gyrus (V5) -48 -72 6 0 0 5.48
middle occipital gyrus 30 -93 12 0.001 0 5.15
middle occipital gyrus -24 -99 6 0.001 0 5.14
middle occipital gyrus -45 -75 -9 0.02 0 3.69
pSTS 63 -42 9 0.003 0 4.58
pSTS -60 -54 24 0.009 0 4.03
pSTS 42 -57 21 0.015 0 3.82
superior occipital gyrus/intra occipital 
sulcus 24 -93 27 0.003 0 4.61
parieto-occipital sulcus/superior 
occipital gyrus -21 -72 36 0.001 0 4.96
gyrus descendens/calcarine sulcus 
(V3) -12 -102 3 0.001 0 5.04
lingual gyrus/calcarine sulcus/cuneus 
(V3) 18 -93 -3 0.008 0 4.1
lingual gyrus 30 -84 -15 0.004 0 4.37
lingual gyrus -24 -84 -18 0.014 0 3.84
collateral sulcus/fusiform gyrus -24 -75 -6 0.034 0 3.41
collateral sulcus/fusiform gyrus 27 -69 -6 0.009 0 4.04
superior parietal gyrus/ips 27 -60 63 0.006 0 4.27
superior parietal gyrus/ips -30 -57 66 0.005 0 4.34
ips/angular gyrus -36 -45 57 0.009 0 4.06
middle temporal gyrus -54 -30 -6 0.004 0 4.53
superior parietal gyrus/precuneus 12 -60 69 0.003 0 4.64
precuneus/subparietal sulcus 6 -51 42 0.01 0 4.01
Middle frontal gyrus/superior frontal 
sulcus -30 -6 54 0.018 0 3.74
Cerebellum -42 -78 -18 0.021 0 3.67
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7.3.2.1.7 Subject > No Agent and Other > No Agent (see Figure 7.2a & c)
Similar regions were also revealed by the contrasts ‘subject’ -  ‘no agent’ and ‘other’ 
-  ‘no agent’ ,thus I specifically looked for regions that showed significantly greater 
activation to both ‘subject’ compared to ‘no agent’ conditions and to ‘other’ 
compared to ‘no agent’ conditions as revealed by the contrast [(‘other’ -  ‘no agent’) 
masked by (‘subject’ -  ‘no agent’)]. This contrast revealed two main areas showing 
this pattern of activation: the medial precuneus, and the dorsal medial prefrontal 
cortex (dMPFC). The posterior superior temporal sulcus and angular gyrus 
bilaterally also showed this pattern of activation as did a few other small clusters. 
(See Table 7.8 for full details of all activated loci).
Table 7.8 - Other -  No Agent (p<0.001 uncor) masked by Subject -  No Agent
(p<0.01 uncor)
X y z p-FDR p-unc z
superior frontal gyrus (dMPFC) 3 57 21 0.007 0 3.97
precuneus 6 -54 39 0.001 0 4.68
precuneus/parieto-occipital fissure 3 -69 39 0.003 0 4.32
precuneus/superior parietal gyrus -6 -54 42 0.002 0 4.56
pSTS/angular gyrus -48 -57 30 0.023 0 3.39
pSTS/angular gyrus 57 -60 30 0.009 0 3.86
angular gyrus 51 -69 42 0.01 0 3.83
cerebellum 48 -63 -27 0.009 0 3.87
superior frontal gyrus (anterior dorsal) 12 39 54 0.003 0 4.34
cingulate gyrus (central) 0 -21 42 0.009 0 3.84
superior post central sulcus/ gyrus 24 -45 63 0.016 0 3.6
middle occipital gyrus -42 -75 -6 0.001 0 4.92
lingual gyms 12 -78 -12 0.001 0 4.91
Pulvinar 15 -21 6 0.008 0 3.9
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1 .3 .2.2 Effects of predictability
7.3.2.2.1 Predictable > Unpredictable
Areas showing greater activation to ‘predictable’ conditions, when the sound 
occurred exactly 400ms after the button press or the disappearance of the white dot, 
compared to ‘unpredictable’ conditions, when the sound occurred randomly any time 
up to 800ms after the button press or the disappearance of the white dot, were 
revealed by the contrast (‘predictable’ -  ‘unpredictable’). Several clusters in the 
orbital medial prefrontal cortex (oMPCF), showed this pattern of activation, as did a 
few voxels in the angular gyrus. (See Table 7.9 for full details of activated loci). 
However, none of these activations reached significance when corrected for multiple 
comparisons.







7.3.2.2.2 Predictable > Partially Predictable
The contrast ‘predictable’ -  ‘partially predictable’ revealed areas showing greater 
activation to ‘predictable’ conditions, when the sound occurred exactly 400ms after 
the button press or the disappearance of the white dot, compared to ‘partially 
predictable’ conditions, when the sound occurred 200 to 600ms after the button press 
or the disappearance of the white dot. The main region showing this pattern of 
activation was the orbital medial prefrontal cortex (oMPFC). Parts of the dorsal 
medial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) also showed this pattern of activation, as did the
gyrus rectus/cingulate sulcus/gyrus
X y z p-FDR p-unc
(oMPFC) 3 21 -18 0.696 0
sub callosal gyrus (oMPFC) 6 12 -6 0.975 0
cingulate gyrus (oMPFC) 
Supraorbital sulcus /cingulate sulcus
6 45 -6 0.975 0.001
(oMPFC) -9 45 -9 0.975 0
superior frontal gyrus -12 66 9 0.975 0
angular gyrus -36 -84 36 0.975 0
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medial precuneus. A few other clusters also showed this pattern of activation, mostly 
in the temporal lobe, (See Table 7.10 for full details of all activated loci). However, 
none of these activations reached significance when corrected for multiple 
comparisons.
Table 7.10 - Predictable -  Partially Predictable (p<0.001 uncorrected)
X y z p-FDR p-unc z
gyrus rectus (oMPFC) 3 42 -21 0.056 0 4.7
supraorbital sulcus (oMPFC) -6 54 -6 0.132 0 3.9
sub callosal/cingulate gyrus (oMPFC) 0 24 -3 0.162 0 3.73
superior frontal gyrus (dMPFC) -6 54 18 0.099 0 4.14
superior frontal gyrus (dMPFC) 6 57 36 0.199 0 3.42
middle temporal gyrus -66 -21 -18 0.099 0 4.01
temporo-occipital sulcus / inferior 
temporal sulcus -51 -39 -12 0.151 0 3.81
precentral gyrus -15 -30 69 0.162 0 3.74
middle temporal gyrus (temporal pole) -54 6 -27 0.172 0 3.6
mtg/sts (at temporal pole) 42 12 -33 0.199 0 3.45
preceuneus / cingulate gyrus -9 -51 24 0.195 0 3.51
preceuneus / cingulate gyrus 3 -57 27 0.195 0 3.49
pSTSh 57 -66 24 0.195 0 3.51
anterior calcarine sulcus -6 -60 9 0.199 0 3.42
Putamen -30 -12 -9 0.202 0 3.35
7.3.2.2.3 Partially Predictable > Unpredictable
A few regions were revealed that showed greater activation to ‘partially predictable’ 
compared to ‘unpredictable’ trials. The main areas showing this pattern of activation 
was the cerebellum. The cingulate sulcus, right inferior frontal gyrus, and circular 
insula sulcus, and the left intra- parietal/occipital sulcus, also showed greater 
activation to ‘partially predictable’ compared to ‘unpredictable’ trials. (See Table
7.11 for full details of activated loci). However, these activations were not significant 
when corrected for multiple comparisons.
Table 7.11 - Partially Predictable -  Unpredictable (p<0.001 uncor)
X y z p-FDR p-unc z
Cerebellum -6 -63 -18 0.907 0 3.77
Cerebellum 12 -57 -9 0.907 0 3.42
Cerebellum -6 -69 -9 0.907 0 3.41
cingulate sulcus -12 -18 45 0.907 0 3.53
circular insula sulcus/inferior frontal gyms 48 9 6 0.907 0 3.46
ips/intra-occipital sulcus -24 -78 33 0.907 0.001 3.24
7.3.2.2.4 Predictable > Partially Predictable > Unpredictable
I looked for regions that showed greater activation to ‘predictable’ compared to 
‘partially predictable’ trials , as well as showing greater activation to ‘partially 
predictable’ compared to ‘unpredictable’ trials, using the contrast ‘predictable’ -  
‘partially predictable’ (p<0.001 uncorr) masked by ‘partially predictable’ -  
‘unpredictable’ (p<0.01 uncorr), and the contrast ‘partially predictable’ -  
‘unpredictable’ (p<0.001 uncorr) masked by ‘predictable’ -  ‘partially predictable’ 
(p<0.01). Neither of these contrasts revealed any regions showing significantly 
greater activation to ‘predictable’ compared to ‘partially predictable’ trials, and 
significantly greater activation to ‘partially predictable’ compared to ‘unpredictable’ 
trials. Thus no regions showed a linear increase in activation from ‘unpredictable’, to 
‘partially predictable’, through to ‘predictable’ trials.
7.3.2.2.5 Predictable > Partially Predictable and Predictable > Unpredictable
However, the regions revealed by the contrasts ‘predictable’ -  ‘unpredictable’ and 
‘predictable’ -  ‘partially predictable’ appeared very similar, thus I specifically 
looked for regions that showed greater activation to ‘predictable’ compared to 
‘partially predictable’ conditions, as well as greater activation to ‘predictable’ 
compared to ‘unpredictable’ conditions. Such areas were revealed by the contrast 
[(‘predictable’ -  ‘partially predictable’) masked by (‘predictable’ -  ‘unpredictable’)]. 
The only regions showing greater activation to ‘predictable’ conditions both when 
compared to ‘partially predictable’ conditions and when compared to ‘unpredictable’ 
conditions were in the orbital medial prefrontal cortex. (See Figure 7.3 and Table
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7.12 for full details of activated loci.). Though these activations do not quite reach 
significance when corrected for multiple comparisons they will nevertheless be 
discussed.
Table 7.12 - Predictable - Partially Predictable (p<0.001 uncor) masked by 
Predictable -  Unpredictable (p<0.01 uncor)
X y z p-FDR p-unc z
gyrus rectus (oMPFC) 3 42 ■21 0.056 0 4.7
cingulate sulcus/gyrus /supraorbital sulcus
(oMPFC) 0 45 ■12 0.099 0 4.03
sub callosal/cingulate gyrus (oMPFC) 0 24 -3 0.162 0 3.73
cingulate sulcus/gyrus (oMPFC) -3 30 ■15 0.195 0 3.52
Table 7.13 -  Unpredictable -  Predictable (p<0.001 uncor)
X y z p-FDR p-unc Z
inferior frontal gyrus / lateral fissure 48 24 -3 0.001 0 5.44
posterior lateral fissure/supramarginal gyrus 54 -36 39 0.106 0 4.09
middle frontal gyms 42 57 9 0.106 0 4.07
subcentral gyrus (between inferior
precentral sulcus and central sulcus) -39 -6 27 0.106 0 4.06
lateral fissure/circular insular sulcus 30 21 -12 0.145 0 3.92
superior frontal gyrus 9 27 57 0.151 0 3.89
superior frontal gyrus 3 15 57 0.321 0 3.32
lateral orbital gyms 42 51 -6 0.208 0 3.73
Superior temporal sulcus -51 -27 3 0.226 0 3.58
Superior temporal sulcus 66 -36 0 0.287 0 3.39
Cerebellum -30 -57 -33 0.226 0 3.58
7.3.2.2.6 Unpredictable > Predictable
The contrast ‘unpredictable’ -  ‘predictable’ revealed areas showing greater activation 
to ‘unpredictable’ trials compared to ‘predictable’ trials. The regions showing this 
pattern of activation were mostly located in the right lateral frontal cortex (right 
superior, middle and inferior frontal gyri, right lateral fissure and right insula). The 
superior temporal sulcus also showed this pattern of activation bilaterally, as did the
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right posterior lateral fissure, the left sub-central gyrus, and the left cerebellum. (See 
Table 7.13 for full details of activated loci). However, most of these activations were 
not significant when corrected for multiple comparisons.
73.2.2, 7  Unpredictable > Partially Predictable
Areas, showing a greater response to unpredictable compared to partially predictable 
trails, were revealed in the medial prefrontal cortex (ventral and dorsal), the medial 
precuneus, the left precentral gyrus, and in several locations in the temporal lobes 
bilaterally, including the temporal poles. (See Table 7.14 for full details of activated 
loci). However, these activations are not significant when corrected for multiple 
comparisons.
Table 7.14 -  Unpredictable -  Partially Predictable (p<0.001 uncor)
X y z p-FDR. p-unc z
precentral gyrus/sulcus -57 -9 30 0.332 0 4.34
precentral gyrus/paracentral lobule -15 -27 69 0.373 0 3.97
gyrus rectus (vMPFC) -3 45 -18 0.332 0 4.24
inferior temporal sulcus (temporal pole) -45 9 -39 0.373 0 4.09
inferior temporal sulcus (temporal pole) 54 -3 -30 0.373 0 3.48
Isthmus -15 -33 0 0.373 0 3.86
middle temporal gyrus / superior temporal 
sulcus 66 -45 6 0.373 0 3.83
superior temporal sulcus 51 -30 3 0.373 0 3.57
middle temporal gyrus -57 -24 -9 0.373 0 3.58
middle temporal gyrus (temporal pole) 45 12 -36 0.373 0 3.46
inferior temporal gyrus (anterior) -48 -15 -33 0.373 0 3.68
inferior frontal gyrus 57 27 6 0.373 0 3.61
cingulate sulcus 18 45 0 0.373 0 3.59
posterior orbital gyrus 27 18 -18 0.373 0 3.47
Pulvinar -15 -27 0 0.373 0 3.46
superior frontal gyms (dMPFC) 3 54 33 0.373 0 3.4
lateral orbital gyrus -39 33 -12 0.389 0 3.36
tail of hippocampus 18 -36 9 0.389 0.001 3.27
preceuneus / cingulate gyrus -9 -51 24 0.389 0.001 3.25
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7.3.2.2,8 Partially Predictable > Predictable
Areas showing greater activation to ‘partially predictable’ compared to ‘predictable’ 
trials were revealed by the contrast ‘partially predictable’ -  ‘predictable’. These 
regions were located mainly in the right lateral frontal cortex, around the right 
middle frontal gyrus, and right inferior frontal gyrus. Other areas showing this 
pattern of activation included the left precentral gyrus, the right central sulcus, right 
posterior STS, the left IPS, the right posterior lateral fissure, the left cerebellum, the 
left insula and the right cingulate gyrus. (See Table 7.15 for full details of activated 
loci). Most of these activations were not significant when corrected for multiple 
comparisons.
Table 7.15 - Partially Predictable -  Predictable (p<0.001 uncor)
Subcentral gyrus / precentral gyrus (near
X y z p-FDR p-unc z
inferior precentral sulcus) -36 -3 30 0.014 0 5.01
precentral gyrus/central sulcus -48 -6 48 0.243 0.001 3.28
inferior frontal sulcus 30 42 18 0.014 0 4.89
inferior frontal sulcus 45 36 30 0.229 0 3.35
inferior frontal gyurs 51 15 9 0.062 0 4.28
inferior frontal gyrus 63 21 12 0.096 0 4.07
inferior frontal gyrus / lateral fissure 48 24 -3 0.104 0 3.98
central sulcus 33 -15 39 0.038 0 4.56
middle frontal gyrus/inferior frontal sulcus 51 48 9 0.038 0 4.51
middle frontal gyrus 42 48 24 0.192 0 3.61
angular gyrus/pSTS 33 -54 30 0.104 0 4.01
intraparietal sulcus -21 -54 36 0.104 0 4.01
Cerebellum -33 -60 -24 0.129 0 3.84
Cerebellum -3 -72 -33 0.22 0 3.49
calcarine sulcus 30 -69 9 0.146 0 3.74
supramarginal gyrus/posterior lateral fissure 57 -39 42 0.184 0 3.65
Short insular gyri -36 12 3 0.22 0 3.4
cingulate gyrus 6 -30 48 0.243 0.001 3.29
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7.3.2.2.9 Unpredictable > Partially Predictable > Predictable
I looked for regions that showed greater activation to ‘unpredictable’ compared to 
‘partially predictable’ trials , as well as showing greater activation to ‘partially 
predictable’ compared to ‘predictable’ trials, using the contrast ‘unpredictable’ -  
‘partially predictable’ (pO.OOl uncorr) masked by ‘partially predictable’ -  
‘predictable’ (p<0.01 uncorr), and the contrast ‘partially predictable’ -  ‘predictable’ 
(p<0.001 uncorr) masked by ‘unpredictable’ -  ‘partially predictable’ (p<0.01). 
Neither of these contrasts revealed any regions showing significantly greater 
activation to ‘unpredictable’ compared to ‘partially predictable’ trials, and 
significantly greater activation to ‘partially predictable’ compared to ‘predictable’ 
trials. Thus no regions showed an increase in activation from ‘predictable’, to 
‘partially predictable’, through to ‘unpredictable’ trials.
7.3.2.2.10 Partially Predictable > Predictable and Unpredictable > Predictable
However, the regions revealed by the contrasts ‘unpredictable’ -  ‘predictable’ and 
‘partially predictable’ -  ‘predictable’ appeared very similar, thus I specifically 
looked for regions that showed greater activation to ‘partially predictable’ compared 
to ‘predictable’ conditions, as well as greater activation to ‘unpredictable’ compared 
to ‘predictable’ conditions. Such regions were revealed by the contrast [(‘partially 
predictable’ -  ‘predictable’) masked by (‘unpredictable’ -  ‘predictable’)] (see Figure 
7.3). Areas showing this pattern of activation were mainly located in the right lateral 
frontal cortex (in the right middle frontal gyrus and in the right inferior frontal gyrus 
next to the lateral fissure. The left precentral gyrus, right central sulcus, right 
calcarine sulcus and right supramarginal gyrus also showed this pattern of activation. 
(See Table 7.16 for full details of activated loci.) Though not all these activations 
reach significance when corrected for multiple comparisons they will nevertheless be 
discussed.
166
Table 7.16 - Partially Predictable - Predictable (p<0.001 uncor) masked by 
Unpredictable - Predictable (p<0.01 uncor)
Subcentral gyrus / precentral gyrus (next
X y z p-FDR p-unc z
to inferior precentral sulcus) ■36 -3 30 0.014 0 5.01
central sulcus 33 -15 39 0.038 0 4.56
inferior frontal sulcus 30 42 18 0.014 0 4.89
middle frontal gyrus/inferior frontal sulcus 51 48 9 0.038 0 4.51
middle frontal gyrus 42 48 24 0.192 0 3.61
inferior frontal gyrus 63 21 12 0.096 0 4.07
inferior frontal gyrus /lateral fissure 48 24 -3 0.104 0 3.98
inferior frontal gyrus /lateral fissure 48 18 9 0.132 0 3.79
calcarine sulcus
supramarginal gyrus/posterior lateral
30 -69 9 0.146 0 3.74
fissure 57 -39 42 0.184 0 3.65
13,23  Interactions
I looked for regions whose response showed an interaction between the effect of the 
predictability of the trials and the effect of agency, such that the effect of 
predictability was modulated by the agent, or that effect of agency was modulated by 
the predictability of the trial. I used an F-contrast to reveal brain regions showing any 
type of interaction between these two factors: agency and predictability. This 
revealed two regions showing an interaction between agency and predictability: the 
cerebellum and the inferior parietal gyrus. (See Table 7.17 for details), but the 
interaction in these cluster did not reach significance at the corrected level.
Table 7.17 - Interactions F-test
x y z p-FDR p-unc Z
Cerebellum 3 -60 -15 1 0 4.11
supramarginal gyrus/inferior parietal
gyrus -57 -27 21 1 0 3.53
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I also conducted T-tests to test for specific interactions as such T-tests are more 
sensitive than the above F-test. Since the effects of contingency were mostly 
observed between the ‘predictable’ condition and the ‘partially predictable’ and 
‘unpredictable’ conditions, I looked for an interaction between the effect of 
‘predictable’ compared with ‘partially predictable’ and ‘unpredictable’ conditions, 
and the effects of agency. This revealed an interaction between predictability and 
agency in several small clusters (see Table 7.18), however none of these activations 
were significant when corrected for multiple comparisons.
Table 7.18 -  Interaction T-tests
X y z p-FDR p-unc z
(P-  PP -  U) x (subject-no agent)
superior frontal gyrus (dMPFC) 9 48 21 0.999 0 3.75
Cerebellum 9 -54 -21 0.999 0 3.5
(P -  PP -  U) x (no agent-subject)
Right STS 60 -30 3 0.832 0 3.99
Right ITS 57 -9 -30 0.832 0 3.62
(P -  PP -  U) x (subject- other)
MFG 33 42 42 0.973 0.001 3.19
( P - P P - U ) x  (other -  subject)
Nothing
(P -  PP -  U) x (other -  no agent)
Nothing
(P-  PP -U ) x (no agent-other)
Short insular gyri 36 18 -12 0.877 0 3.48
putamen 21 15 -9 0.877 0 3.44
STG(planum polare)/lateral
fissure/circular insular sulcus 48 -9 -3 0.877 0 3.36
inferior temporal gyrus -51 -21 -30 0.877 0.001 3.24
inferior temporal gyrus 36 -15 -33 0.877 0.001 3.12
I also looked specifically for interactions within the regions that showed a main 
effect of agency or contingency, by conducting the same interaction T-tests (see 
Table 7.18 for details of T-tests conducted) masked inclusively by the main effects of
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agency or contingency. I found no significant interactions (p<0.001 uncorrected), 
between contingency (‘predictable’ v. ‘partially predictable’ + ‘unpredictable’) and 
agency (‘subject’ v. ‘no agent’, ‘subject’ v. ‘other’, and ‘other’ v. ‘no agent’) within 
areas that show an effect of agency (F-test p<0.01 uncorrected). Neither did I find 
any significant interactions (pO.OOl uncorrected) between contingency 
(‘predictable’ v. ‘partially predictable’ + ‘unpredictable’) and agency (‘subject’ v. 
‘no agent’, ‘subject’ v. ‘other’, and ‘other’ v. ‘no agent’), within areas that show an 




In ‘predictable’ blocks the sounds, which occurred exactly 400 ms after the button 
press or disappearance of the white dot, were rated as being contingent/predictable 
on 86.5% of occasions. The sounds in ‘partially predictable’ blocks were rated as 
being contingent/predictable on only 53.4% of occasions, (i.e. at chance level), and 
in ‘unpredictable blocks’ the sounds were rated as predictable/contingent on 20.4% 
of occasions. This shows that my manipulation of the time delay between the button 
press, or disappearance of the white dot, and the occurrence of the sound, modified 
the perceived predictability of the sound as expected.
7.4.2 fMRI data
7.4.2.1 Effects of Agency
Contrary to my hypothesis I did not find a difference between the response to self­
generated (‘subject’ condition) and externally generated (‘no agent’ condition) 
auditory stimuli in the auditory cortex. This may be due to the presence of 
background scanner noise. Previous studies of attenuation of auditory responses have 
mainly used MEG and EEG, which are silent technologies, unlike fMRI. It may be 
that my auditory stimuli do not activate the auditory cortex sufficiently, relative to 
auditory activation caused by the scanner noise, for a difference between the self- 
and externally-generated conditions to be detected. This may also explain the 
absence of a difference in the auditory cortex between the ‘other’ and ‘no agent’ 
conditions, and between the ‘other’ and ‘subject’ conditions. Thus I can not conclude 
that agency does not affect the response to auditory stimuli, (a conclusion which in 
the case of self-produced stimuli would be contrary to many previous studies). I did 
however find many other brain regions showing significant effects of agency.
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Figure 7.2 -  Effects o f agency
DMPFC
DMPFC
Subject > Other and Subject > No Agent 
Other > Subject and Other > No Agent 
Other > No Agent and Subject - No Agent
A.Left lateral, right lateral, and superior views of a standard T1 weighted image rendered in 
the standard space defined by the Montreal Neurological Institute template. Regions 
showing significant effects o f agency are shown superimposed on the rendered image 
(spatial extent threshold o f 3 voxels was used for display purposes). Areas in green show 
greater activation for the ‘subject ’ condition, compared to the ‘other ’ and ‘no agent ’ 
conditions (subject > other p < 0.001 uncorrected, masked by subject > no agentp<0.01 
uncorrected). Areas in blue, show greater activation for the ‘other ’ condition, compared to 
the ‘subject’ and ‘no agent’ conditions (other > subject p < 0.001 uncorrected, masked by 
other > no agent p<0.01 uncorrected). Areas in red show greater activation for the ‘subject’ 
and ‘other’ conditions, compared to the ‘no agent’ condition (other > no agentp < 0.001 
uncorrected, masked by subject > no agentp<0.01 uncorrected). R  Activity revealed by the 
contrast ‘subject’-  ‘other’ (p<0.001), masked by ‘subject’ -  ‘no agent’ (p<0.01), overlaid 
on a coronal slice of the standard T1 weighted structural image in the standard space 
defined by the Montreal Neurological Institute template. C. Activity revealed by the contrast 
‘other’ -  ‘no agent’ (p<0.001), masked by ‘subject’ -  ‘no agent’ (p<0.01), overlaid on a 
sagittal and a coronal slice o f the standard T1 weighted structural image in the standard 
space defined by the Montreal Neurological Institute template. Ml=Primary Motor Cortex, 
PMC=Premotor Cortex, SMA=Supplementary Motor Area, I=Insula, EBA=Extrastriate 
Body Area, IPS=intraparietal sulcus, DMPFC=dorsal medial Prefrontal Cortex, 
pSTS=posterior superior temporal sulcus, P=Precuneus.
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7.4.2.1.1 Motor regions
As expected motor regions, including the right primary motor cortex (Ml), the right 
premotor cortex (PMC), the supplementary motor area (SMA), the right 
supramarginal gyrus, and the cerebellum, were activated during the ‘subject’ 
conditions, during which the subject pressed a button at the start of each trial, 
compared to the ‘other’ and ‘no agent’ trials during which the subject did not make a 
button press (see Figure 7.2a & b, areas in green). The locations of the motor regions 
activated by the button presses in the ‘subject’ condition are consistent with previous 
studies identifying human motor regions (Fink et al., 1997), including a meta­
analysis of eight other studies (Grezes and Decety, 2001). The inferior frontal gyrus 
(pars opercularis) bilaterally showed greater activation during the subject condition 
but only when compared to the ‘other’ conditions. It has previously been shown to be 
activated by actions (Fink et al., 1997;Grezes and Decety, 2001), and may 
correspond to the macaque ventral Premotor Area (Fink et al., 1997).
7.4.2.1.2 Insula
The insula also showed greater activation during the ‘subject’ compared to both the 
‘other’ and ‘no agent’ conditions. (See Figure 7.2a & b). Activation of the insula by 
the ‘subject’ condition is consistent with previous studies of willed actions 
(Blakemore et al., 1998a;Fink et al., 1997). More recent work suggests that rather 
than being involved in making movements per se, the insula is involved in the 
experience of agency (Farrer et al., 2003;Farrer and Frith, 2002). Subjects used a 
joystick to move a circle on the screen, but in some conditions they were told that the 
circle would be controlled by the experimenter rather than their own movement. 
Awareness of causing the movement of the circle on the screen activated the insula, 
to a greater extent than when another person controlled the movement seen on 
screen, although the subject performed the same arm actions in both conditions 
(Farrer and Frith, 2002). Similarly, activity in the insula decreased with the degree of 
discrepancy between the hand movements made by the subject, and the movements 
made by a virtual hand on screen. Thus, activity in the insula decreased as the degree 
of control felt by the subject decreased (Farrer et al., 2003). Thus, rather than merely 
reflecting motor activation, the insula activation seen in my study during the
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‘subject’ condition may reflect the subject’s sense of agency and control over the 
sounds heard in the ‘subject’ conditions. The variation in the time delay between the 
predictable, partly predictable and unpredictable trials is probably not great enough 
to abolish the subject’s sense of agency as in all ‘subject’ conditions the sound 
occurs within 1 second of the button press.
7.4.2.13 Parietal cortex
Whereas the insula is activated by the attribution of agency to the self, attribution of 
agency to another person activates the inferior parietal cortex (Farrer and Frith, 
2002). Similarly activity in the inferior parietal lobe increases as the discrepancy 
between the subject’s hand movement and visual feedback from that movement 
increases. In other words activity in the inferior parietal cortex increases as the sense 
of personal agency decreases (Farrer et al., 2003). The activation of a parietal region 
around the intra-parietal sulcus and angular gyrus, observed during the ‘other’ 
condition, compared to both the ‘subject’ and ‘no agent’ conditions, (see Figure 
7.2a), in my experiment could reflect the attribution of agency to another person 
during the ‘other’ condition, as in the ‘other’ condition the sounds appear to be 
caused by the experimenter’s button press. Alternatively, the increased activity seen 
in this region during the ‘other’ compared to the ‘no agent’ condition could be due to 
the presence of a hand movement, and the intra-parietal cortex is known to respond 
to the observation of hand and arm movements (Buccino et al., 2001). The increased 
activation during the ‘other’ compared to ‘subject’ conditions could be due to the 
subject paying greater visual attention to the experimenter’s hand movements than to 
their own, as they do not need to watch their own hand to know when it is moving.
7.4.2.1.4 Occipito-temporal cortex
The ‘other’ condition, when subjects watched the experimenter press the button at 
the begining of each trial, also activated several regions in the occipito-temporal 
cortex when compared to both the ‘subject’ conditions and the ‘no agent’ conditions. 
These activations form two main lateral occipito-temporal clusters (covering the 
middle occipital gyrus, middle temporal gyrus and lateral occipital sulcus), one in 
each hemisphere, the anterior part of which appears to correspond to V5/MT (Zeki et
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al., 1991), while the posterior part of the cluster could correspond to a region of the 
occipital cortex that is activated by observation of human body parts, known as the 
Extrastriate Body Area (EBA) (Downing et al., 2001). (See Figure 7.2a, areas in 
blue). Though both the subject’s hand and the experimenter’s hand were within the 
subject’s field of view throughout the experiment, increased activation in the EBA 
during the ‘other’ condition could be due to the subject paying greater attention to 
the experimenter’s hand during the ‘other’ conditions as they need to pay close 
attention to the timing of the experimenter’s hand movement, whereas in the 
‘subject’ and ‘no agent’ conditions subject’s do not need to visually monitor their 
own or the experimenter’s hand movements. Increased activation in V5/MT, which 
responds to visual motion, could be due to the subjects paying close attention to the 
movement of the experimenter’s hand during the ‘other’ conditions but not during 
the ‘subject’ or ‘no agent’ conditions. The observed increased activation in a 
posterior occipital region, which may correspond to area V3 (Hasnain et al., 1998), 
during the ‘other’ condition, could have a similar explanation. In macaques V3 cells 
exhibit complex motion responsive properties (Gegenfurtner et al., 1997), and 
compared to other visual areas, V3 appears to be particularly suited to the analysis of 
motion stimuli like V5/Ml(Felleman and Van Essen, 1987).
This cluster extends up to the superior temporal sulcus. This part of the STS is 
activated by biological motion (Allison et al., 2000), and its increased activation in 
the ‘other’ condition may be due to the subject paying greater attention to 
experimenter’s moving hand in the ‘other’ condition than they do to their own hand 
in the ‘subject’ condition, and due to the lack of any hand motion in the ‘no agent’ 
condition. A similar explanation may apply to the observed activation of the fusiform 
gyrus, on the banks of the posterior collateral sulcus, in the ‘other’ compared to the 
‘subject’ and ‘no agent’ conditions, as the fusiform gyrus has been shown to respond 
to biological motion (Bonda et al., 1996;Grezes et al., 1998).
7.4.2.1.5 Social cognition areas
I found a set of regions that are activated by both the ‘subject’ and the ‘other’ 
conditions compared to the ‘no agent’ conditions, including the medial prefrontal 
cortex, the medial precuneus and posterior cingulate, the posterior STS, and the
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temporal poles. (See Figure 7.2a, c & d, areas in red). These regions are commonly 
activated in a variety of tasks involving thinking about one’s own and other people’s 
actions and mental states, i.e. social cognition (Amodio and Frith, 2006;Saxe, 2006). 
For example, the medial preffontal cortex is activated during self-monitoring tasks 
(McGuire et al., 1996a;McGuire et al., 1996b), and when subjects play games with 
another person, in which the subjects think about the other person’s actions and 
intentions, compared with playing against a computer (Gallagher et al.,
2002;McCabe et al., 2001). In both the ‘subject’ and ‘other’ conditions the subject 
had to monitor an action and its consequences in order to judge at the end of the 
block whether the sound heard was predictable/contingent upon the button press. In 
the ‘no agent’ condition subjects did not have to monitor an action but just had to 
assess whether the sound heard was predictable/contingent upon the disappearance of 
the white dot. I suggest that the activation seen in the dorsal medial preffontal cortex 
during the ‘subject’ and ‘other’ conditions reflects this monitoring of actions and 
their consequences, whether they are made by the subject or the experimenter, in 
these conditions. In a recent review of the medial frontal cortex, Amodio and Frith 
suggest that the posterior rostral medial frontal cortex, the location of which is 
consistent with the location of the dorsal medial preffontal activation observed in this 
study, is involved in the internal monitoring of our own actions and their outcomes 
(Amodio and Frith, 2006). My results suggest that it is also involved in monitoring 
the actions of others. In support of this notion, anticipating the action of another 
person has been shown to activate the dMPFC, in a location consistent with that 
activated by the ‘other’ and ‘subject’ compared with the ‘no agent’ condition in my 
experiment (Ramnani and Miall, 2004). In addition, the error-related negativity, an 
ERP signal that arises when one makes an error (Gehring et al., 1993), and which has 
been localised to the MPFC (Dehaene et al., 1994), has recently been shown to also 
arise when one observes another person making an error (Bates et al., 2005;van Schie 
et al., 2004).
I suggest that the activation of the posterior STS in both the ‘other’ and ‘subject’ 
conditions, compared to the ‘no agent’ condition, also reflects the monitoring of an 
action and its consequences in these two conditions. The posterior STS is involved in 
the analysis of biological motion (Allison et al., 2000) and more specifically it is 
believed to be involved in representing goaf directed actions (Bonda et al.,
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1996;Castelli et al., 2000;Grezes et al., 1998). Recently the posterior STS has been 
implicated in predicting/monitoring the actions of others (Pelphrey et al., 
2003;Pelphrey et al., 2004a;Ramnani and Miall, 2004). My results suggest that the 
posterior STS is involved in monitoring our own actions and their consequences as 
well as those of others.
The temporal poles and the region around the precuneus and posterior cingulate also 
showed greater activation to both the ‘other’ and the ‘subject’ conditions compared 
to the ‘no agent’ condition, suggesting that they are also involved in monitoring 
actions and their outcomes, which is consistent with their activation in many tasks 
involving thinking about other peoples actions (Fletcher et al., 1995;Gallagher et al., 
2000). However, the precuneus was significantly more active during the ‘other’ 
compared to the ‘subject’ condition, suggesting that this region is primarily involved 
in monitoring the actions of others. This is consistent with a previous study, which 
found that imagining yourself performing an action activated the precuneus, but to a 
lesser extent than imagining someone else performing the same action (Ruby and 
Decety, 2001).
A cluster in the right lateral cerebellum showed significant activation during the 
‘other’ conditions compared to the ‘no agent’ condition, as well as during the 
‘subject’ compared to the ‘no agent’ condition. The right lateral cerebellum has 
previously been implicated in predicting the sensory consequences of our own 
actions (Blakemore et al., 1998b;Blakemore et al., 2001). Activation of this region in 
the ‘other’ as well as the ‘subject’ condition suggests that the cerebellum may also be 
involved in monitoring the consequences of other people’s actions.
7.4.2.2 Effects of predictability
I did not find any effect of contingency/predictability in the auditory cortex. This 
may be due to back ground scanner noise concealing any more subtle effects in the 
auditory cortex, or it may be because the difference in the time delay between the 
tone and the button press/disappearance of the white dot, in the ‘predictable’, 
‘partially predictable’ and ‘unpredictable’ conditions, was insufficient to cause 
differential activation in the auditory cortex. Shafer and Marcus demonstrated that
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attenuation of the response to self-produced auditory stimuli persisted even with 
delays of up to 4 seconds between the tone and the button press. All my stimuli 
occurred within 1 second of the button press, perhaps explaining why I did not see an 
effect of predictability in the auditory cortex. However, I did identify effects of 
stimulus predictability/contingency in the orbital medial prefrontal cortex, the lateral 
frontal cortex, and the supramarginal gyrus (see Figure 7.3).
Right lateral and ventral views of a standard T1 weighted image rendered in the standard 
space defined by the Montreal Neurological Institute template. Regions showing significant 
effects o f predictability/contingency are shown superimposed on the rendered image (spatial 
extent threshold of 3 voxels was used for display purposes). Areas in green, including the 
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), the Middle Frontal Gyrus(MFG) and Inferior Frontal sulcus 
(IFS), and the Supramarginal gyrus (SMG), show greater activation for the ‘unpredictable’ 
and ‘partially predictable ’ conditions, compared to the ‘predictable ’ condition (partially 
predictable > predictable p < 0.001 uncorrected, masked by unpredictable > predictable 
p<0.01 uncorrected). The orbital medial prefrontal cortex (oMPFC), in red, shows 
significantly greater activation for the predictable ’ condition, compared to the ‘partially 
predictable ’ and ‘unpredictable ’ conditions (predictable > partially predictable p <0.001 
uncorrected, masked by predictable > unpredictable P<0.01 uncorrected).
Figure7. 3 -  Effects of contingency/predictability
G/IFS
oMPFC
Predictable > Unpredictable and Partially Predictable 
Unpredictable and Partially Predictable > Predictable
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7.4.2.2.1 Orbital medial prefrontal cortex
While the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex showed greater activation to the ‘subject’ 
and ‘other’ conditions compared to the ‘no agent’ conditions, the orbital medial 
prefrontal cortex (oMPFC) showed greater activation to the ‘predictable’ conditions, 
compared with the ‘partially predictable’ and the ‘unpredictable’ conditions, across 
agency conditions. It has been proposed that the medial orbito-frontal cortex is 
involved in monitoring and learning associations between stimuli, responses and 
outcomes (Elliott et al., 2000;Rolls, 2004). Amodio and Frith propose that while the 
dMPFC is involved in monitoring actions, the oMPFC is involved in monitoring 
outcomes (Amodio and Frith, 2006). In my study, subjects had to monitor the 
association between an outcome, the sound, and an action (a button press) or a visual 
stimulus (another person making a button press or the disappearance of the white 
dot). Thus the activation of the oMPFC in my study is consistent with its proposed 
role in monitoring the relationship between a stimulus and an outcome. My findings 
suggest that the oMPFC shows greater activation when the degree of contingency, 
between the stimulus and the outcome, is greater.
7.4.2.2.2 Lateral frontal regions
Two main lateral frontal regions showed greater activity during the ‘unpredictable’ 
and ‘partially predictable’ conditions compared to the ‘predictable’ conditions: a 
region around the right middle frontal gyrus and inferior frontal sulcus, and the right 
inferior frontal gyms, where it meets the lateral fissure and insula. Both of these 
areas have been implicated in temporal processing in several studies (Coull et al., 
2004;Ferrandez et al., 2003;Lewis and Miall, 2003;Livesey et al., 2006;Smith et al., 
2003;Tregellas et al., 2006), and activity in these regions increases with task 
difficulty (Tregellas et al., 2006). In my experiment, at the end of each block, 
subjects had to judge whether the tones heard in that block were contingent upon the 
button press or the disappearance of the white dot. This was essentially a timing task 
as the subjects had to monitor and compare the time intervals between the button 
press, or disappearance of the white dot, and the subsequent tones in each block in 
order to complete the task. The increased activity seen in these time perception 
regions during the ‘partially predictable’ and ‘unpredictable’ conditions may reflect
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increased task difficulty in these two conditions compared to the ‘predictable’ 
condition. The task was inherently more difficult in the ‘partially predictable 
condition’ as the stimuli in this condition were designed so that the sounds would not 
be perceived as clearly contingent or non-contingent by the subjects, and that instead 
the subjects’ responses would be at chance level. The task also appears to have been 
more difficult in the ‘unpredictable’ condition compared to the ‘predictable’ 
condition as subjects’ responses were 87% accurate in the ‘predictable’ blocks but 
only 80% accurate in ‘unpredictable’ blocks, though this difference did not reach 
significance (p=0.087). If these areas are responding to task difficulty I would expect 
to see more activity in these regions during the ‘partially predictable’ than during the 
easier ‘unpredictable’ condition. Comparison of the ‘partially predictable’ and 
‘unpredictable’ conditions reveals greater activity in the right inferior frontal gyrus 
during the ‘partially predictable’ condition. Similarly, plotting the betas for the peak 
voxels in the right middle frontal gyrus/inferior sulcus reveals higher activation for 
the ‘partially predictable’ than the ‘unpredictable’ condition, though this difference 
does not appear to be significant.
7.4,2.2.3 Supramarginal gyrus
The right inferior parietal cortex, in the supramarginal gyrus also showed 
significantly greater activation during the ‘partially predictable’ and ‘unpredictable’ 
conditions. The right inferior parietal lobe, and the supramarginal gyrus specifically, 
has also been implicated in timing (Assmus et al., 2003;Livesey et al., 2006), (though 
in these studies it was the left rather than the right supramarginal gyrus that was 
activated). Activity in this region is greatest during the ‘partially predictable’ 
condition suggesting that the increased activity seen in this region reflects the 
difficulty of the task as does the activity in the lateral frontal cortex.
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7.5 Conclusion
I found that a set of brain regions, namely the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, 
precuneus, and posterior STS, previously implicated in monitoring and predicting 
our own actions and those of others, are also involved in monitoring and predicting 
the sensory consequences of those actions. I also identified an orbital medial 
prefrontal region, previously implicated in learning and outcome monitoring, that 
shows an increased response as the degree of contingency between and event and its 
outcome increases.
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CHAPTER 8: SOMATOSENSORY ACTIVATIONS DURING THE 
OBSERVATION OF TOUCH
8.1 Introduction
During the observation of action, a significant proportion of the brain's motor system 
becomes active (Rizzolatti et al., 2001;Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). In monkeys, 
neurons in ventral premotor cortex fire bothwhen the monkey executes grasping 
actions and when it observes another individual (human or monkey) performing the 
same action (Gallese et al., 1996;Rizzolatti et al., 1996a). There is growing evidence 
that a similar mirror system also exists in the human brain (see General Introduction 
for a review of the evidence). For example, observing actions leads to somatotopic 
activation of the premotor cortex, with the mouth represented laterally and the foot 
medially (Buccino et al., 2001). There is also accumulating evidence that action 
observation modulates activity in the sensory cortices in the absence of sensory 
stimulation (see General Introduction). This activity may represent the predicted 
sensory consequences of the observed action. In addition, a number of brain systems 
with ‘mirror’ properties have recently been described. Common regions are activated 
by the experience and mere observation of disgust (Wicker et al., 2003), emotional 
facial expression (Carr et al., 2003), and pain (Singer et al., 2004).
Here I sought to investigate whether in addition to representing actions of other in 
our own motor system, and representing the sensory consequences of these actions in 
our sensory cortices, we also represent the sensations experienced by others in a 
similar manner. A recent study has demonstrated that the observation of touch to 
someone else's legs activates similar regions in the secondary somatosensory cortex 
(SII) in the observer's brain as when the observer's own legs are touched (Keysers et 
al., 2004), suggesting the existence of the touch mirror system, equivalent to the 
action mirror system. However, this SII activation was also found during the 
observation oftouch to an object, and no primary somatosensory cortex activity was 
found in either condition.
I also describe a female subject (C) for whom the observation of another person 
being touched is experienced as tactile stimulation on the equivalent part of her own
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body, and investigate the neural basis of this experience. C experiences touch from 
purely visual input. She experiences tactile stimulation on the part of her body that 
mirrors the body part she observes being touched. C has spent the whole of her life 
experiencing touch when she observes touch on others, unaware that the vast 
majority of the population does not experience similar sensations. She was surprised 
to discover that her perception of touch on observing others being touched is unusual.
There are various possible causes of C's mirror-touch sensation. One possibility is 
that it is due to over activation of somatosensory regions normally activated during 
the observation of touch (the putative tactile mirror system; (Keysers et al., 2004)). 
Perhaps this system is activated above a threshold for conscious tactile perception in 
C when she observes touch to another person so that she perceives the touch as if she 
is the object of it. In most people, this system would be active below a certain 
threshold, resulting in no conscious perception of tactile stimulation. In the visual 
system, there is evidence that stimulus processing with awareness is associated with 
greater activity in ventral visual cortexthan processing without awareness (Beck et 
al., 2001;Rees et al., 2002). One crucial difference betweenC s phenomenology and 
the results of the fMRI experiment described above (Keysers et al., 2004) is that C 
reports no experience of tactile perception when she observes objects being touched. 
Therefore, her touch mirror system should not be activated more than normalwhen 
she observes objects being touched.
A second possible explanation of C’s mirror-touch sensation is that it reflects direct 
connectivity between visual and somatosensory regions that is unique to C. In this 
account, C’s mirror-touch experience would not depend upon the same mechanisms 
that are believed to be involved in the observation of touch in the rest of the 
population. A third possible explanation is thatbimodal cells in the parietal cortex, 
specifically the intraparietal sulcus, which respond to both visual and tactile stimuli 
(Bremmer et al., 2001;Macaluso et al., 2003), are activated above the threshold for 
tactile perception during the observation of touch in C.
The aims of the current study were twofold. First, the experiment was designed to 
investigate neural interactions between visually perceived touch and tactile 
perception in the normal population. Secondly, I investigated the neural systems
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underlying C s mirror-touch experience. I used fMRI to compare brain activity while 
the C and a group of ‘normal control’ subjects observed people being touched and 
objects being touched.
To investigate whether brain activity during observation of touch follows a 
somatotopic organization, I compared brain activity during the observation of touch 
to different areas of the body (human neck and face, and similar regions on anobject) 
and to different sides of the body. There were three reasons why the face and neck 
were chosen as regions of stimulation in both the videos and the touch conditions. 
First, the face was chosen because of the known somatotopic representation ofthis 
region in primary somatosensory cortex (SI). Although the exact representation of the 
neck in human SI is unknown, the neck was chosen because it is physically close to 
the face but does not activate the face area of SI. Secondly, the face and neck were 
chosen because of the desire to match as closely as possible the human face and neck 
with an object with face- and neck-like properties (e.g. an electric fan) in the 
observationconditions. Finally, C reported being particularly sensitive to the 
observation of touch to another person's face and neck.
Activations during the observation of touch were compared with activations during 
tactile stimulation to the subject's own face and neck. I made several predictions. 
First, I predicted that, in the control subjects and in C, observationof touch to another 
human would activate somatosensory regions more than observation of touch to an 
object. Secondly, I predicted that SI activity to the observation of touch would be 
related to the region of the body observed being touched in a somatotopic manner. 
Finally, I predicted that these observation-related activations would be significantly 
higher in C than in the control subjects. In addition, there may be additional regions 
of C’s brain that are activated by the observation of touch which are not activated in 
the control group. This could account for why observed touch is not perceived as 
touch in most people.
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8.2 Materials and Methods
8.2.1 Subjects
A female, right-handed subject (C, age 41 years), who experienced tactile stimulation 
on her own body when seeing another personbeing touched, as well as 12 right- 
handed control participants (seven females; mean age 28.75 ± 2.66 years), gave 
informed consent and participated in the study, which was approved bythe National 
Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery Ethics Committee.
C, who appears to be neurologically and psychologically normal in every other way, 
claims always to have perceived observed touch on other people as touch to her own 
body. Although always having experienced touch when she observes touch on others, 
she was unaware that the vast majority of the population do not experience similar 
sensations until July 2003 when the authors were talking with her about observed 
touch and the mirror system. She was surprised to discover that her perception of 
touch on observing others being touched is unusual. C’s reported perception of touch 
when observing touch on other people seems to be reliable over time: the words and 
phrases she uses to describe the observed touch, its intensity and exact location on 
herself are highly consistent.
8.2.2 Stimuli
8.2.2.1 Touch session
During the touch session, the subjects lay on the MRI bed with their eyes shut, while 
the experimenter applied a tactile stimulus to the subjects’ neck or face (cheek area). 
There were four touch conditions defined according to the site of tactile stimulation: 
1) touch to left side of neck (tLN); 2) touch to right side of neck (tRN); 3) touch to 
left side of face (tLF); and 4) touch to right side of face (tRF). In addition there was a 
Baseline condition during which no touch occurred. The tactile stimulus device 
consisted of a 2-inch rigid piece of felt attached to the end of a wooden rod (length 
~lm). The rod reached into the scanner bore and could be positioned by the 
experimenter such that the felt-tip touched the subject’s neck or cheek (or neither in
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the baseline condition). In each block, the subject was stroked for 20 seconds on one 
of the four areas. Over the session there were five blocks of each tactile stimulus 
condition and five blocks of the rest baseline. The order of conditions was alternated 
between Face and Neck on either side.
8,2.2.2 Video sessions
The experiment also involved two video sessions, during which subjects were 
scanned while viewing short video clips. Each video clip lasted 4.5 seconds. Half the 
clips (the “human” videos) showed the head and shoulders of a person being touched 
on their neck or face by the finger of another person. Three different people, one 
male and two female, featured in these videos and only their head and shoulders were 
visible. The other half (the “object” videos) showed inanimate objects (a lamp, an 
electric fan and a loud speaker) being touched on their equivalent ‘neck’ or ‘face’ 
regions. The object conditions were designed to control for the presence of visual 
stimulation and movement of the toucher’s hand and arm and any other non-specific 
visual factors in the films.
The design was factorial with 3 factors: 1) Focus of the observed touch (human or 
object), 2) side of observed touch (left or right) and 3) location of observed touch 
(face or neck). This resulted in 8 conditions, as shown in Table 8.1. In addition, a 
fixation baseline condition was included.
Table 8.1 - Experimental conditions in video sessions
Human Object
Right Neck Human Right Neck (HRN) Object Right Neck (ORN)
Face Human Right Face (HRF) Object Right Face (ORF)
Left Neck Human Left Neck (HLN) Object Left Neck (OLN)
Face Human Left Face (HLF) Object Left Face (OLF)
The videos were presented in 23-sec blocks. Each block contained four different 
video clips from the same condition. The order in which the four video clips were 
presented within each block was random. At the end of each block, following the 
four videos, subjects were asked to rate the intensity of the touch applied to the
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person or object in the most recent video. A screen appeared for 5 seconds displaying 
the words “hard”, “medium” and “soft”. Subjects indicated their answer by pressing 
one of three buttons on a keypad held in their right hand. The intensity of the touch 
in the videos was not in fact deliberately varied between the different clips. The 
question was designed to ensure that the subjects paid attention to the touch stimulus 
in the videos for its duration.
During each of the video sessions, there was a total of 27 blocks, comprising three 
repetitions of each of the eight video conditions (see Table 8.1) and three repetitions 
of the 23-sec fixation baseline block. The order of presentation of the blocks was 
counterbalanced within and between subjects.
8.2.3 Imaging
A Siemens ALLEGRA system (Siemens, Erlangen) operating at 3 T was used to 
acquire both multi-slice axial gradient-echo, echo-planar T2* weighted image 
volumes with blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) contrast and axial T1 
weighted fast-field echo structural images for anatomical co-registration. (See 
Chapter 2: fMRI Methods for details of functional imaging). Data were acquired in 3 
functional imaging sessions. A total of 205 volumes was acquired in the Touch 
session, and 250 volumes were acquired in each of the following two Video sessions. 
Each session began with 8 “dummy” volumes, which were subsequently discarded, 
to allow for T1 equilibration effects. Each functional-image volume comprised 40 
2mm axial slices with in-plane resolution of 3 x 3 mm positioned to cover the whole 
brain. Volumes were acquired continuously every 2.6 seconds throughout each 
session (TR = 2.6).
The acquisition of a T1 - weighted anatomical image occurred after the three 
functional sessions and lasted approximately 12 minutes. The total duration of the 
experiment was approximately 45 minutes.
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8.2.4 Perceptual Ratings
After scanning, subjects were asked whether they felt the observed touch in any of 
the conditions. If they responded that they did, they were asked to watch 32 video 
clips comprising four exemplars of each of the eight conditions, selected at random 
from the video clips used in the scanning experiment. The order of presentation of 
the clips was random. Subjects were asked to rate the intensity of the tactile 
stimulation they felt on their own face or neck when they watched each video on a 
scale from 0 (indicating ‘no perceived tactile sensation’) to 5 (indicating ‘very 
intense tactile sensation’).
8.2.5 Statistical analysis
Functional imaging analysis used Statistical Parametric Mapping, implemented in 
SPM2 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neuroscience, 
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). For each subject, the fMRI scans were realigned to 
correct for inter-scan movement, using sine interpolation (Friston et al. 1995), and 
subsequently stereotactically normalised using affine registration followed by non­
linear registration (Ashbumer and Friston, 1999). The data were resampled using 
sine interpolation, with a resolution of 3 x 3 x 3 mm3, into the standard space of the 
Montreal Neurological Institute brain. The scans were then smoothed with a 
Gaussian kernel of 6mm full-width half maximum. (See Chapter 2: fMRI Methods 
for details of realignment, normalisation and smoothing).
The analysis of functional imaging data entails the creation of statistical parametric 
maps that represent a statistical assessment of hypothesised condition specific effects 
(Friston et al., 1994a). Condition specific effects were estimated with the General 
Linear Model with a delayed box-car waveform. (See Chapter 2: fMRI Methods for 
details of statistical analysis). Low frequency sine and cosine waves modelled and 
removed subject-specific, low frequency drifts in signal, and global changes in 
activity were removed by proportional scaling. Each component of the model served 
as a regressor in a multiple regression analysis. For the group of control subjects, the 
resulting parameter estimates for each regressor at each voxel were then entered into 
a second level analysis where subject served as a random effect in a within-subjects
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ANOVA. For both the group of control subjects (at the second level) and C (at the 
first level), the main effects and interactions between conditions were then specified 
by appropriately weighted linear contrasts and determined using the t-statistic on a 
voxel-by-voxel basis.
Statistical analysis was performed on the data from the Touch session to examine the 
main effects of tactile stimulation versus the no tactile stimulation baseline 
({tRN+tLN+tRF+tLF} -  baseline). Because of my specific hypothesis concerning 
somatotopic representation of observing the face being touched, analysis was 
performed to examine the main effects of touching the subject’s face versus neck 
({tRF+tLF} -  {tRN+tLN}), left versus right side ({tLF+tLN} -  {tRF+tRN}) and 
right versus left side ({tRF+tRN} -  {tLF+tLN}). In addition to a group analysis, 
individual subject analyses were performed to investigate the somatotopy of the 
activations during each touch condition.
The data from the video sessions were analysed to examine the main effects for 
which a priori predictions were made. These were the main effects of watching 
videos ({HRF+HLF+HRN+HLN+ORF+OLF+ORN+OLN} -  baseline) and 
observing touch to a human compared with touch to an object 
({HRF+HLF+HRN+HLN} -  {ORF+OLF+ORN+OLN}) (see Table 8.1 for an 
explanation of the abbreviations). In addition, analysis of the human video conditions 
was performed to examine the main effects of observation of touch to the face 
({HRF+HLF} -  {HRN+HLN}), to the left side ({HLF+HLN} -  {HRF+HRN}) and 
to the right side ({HRF+HRN} -  {HLF+HLN}). For each of these latter contrasts, 
the resulting images were inclusively masked (at p<0.05 uncorrected) with the 
equivalent contrast in the Touch experiment to investigate common activations 
during tactile stimulation and the observation of tactile stimulation.
These statistical contrasts were used to create an SPM{t}, which was transformed 
into an SPM{Z} and thresholded at p<0.05 (corrected on the basis of the theory of 
random Gaussian fields for multiple comparisons across the whole brain volume 
examined). I report those regions that survive correction at p<0.05 plus those regions 
surviving an uncorrected threshold of p<0.001 for which I had an a priori hypothesis 
for their activation, namely somatosensory areas and the mirror neuron system
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8.2.5.1 Comparison between C and control subjects
At the second level, a between-subjects ANOVA was used to test the significance of 
the interaction between group (control vs. C) and condition (observing human vs. 
observing object). This analysis was performed to test the hypothesis that there 
would be significantly greater activity in somatosensory and premotor regions when 





None of the control subjects reported feeling the observed touch on their own face or 
neck during any of the video conditions. C was asked to rate the intensity of the 
tactile stimulation she felt on her own face or neck when she watched each video on 
a scale from 0 (indicating ‘no perceived tactile sensation’) to 5 (indicating ‘very 
intense tactile sensation’). Table 8.2 shows C’s perceptual ratings. C reported feeling 
no sensation on her own face or neck during the object videos.
Table 8.2 - C’s mean ratings for the perception of touch on her own face or neck 
during the observation of touch to another person or object’s face and neck.
Observation condition C’s mean ratings
Human right neck (HRN) 3.88
Human right face (HRF) 3.50
Human left neck (HLN) 3.67
Human left face (HLF) 4.33
8.3.2 fMRI data: touch session
8.3.2.1 Main effect of touch -  baseline:
Comparison of the four touch conditions relative to baseline ({tRN+tRF+tLN+tLF} 
-  baseline) in the group of control subjects and in C resulted in activation of a 
number of somatosensory regions, including primary somatosensory cortex (SI) and 
secondary somatosensory cortex (SII), and motor and premotor regions. (See Figure 
8.1a).
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8.3.2.2 Main effect of touch to the face vs. neck:
Comparison of the two touch-face conditions relative to the two touch-neck 
conditions ({tRF+tLF} -  {tRN+tLN}) in the group of control subjects and in C 
resulted in activation of regions in SI corresponding to the head area, SII and the 
parietal cortex. (See Figure 8.1b).
Figure 8.1 - Activations due to tactile stimulation in the control group
a) somatosensory activations resulting from the comparison of the four touch conditions 
relative to rest baseline superimposed on T1 weighted image rendered in the standard space 
defined by the Montreal Neurological Institute template, b) SI activation resulting from the 
comparison of the two touch-face conditions relative to the two touch-neck conditions on a 
coronal section of a TI MR image at y  = -27. c) right SII activation resulting from the 
comparison of the two touch-left side conditions relative to the two touch-right side 
conditions on a coronal section of a TI MR image at y  = -18. d) shows left SI and SII 
activation resulting from the comparison of the two touch-right side conditions relative to 
the two touch-left side conditions shown on a coronal section of aTI MR image aty = -18. 
Activatios are thresholded atp<0.001 uncorrected with spatial extent threshold o f 5 voxels.
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8.3.2.3 Main effect of touch to the right vs. left:
Comparison of the two touch-left side conditions relative to the two touch-right side 
conditions ({tLF+tLN}-{tRF+tRN}) in the group of control subjects and in C 
resulted in right-sided activation of SI and SII. (See Figure 8.1c). The contrast of the 
two touch-right side conditions relative to the two touch-left side conditions 
({tRF+tRN}-{tLF+tLN}) resulted in left-sided activation of SI and SII. (See Figure 
8. Id).
8.3.3 fMRI data: video sessions
8.3.3.1 Main effect of observing touch to humans vs. touch to objects:
In the control subjects, the main effect of observing touch to a human relative to 
observing touch to an object resulted in bilateral activation along the length of the 
superior temporal sulcus (STS). In addition bilateral fusiform gyrus (including the 
fusiform face area; Kanwisher et al. 1997), primary and secondary somatosensory 
cortex and premotor cortex were activated in this contrast. (See Table 8.3 and Figure
8.2 A).
Table 83 -  Observing touch to a human relative to touch to an object in the control 
group
X y z Z
Left occipital gyrus, bordering with superior temporal 
sulcus -45 -72 3 4.17
Right temporo-parietal junction, intraparietal sulcus and 
STS 60 -57 24 4.86
Right fusiform gyrus 45 -57 -27 4.24
Precuneus bordering posterior cingulated 3 -57 36 4.42
Right intraparietal sulcus 42 -36 60 3.11
Left superior temporal sulcus -60 -21 -12 4.03
Right post central gyrus (SI) 66 -18 30 3.70
Right parietal operculum (SII) 63 -18 15 3.97
Right inferior frontal gyrus 54 30 -6 3.25
Superior/middle frontal gyrus (premotor cortex) 42 6 39 4.42
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Figure 8.2 -  Observing touch to a human versus touch to an object
» SI ( 0  -1 1 4 5
Pwrootor cort** 
5 1 ( 3 4
(A) In the control group the contrast ({HRF+HRN+HLF+HLN}-{ORF+ORN+OLF+ORF}) 
resulted in activation o f bilateral STS at the temporo-parietaljunction, fusiform gyrus, SI, 
SII and premotor cortex. (B) In C this contrast resulted in activation of the right STS, 
bilateral SI and SII, insula cortex, left anterior premotor cortex and right cerebellar cortex.
These activations are shown superimposed on a rendered TI structural MR image in the 
stereotactic space of Montreal Neurological Institute template. Activatio ns are thresholded 
atp<0.001 uncorrected with spatial extent threshold of 5 voxels. The plot shows parameter 
estimates of the relative activation in each of the eight conditions in right SI, right STS and 
right premotor cortex in controls (A), and in left SI in C (B). Condition labels as in top plot
can be found in Table 8.1.
In C, this contrast resulted in activation of the right superior temporal sulcus (STS), 
bilateral primary and secondary somatosensory cortex, insular cortex, anterior 
premotor cortex and cerebellar cortex. (See Table 8.4 and Figure 8.2B).
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Table 8.4 -  Observing touch to a human relative to touch to an object in C
X y z Z
Right occipital gyrus 60 -60 -3 6.36
Right superior temporal sulcus 69 -45 0 4.79
Right intraparietal sulcus 42 -42 66 4.41
Left post central gyrus (SI) -39 -33 42 6.28
Right post central gyrus (SI) 54 -21 39 5.60
Left parietal operculum (SII) -57 -30 21 5.53
Right parietal operculum (SII) 60 -30 18 3.96
Right cerebellum 45 -51 -33 5.18
Left precentral gyms / premotor -54 0 33 5.18
8.3.4 Common activations between touch and observation conditions
8.3.4.1 Observing touch to a human face masked with touch to subject’s face:
Areas that are activated by touch to the subject’s face versus neck, and that were also 
activated by observing touch to a human face, versus touch to the neck, were 
revealed by the contrast ({HRF+HLF}-{HRN+HLN}) inclusively masked with 
({tRF+tLF}-{tRN + tLN})  at p<0.05 uncorrected This contrast revealed activation of 
the head area of SI located in the anterior wall of the right post central gyrus in the 
control group. The same contrast also revealed activation of the head area of SI 
located in the anterior wall of the right post central gyrus in C. (See Table 8.5 and 
Figure 8.3A & B).
Table 8.5 - Observing touch to human face masked by touch to subject’s face
control group X y z Z
Right post central gyrus (SI head area) 30 -48 66 4.05
Right precentral gyms 57 -15 45 3.92
Right superior frontal gyrus 27 -9 69 3.44
C
Right post central gyrus (SI) 63 -18 27 2.38
Right parietal operculum (SII) 51 -24 18 1.55
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(A) Activations in SI head area resulting from the comparison of observing touch to a human 
face (relative to a human neck) atp<0.01 uncorrected masked with touch to the subject's 
face (relative to their neck) in the control group atp<0.05 uncorrected, shown on a coronal 
section of a TI image at y =-15. (B) Activations in SI head area resulting from the 
comparison of observing touch to a human face (relative to a human neck) at p<0.01 
uncorrected masked with touch to the subject's face (relative to neck) in C at p<0.05 
uncorrected, shown on a coronal section of a TI image aty = -18. (C) Activations in right 
SII resulting from the comparison o f observing touch to the leftside o f a human (relative to 
the right side) atp <0.01 uncorrected masked with touch to the subject's left side (relative to 
their right side) in the control group at p<0.05 uncorrectd, shown on a coronal section of a 
TI image aty = -30. A spatial extent threshold of 5 voxels was used..
8.3.4.2 Observing touch to the left or right side of a human masked with touch 
to the subject’s corresponding side:
Areas activated by touch to the subject’s left, versus right, side that were also 
activated by the observation of touch to the left, versus right, side of a human were 
revealed by the contrast ({HLF+HLN}-{HRF+HRN}) inclusively masked by 
({tLF+tLN}-{tRF+tRN}) at p<0.05 uncorrected This contrast revealed activation of 
right secondary somatosensory areas in the control group. (See Figure 8.3C). The 
opposite contrast ({HRF+HRN}-{HLF+HLN}) inclusively masked by ({tRF+tRN}- 
{tLF+tLN}) at p<0.05 uncorrected, did not reveal any regions significantly activated 
by observing touch to the right side that were also activated by touch to the subject’s 
right side. Neither of these masked contrasts revealed any significant activation in C, 
possibly because of lack of power.
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8.3.5 Comparison between C and control subjects
The between subjects ANOVA demonstrated a significant interaction between 
subject (control vs. C) and observation condition (human vs. object) in the primary 
and secondary somatosensory cortex, the anterior insular on both sides and the left 
premotor cortex. These regions were significantly more active in C than in the 
controls during the observation of touch to a human relative to an object.
Table 8.6 - Regions showing greater activity in C than in the control group 
during the observation of touch to a human relative to an object
X y z Z
Left supramarginal gyrus -60 -27 30 3.52
Left parietal operculum (SII) -60 -33 18 3.55
Right parietal operculum (SII) 60 -30 18 2.95
Left post central gyrus (SI) -39 -33 4 3.09
Right post central gyrus / central sulcus 54 -24 39 3.29
Left anterior insular cortex -45 -3 -6 3.65
Right anterior insular cortex 45 0 -3 2.95
Left frontal operculum (Broca’s area) -60 6 18 3.31
Figure 8 .4 - Areas that show greater activation to observation of touch to a human 
(versus observation of touch to an object) in C than in normal controls.





(A) Bilateral SI, SII, anterior insula and left premotor cortex were significantly more active 
in C than in the control group during the observation o f touch to a human relative to an 
object (p <0.001 uncorrected). The left sided-activations are superimposed on a rendered 
MR image. (B) Bilateral insula activations resulting from this contrast superimposed on a 
coronal section o f a TI image. Spatial extent threshold o f 5 voxels.
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To ensure that C’s activations to the observation of touch to a human were not simply 
higher than the mean ofthe control group's activations, I plotted individual responses 
in left and right SI and SII for each subject. (See Figure 8.5). This demonstrated that 
activity in these regions was higher in C than in any of the control subjects during the 
observation of touch to a human relative to touch to an object.
Fig. 8.5 Plots showing individual subject neural activity during the conditions 
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The plots show the difference in activity between all the conditions where subjects observed 
humans (H) being touched and conditions where subjects observed objects (O) being 
touched ({HRN+HRF+HLN+HLF}-{ORN+ORF+OLN+OLF}). Activity is shown for each 
individual subject in the control group (1-12), and for C, in SI and SII in both hemispheres. 
The plots indicate thatactivity in these regions was higher during observation of touch to a 
human relative to touch to an object in C than in all the control individuals
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8.4 Discussion
In this study, I investigated the neural systems associated with the observation of 
touch in normal humans and in an individual who experiences mirror-touch 
sensations. The results of the fMRI study demonstrate that, in normal control 
subjects, a number of regions including the primary and secondary somatosensory 
cortices are activated by the mere observation of touch to another human (relative to 
observation of touch to an object). The somatosensory activations to the observation 
of touch were somatotopically organised, following the classical sensory homunculus 
in SI (Disbrow et al., 2000). In the control subjects, somatosensory activations were 
present in the absence of any perception of touch. However, in this study I also 
included a subject, C, who experiences tactile stimulation on her own body when she 
observes other people being touched. My fMRI study was designed to investigate the 
difference in the neural systems that are activated by the observation of touch C, who 
experiences observed touch as tactile stimulation on herself, compared with the 
control subjects who experience no such tactile sensations. The somatosensory 
activation induced by the observation of touch to a human was significantly greater 
in C, who felt the observed tactile stimulation on her own body, than in the control 
group. In addition, C showed a higher activation than in the control group in 
premotor cortex and insular cortex during the observation of touch to a human.
8.4.1 Observation of touch in the brain
My study demonstrates that the observation of touch to another person’s head or 
neck activates the STS, especially on the right, fusiform gyrus (in the region of the 
fusiform face area; (Kanwisher et al., 1997)), bilateral SI and SII, and premotor 
cortex. These regions were activated more by the observation of a human’s head or 
neck being touched than by the observation of a similarly shaped object being 
touched.
The fusiform gyrus and the STS are typically activated by the visual presentation of 
faces (Kanwisher et al., 1997). Single-cell studies in the monkey homologue of 
human STS have identified cells that respond selectively to faces (Baylis et al., 
1985;Perrett et al., 1992). In the human brain, the STS is activated by faces, in
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particular by facial movements (Puce et al., 1998;Wicker et al., 1998). The STS is 
often activated when subjects observe human action and biological motion (Grezes et 
al., 2001;Grossman et al., 2000), and as such is generally considered as part of the 
mirror system even though it is not activated by action execution (Rizzolatti et al., 
2001). The STS activation in the current study was stronger in the right than in the 
left hemisphere, which is consistent with previous neuroimaging studies of biological 
motion (Grezes et al., 2001;Grossman et al., 2000).
The premotor cortex has similar mirror properties. In monkeys, the premotor cortex 
contains neurons that respond both to the execution and the observation of action 
(Gallese et al., 1996). The human premotor cortex has been activated in 
neuroimaging studies in which subjects observe a range of different actions (Buccino 
et al., 2001;Grafton et al., 1996;Rizzolatti et al., 1996b). It is interesting to note that, 
in the current experiment, the STS and premotor cortex were activated significantly 
more by the observation of a human head being touched than by objects being 
touched. Both the object and human videos contained movement of a human hand 
(doing the touching), the only difference being the presence of a human face in the 
human videos. This raises the intriguing possibility that mirror areas are 
preferentially activated by “social” actions, i.e. actions directed towards other 
humans. The selectivity of mirror areas for biological agents (rather than inanimate 
devices) has been suggested before (Tai et al., 2004). My results imply that mirror 
areas are not only selective for biological actors, but are also preferentially activated 
when the target of the action is biological.
The intraparietal sulcus contains bimodal cells responsive both to vision and tactile 
stimulation (Bremmer et al., 2001;Macaluso et al., 2003). The activation of the 
intraparietal sulcus during the observation of touch to a human might represent 
responses of these bimodal cells. Alternatively, it is possible that the intraparietal 
activations reflect activity of neurons that respond to visual stimulation only (Grefkes 
et al., 2002).
SI, comprising areas 1, 2 and 3 in the post central sulcus, and SII, located in the 
parietal operculum in the posterior insula, respond to tactile stimulation (Burton et 
al., 1993;Del Gratta et al., 2000;Disbrowet al., 2000). It is remarkable that both SI
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and SII were activated by the mere observation of touch to a human in the current 
study. This is in line with a recent study demonstrating that observing touch to a 
person’s legs activates SII (Keysers et al., 2004). However, there are several notable 
differences between the current study and the study by Keysers and colleagues 
(Keysers et al., 2004). First, the videos in the current study depicted touch to the face 
and neck, whereas the videos in the study by Keysers and colleagues depicted touch 
to the legs. Secondly, the somatosensory activations here were significantly higher 
for the observationof touch to a human than to an object. In contrast, SII activation in 
the study by Keysers and colleagues was found both for observationof touch to 
human legs and to cylindrical objects.
Furthermore, I found significant activation of SI to the observation of touch to a 
human. SI activation was somatotopically organised according to which area of the 
body was observed being touched. The head area of SI, located on the anterior wall 
of the post central gyrus, was activated both by being touched on the face (versus on 
the neck) and by observing another human being touched on the face (relative to the 
neck). Keysers and colleagues (Keysers et al., 2004) report a non-significant trend 
towards SI activation to the observation of touch. One possible explanation for the 
differences between the current study and the one by Keysers and colleagues is that 
the presence of a human face in the videos used here triggers especially strong and 
somatotopically organized somatosensory activations. (See Figure 8.2 A).
The lateralisation that occurred when being touched to one side was also present in 
SI when observing touch to the same side. SI lateralisation to the observation of 
touch was same-sided rather than being the mirror image of the side being touched.
In other words, observing touch to the left side of a human face or neck activated 
right SI, which is the same side of SI activated when being touched on the left side. 
Such a finding is consistent with studies recording motor evoked potentials (MEPs) 
evoked by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). MEP threshold is lowered 
specifically in those muscles that are activated during the observed action (Fadiga et 
al., 1995). Each hemisphere is more strongly activated when viewing actions 
conducted by a model’s contralateral hand than when viewing actions conducted by 
an ipsilateral hand (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2002). Larger MEPs were produced in the
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right hand when right rather than left hand actions were observed, while left hand 
MEPs increased only during observation of left hand movements.
Given the existence of mirror systems in several modalities including action 
(Rizzolatti et al., 2001), emotion (Carr et al., 2003) and pain (Singer et al., 2004), my 
data suggest that similar mirror activity is found during the observation of touch. 
However, one possibility is that the somatosensory activity to the observation of 
touch merely represents tactile imagery. There is neuroimaging evidence that 
primary and secondary somatosensory cortices are activated by anticipation of touch 
in the absence of any tactile stimulation (Carlsson et al., 2000). However, no subject 
reported imagining the touch in any of the conditions. Whether the activations to the 
observation of touch in the current study represent a tactile mirror system or tactile 
imagery remains to be investigated.
8.4.2 Mirrored touch sensation
As in the control group, somatosensory, parietal and premotor activation in C was 
significantly higher during the observation of touch to a human than touch to an 
object. The somatosensory activation induced by the observation of touchto a human 
was significantly greater in C than in the control group. In addition, unlike the 
individuals in the control group, C experienced the observed touch to a human face 
or neck as tactile stimulation on her own face or neck.
In the introduction to this chapter, I outlined three possible explanations for C’s 
mirror-touch experiences. First, there could be increased activity in the tactile mirror 
system, demonstrated in the control subjects in this study and by Keysers and 
colleagues (Keysers et al., 2004), above a threshold for conscious tactile perception. 
Secondly, the existence of direct connections between C’s visual and somatosensory 
areas could account for the difference between C and the control subjects. Thirdly, 
hyperactivation ofbimodal visual-tactile cells could be sufficient to give rise to 
illusory touch in C.
Although bimodal visual-tactile cells, for example in parietal cortex, may be 
important in giving rise to mirrored touch sensation, they are unlikely to be the only
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cells involved because of the changes in activation observed elsewhere in the mirror- 
touch system, including SI regions. The second account also seems unlikely. If there 
were direct connections between visual and somatosensory cortices in C, then 
activity in somatosensoryregions would be predicted in C but not necessarily activity 
in the other areas found here. Nor would I expect to see any somatosensory activation 
in the normal control subjects when they observe touch, as they would not have the 
hypothesized direct connections.
The first account is favoured on the basis of the empirical evidence from this study.
In most people, it is possible that the somatosensory mirror system, which matches 
observed and felt touch, is involved in understanding the effect of tactile stimulation 
on others. This system is normally active below a certain threshold such that no 
conscious perception of tactile stimulation is experienced. One possibility is that this 
system is activated above that perceptual threshold in C whenever she observes touch 
to another person. In this case, rather thansimply allowing C to understand the tactile 
stimulation she is observing, C perceives it as if she were the receiver of it. In support 
of this supposition, activity in bilateral SI and SII was higher in C’s brain than in any 
of the controlsubjects during the observation of touch to a human relative to touch to 
an object. (See Figure 8.5). In other words, SI and SII activity in C was not only 
significantly higher than the mean activity in these regions in the control subjects;
C’s activations were also higher than all individuals within the control group.
In addition to somatosensory activity during the observationof touch to a human, C 
showed a higher activation in left premotor cortex, in the vicinity of Broca's area in 
the frontal operculum, in this contrast than did the control group. I propose that this 
higher activation of premotor cortex represents overactivity of the action mirror 
system in C. It is possible that, whenC observes action, her mirror system is 
activated to a greater extent than in most people.
This idea of a threshold for conscious perception is supported by several studies 
showing that consciousness of visual stimuli is associated with greater activity in 
ventral visual cortex, but that unconscious processing also activates the same region 
(Beck et al., 2001;Rees et al., 2002). Given the somatotopic activation of SI and SII 
during the observationof touch in the control group as well as in C, however, this
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threshold hypothesis may be too simple to account for why the control subjects, and 
indeed most people, never perceive observed touch. Presumably the touch mirror 
system could occasionally be activated above threshold even in normal control 
subjects. Even though C’s somatosensory activations were significantly higher than 
the activations in the control group, this may not explain why C feels observed touch 
whereas there was no hint of feeling observed touch in any of the controlsubjects. It 
would be surprising if there were no special regions associated exclusively with the 
conscious experience of touch.
One possible region that mediates the conscious perception of touch on oneself 
during the observation of touch is the anterior insula. This region was bilaterally 
activated in C during the observation of touch, but was not activated during the same 
condition in the control group. The anterior insula contains tactile receptive fields 
(Burton et al., 1993;01ausson et al., 2002). Furthermore, the insula is associated with 
self-processing. The anterior insula was activated in neuroimaging studies in which 
subjects imagined themselves performing actions relative to someone else 
performing the same action (Ruby and Decety, 2001), looked at pictures of their own 
face (Kircher et al., 2001) or identified their own memories (Fink et al., 1996). Farrer 
and Frith found activation of a very similar region of the anterior insula cortex, in 
both hemispheres, when subjects attribute actions to themselves rather than to 
another person (Farrer and Frith, 2002). Given its role in attribution to the self, it is 
possible that the anterior insula activity found in C in my study, along with over 
activation of the touch mirror system, accounts for why she perceives herself as the 
direct target of the observed touch.
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8.5 Conclusion
In this study, I investigated the neural systems associated with the observation of 
touch in normal humans and in an individual who experiences mirror-touch 
sensations. In normal subjects the primary and secondary somatosensory cortices 
were activated by the mere observation of touch to a human (relative to observation 
of touch to an object). This activation was somatotopically organized, following the 
classical sensory homunculus in SI (Disbrow et al., 2000), such that observation of 
touch to the face activated the head area of primary somatosensory cortex, whereas 
observation of touchto the neck did not. In normal subjects, the brain's mirror 
system—comprising premotor cortex, superior temporal sulcus and parietal cortex— 
was also activated by the observation of touch to another human more than to an 
object. This suggests that we use our own somatosensory system to predict and 
simulate the sensory experiences of others, similar to the way in which we use our 
own motor system to predict and simulate the actions of others.
The activation patterns observed in C, who experiences observed touch as tactile 
stimulation on herself, differed from those of the normal control subjects (who 
experience no such tactile sensations) in three ways. Activations in the 
somatosensory cortex were significantly higher in C when she observed touch. These 
results suggest that, in C, the mirror system fortouch is overactive, above the 
threshold for conscious tactile perception. C also showed higher activation in 
premotor cortex, part of the action mirror system, and insular cortex than the control 
group during the observation of touch to a human.
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CHAPTER 9: RECOGNISING THE SENSORY CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
ACTIONS OF OTHERS: A CROSS-MODAL REPRESENTATION OF 
VOWELS IN 2-3 MONTH OLD INFANTS
9.1 Introduction
As described in the General Introduction to this thesis, there is strong evidence that 
infants as young as 3-5 months can detect contingencies between their actions and a 
stimulus, and that they can distinguish between self-produced sensory stimuli and 
externally generated stimuli, on the basis of these contingencies between their 
actions and sensory input, as demonstrated by the differential responses they show to 
the two types of stimuli, i.e. by 3-5 months of age infants can recognise the 
consequences of their own actions (Bahrick and Watson, 1985;Field, 1979;Rochat, 
1998;RochatandHespos, 1997;Rochat and Morgan, 1995;Schmuckler, 1996).
It also appears that, as well as being able to recognise the consequences of their own 
actions, infants can recognise the consequences of actions made by others from 2 
months of age, at least in the context of speech. There is strong behavioural evidence 
that infants as young as two months of age can match observed articulatory 
movements, to the appropriate auditory phonemes. When presented with two videos 
of faces articulating vowels, 4.5 month old infants spent significantly longer fixating 
the video that matched the auditory vowels they were played (Kuhl and Meltzoff, 
1982;Patterson and Werker, 1999). This finding has been replicated with 2 month old 
infants (Patterson and Werker, 2003). In an operant sucking paradigm, 4 month old 
infants will suck more to receive a face that matches the heard speech sound (Walton 
and Bower, 1993). As yet the neural mechanisms underlying infants’ ability to match 
visual and auditory speech, remains is unknown. One possibility is that infants have a 
cross-modal representation of speech that is accessed by both heard and seen speech.
Supporting this possibility is the fact that, in adults, both seeing and hearing speech 
has been shown to activate regions involved in speech production (Skipper et al., 
2005;Wilson et al., 2004). When subjects listen to or watch speech, muscle 
potentiation increases in the subject’s own mouth muscles. MEPs were recorded in 
subject’s tongue muscles in response to TMS of left motor cortex, while they listened
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to speech sounds requiring different amount of tongue movement. MEPs were 
greatest when listening to sounds that required greater tongue movements (Fadiga et 
al., 2002). Similarly MEPs in the lip muscles, produced by TMS of the face area of 
the left motor cortex, were recorded while subjects heard speech sounds versus non 
speech sounds and watched speech related lip movements versus eye and brow 
movements. MEPs were greater while subjects listened to speech sounds compared 
to non-speech sounds, and when subjects saw lip movements compared to eye and 
brow movements (Watkins et al., 2003). In addition speech perception has been 
shown to activate the premotor regions involved in speech production using fMRI. 
Viewing silent articulatory mouth movements activates Broca’s area (Calvert and 
Campbell, 2003). Listening to speech sounds also activates premotor areas involved 
in speech production (Wilson et al., 2004). Most recently observation of silently 
articulating faces, and listening to speech sounds have been shown to activate a 
network of brain regions involved in speech production including the premotor 
cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, primary motor cortex and superior temporal sulcus 
(Skipper et al., 2005). These findings demonstrate that speech perception, whether 
visual or auditory, activates the motor areas underlying speech production in the left 
hemisphere. Thus it appears that adults represent seen and heard speech in their 
motor systems. This is consistent with the motor theory of speech, which proposes 
that speech is primarily represented as articulatory gestures (Liberman and 
Mattingly, 1985;Liberman and Whalen, 2000).
There is some evidence of a correspondence between heard speech and motor 
production in infants. When infants, aged 12-20 weeks, listened to an adult speaker 
produce different vowels, they produced more vocalisations resembling that 
particular vowel (Kuhl and Meltzoff, 1996). Likewise, new bom infants, aged from 1 
to 7 days, make the appropriate mouth movement in response to speech sounds 
(Chen et al., 2004). This suggests that like adults, children represent heard speech in 
their motor system. Thus, perhaps infants’ ability to match visual and auditory 
speech is based on a cross-modal representation of seen or heard speech in their 
motor system. Here, I sought to use high density electro-encephalography to examine 
whether infants have a cross- or a-modal neural representation of phonemes that is 
accessed by both auditory and visual speech.
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I designed a habituation paradigm to examine whether infants’ response to auditory 
speech could be habituated by the prior presentation of visual speech in a phoneme 
specific manner, i.e. does visual speech perception affect the processing of auditory 
speech. Repetition of a stimulus leads to decreased activity within the neural 
networks representing that stimulus, in both auditory (Miller et al., 1991) and visual 
(Ulanovsky et al., 2003) cortices, a phenomenon known as repetition suppression. 
Scalp potentials evoked by a stimulus and measured with EEG also show decreases 
amplitude with repetition (Woods and Elmasian, 1986). This response habituation 
with repetition is abolished by presentation of a new or deviant stimulus, due to 
activation of a new set of neurons by the deviant stimulus. Thus trials where a 
stimulus is repeated elicit a smaller response compared to when the stimulus 
changes. By manipulating what stimulus changes elicit a difference in the brain 
response (the ERP), it is possible to infer what counts as a ‘repetition’ for a particular 
neural network and thus the nature of the representation computed by the network. 
For example, a network encoding a phonetic representation should habituate to 
repetition of a phoneme irrespective of the speaker, and should show renewed 
activity to a phonetic change only. In infants the neuronal response to auditory 
phonetic stimuli decreases with repetition, even when different speakers are used, 
and presentation of a new phoneme restores the amplitude of the ERP (Dehaene- 
Lambertz and Baillet, 1998;Dehaene-Lambertz and Dehaene, 1994;Dehaene- 
Lambertz and Pena, 2001;Woods and Elmasian, 1986). This demonstrates that 
infants have a neural network dedicated to phonetic processing, that normalises 
across acoustical differences in the stimuli.
I hypothesised that if infants have a neural network encoding a cross-modal 
representation of phonemes, it should be possible to habituate the response of such a 
network to auditory phonetic stimuli by the prior presentation of visual speech. Any 
such habituation should be specific to the phoneme used for habituation, and a 
change of phoneme, compared to repeated presentation of the same phoneme, across 
modalities should elicit a greater neural response.
Sixteen full term French infants (4 boys; 12 girls) were tested between 9 and 12 
weeks after birth (mean 10.5 weeks, SD=0.92 weeks). In each trial infants were 
presented with a short video clip of a person silently articulating a vowel, a French
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/a/ or a French /i/, presented twice in succession (the context stimuli). This was 
followed by presentation of the test stimulus: an auditory only vowel, either a French 
/a/ or /i/. In half the trials the auditory test vowel was the same as the preceding 
visually presented vowels (vowel match trials), and in half the trials the alternative 
vowel was presented (vowel mismatch trials). I predicted that the response to vowel 
matched auditory test stimulus would be smaller than the response to the vowel 
mismatch auditory test stimuli.
As a control I also varied the gender of the speaker in the visual context and auditory 
test stimuli. Thus in half of each of the two trial types described above, (vowel match 
and vowel mismatch), the gender of the auditory test stimulus matched the gender of 
the speaker previously seen articulating vowels (gender match trials), and in half the 
trials the gender differed (gender mismatch trials). This resulted in four conditions 
overall (see Methods). I did not expect to see a difference in the auditory test 
stimulus ERP between gender match and gender mismatch trials, as infants below 6- 
8 months of age are not able to match gender information in face and voice 
(Patterson and Werker, 2002;Walker-Andrews et al., 1991) suggesting that infants as 
young as those I tested (2.4 months) do not yet have an amodal representation of 
gender.
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9.2 Materials and Methods
9.2.1 Subjects
Sixteen full term infants (4 boys; 12 girls) were tested between 9 and 12 weeks after 
birth (mean age 10.5 weeks, SD = 0.92 weeks). Ten additional infants were tested 
but rejected for fussiness, excessive movement, or bad electrode recording.
9.2.2 Stimuli
Four male and four female actors were filmed articulating /a/ and l\l against a white 
background to create the stimuli. There were four possible visual stimuli (the context 
stimuli): 1) a female articulating /a/, 2) a female articulating /i/, 3) a male articulating 
/a/, or 4) a male articulating /i/. One video clip of each vowel was selected for each 
actor. Four frames were extracted from each clip: i) mouth closed, ii) beginning of 
movement, iii) mouth semi-extended, iv) mouth fully extended. These 4 frames were 
presented at fixed time intervals (calculated from the original videos) to recreate 
natural looking articulatory movements.
Similarly there were four possible auditory stimuli (the test stimuli): 1) a female 
spoken /a/, 2) a female spoken /i/, 3) a male spoken /a/, or 4) a male spoken /i/. 
Whereas several different actors were used to create the visual context stimuli, the 
four test stimuli were always the same. Only one female and one male speaker were 
recorded and only one of each vowel was used for each speaker. The auditory stimuli 
were recorded and edited using Cool Edit Pro (Syntrillium Software) (now renamed 
Adobe Audition). A single /a/ and III lasting 190 ms were selected for the male and 
female speaker. The vowels were then matched for subjective intensity and volume.
9.2.3. Paradigm
Each trial consisted of three stimuli. Two visual vowels were presented in 
succession, (the context stimuli) and followed by an auditory vowel (the test 
stimulus) (see Fig 9.1). Each visual stimulus consisted of a short video clip of a 
person silently articulating a vowel. Each articulatory movement lasted 567ms, and
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was preceded and followed by 500ms of the mouth being fully closed. The auditory 
test stimulus consists of a spoken vowel of duration 190ms. The two visual context 
stimuli and the auditory test stimuli were presented with a 1567 ms interval between 
the onset of each stimulus (onset of the two articulatory movements and onset of the 
sound). Figure 9.1 shows the trial structure. A brightly coloured ‘bull’s eye’ was 
presented after the offset of the context stimuli, and during the presentation of the 
auditory test stimulus, in the same location as the mouth and nose in the visual 
stimuli, to keep the infant’s attention on that location in readiness for the appearance 
of the visual stimuli in the next trial.
Figure 9.1 -  Trial Structure





Stimuli were presented using Eprime (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.). Trials were 
presented in 4 blocks of 32 trials (trial length = 5134 ms) of the same context (1 
block for each possible context), e.g. a female articulating /a/. Each of the 4 possible 
actors appeared 8 times in each block. In each trial the auditory test stimuli could 
either match the visual context stimuli in terms of the vowel produced, the gender of 
the speaker, both or neither. Thus there were four possible trial types/conditions:
1) vowel match, gender match (VM/GM)
2) vowel mismatch, gender match (VMM/GM)
3) vowel match, gender mismatch (VM/GMM)














Female visual /a/ VM/GM VMM/GM VM/GMM VMM/GMM
Female visual III VMM/GM VM/GM VMM/GMM VM/GMM
Male visual /a/ VM/GMM VMM/GMM VM/GM VMM/GM
Male visual III VMM/GMM VM/GMM VMM/GM VM/GM
Each trial type occurred 8 times in each block (twice following each individual 
actor), thus each trial type occurred 32 times during the whole experiment.
The infants were seated in their mother’s lap facing a black screen and two speakers 
hidden behind the screen on each side. Participants viewed the visual stimuli 
projected onto this screen situated at 60 ±10 cm, subtending 37° x 37° of visual 
angle. The auditory stimuli were played through the speakers hidden behind the 
screen. The entire presentation of the 4 blocks lasted 11 minutes, however the 
presentation of trials was stopped whenever the infant looked away, and restarted 
once their attention returned to the screen. Pauses also occurred whenever the infant 
needed comforting. Once the infant’s attention had returned to the screen, interrupted 
trials were restarted at their beginning.
9.2.4 ERP recording and data analysis
A continuous electro-encephalogram (EEG) was recorded with a Geodesic electrode 
net (EGI) referenced to the vertex (electrode 65). The net was positioned in 
anatomical reference to the vertex and the cantho-meatal line. (See Figure 9.2). Scalp 
voltages were recorded amplified, digitized at 125 Hz and filtered between 0.5 and 
20 Hz. Segmentation, artefact detection and averaging was then carried out on the 
EEG using EEGlab toolbox (Delorme and Makeig, 2004). The EEG was segmented 
into epochs starting 500 ms before the onset of each auditoiy test stimulus and 
ending 1500 ms after stimulus onset. The epochs were then automatically checked 
for artefacts. Channels contaminated by eye or motion artefacts were automatically 
rejected. All trials with more than 50% contaminated channels were rejected. Any
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electrodes contaminated in more than 70% of the retained trials were excluded from 
the analysis. The artefact free trials were averaged for each infant for each of the 4 
possible conditions: 1) VMGM, 2) VMMGM, 3) VMGMM, and 4) VMMGMM. On 
average 26 trials were retained per infant for each condition (26.8, 25.9, 26.1, and 
25.7 respectively). Averages were then baseline corrected, with baseline -200 to 0ms 
relative to stimulus onset, and an average reference transformation was applied to 
obtain reference-independent potentials. Two-dimensional reconstructions of scalp 
voltage at each time step were computed using spherical spline interpolation.
Figure 9.2 -Infant wearing the Geodesic 64 electrode net
9.2.5 Statistical analysis
9.2.5.1 Vowel match versus vowel mismatch
To examine the effect of vowel match versus mismatch on the response to the 
auditory test stimulus, the voltages from two electrode groups, one frontal (2, 3, 4, 7, 
8, 11, 12, 14, 54, 55, 57, 58, 61, 62) and one posterior (25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 35, 
36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 44) were averaged for each condition. These electrodes were 
chosen as they were located over the positive and negative maxima of the dipole
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difference between VMM and VM at the peak of the auditory potential. The mean 
voltage was then averaged across the peak of the auditory response (200-300ms) and 
entered into an ANOVA with three factors: location of electrodes (frontal v. 
posterior); type of vowel (match v. mismatch); and gender (match v. mismatch).
9.2.5.2 Gender match versus gender mismatch
To examine the effect of gender match versus mismatch on the auditory response to 
the test stimulus, the voltages from two posterior electrode groups, one on the right 
(45,46,48,49, 50, 51) and one the left (27,28, 31, 32, 35, 36) were averaged for 
each condition. These electrodes were chosen as they were located over the positive 
and negative maxima of the dipole difference between GMM and GM at the peak of 
the auditory potential. The mean voltage was then averaged across the peak of the 
auditory response (230-330ms) (and across various other time intervals after stimulus 
onset) and entered into an ANOVA with two factors: location of electrodes (frontal 
v. posterior); gender (match v. mismatch); and vowel (match v. mismatch).
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9.3 Results
9.3.1 Auditory response to all test stimuli
The main auditory potential, consisting of a strong frontal positivity and a posterior 
negativity, began around 130ms, peaked at around 270-80ms, and started declining 
gradually from around 450-500ms. Prior to this, from 0-100ms, there was a small 
frontal negativity/posterior positivity that peaked around 50ms after stimulus onset.
9.3.2 Vowel match vs. mismatch
Conditions where the vowel presented in the test and the context stimuli matched 
each other (i.e. VM/GM and VM/GMM), were compared with conditions where the 
test and context vowel did not match (i.e. VMM/GM and VMM/GMM) irrespective 
of gender. Examination of the topography revealed a difference between VMM and 
VM consisting of a dipole angled to the right across the head, with a right frontal 
positivity and a posterior negativity (see Figure 9.3b). This difference between VMM 
and VM started early and was greatest around 250ms, i.e. just before the peak of the 
auditory potential.
Analysis of the mean amplitude of the auditory response was performed over two 
packs of electrodes (See Figure 9.3b to see electrode locations), one frontal 
(electrodes 2,3,4, 7, 8,11,12,14, 54, 55, 57, 58, 61, 62) and one posterior 
(electrodes 26,27,28, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,40,44) using an ANOVA with 3 
factors: electrode location (frontal versus posterior); vowel (matched vowel versus 
mismatched vowel); and gender (gender match or gender mismatch). This revealed a 
significant interaction between the vowel (matched vowel versus mismatched 
vowel), and the location of the electrodes in the mean amplitude of the auditory 
potential from 200 to 300 ms after stimulus onset (F(i,i5)=8.53, p=0.011). Post hoc 
analyses showed that in the frontal hemisphere, the response to vowel mismatches 
was significantly more positive than the response to matches (F(i)i5)=7.15, p=0.017), 
(see Figure 9.3c). Meanwhile in the posterior hemisphere, the response to 
mismatches was significantly more negative than the response to matches 






Figure 9.3 -  Vowel mismatch -  vowel match 





a)Topographies of the evoked potential in response to the auditory test stimulus at 248ms 
after stimulus onset, just before the peak of the auditory potential. b)topography o f the 
maximum difference between the response to vowel mismatch and vowel match auditory test 
stimuli (VMM- VM) at 248ms after stimulus onset, just prior to the peak o f the auditory 
potential Two groups o f electrodes were selectedfor statistical analysis: a frontal group 
shown in black, and a posterior group shown in white, c) The average wave form for the 
group offrontal electrodes located over the positive maxima of the difference (VMM- VM), 
showing a significantly greater response to vowel mismatches (VMM- solid line) than to 
vowel matches (VM -  dashed line) from 200-300ms after stimulus onset, c) The average 
wave form for the group ofposterior electrodes located over the negative maxima of the 
difference (VMM -  VM), showing a significantly more negative response to vowel 
mismatches (VMM- solid line) than to vowel matches (VM-  dashed line) from 200-300ms 
after stimulus onset. In c) and d) * indicates significance. Arrow indicated stimulus onset.
In contrast the same 3 way ANOVA did not reveal a significant interaction between 
electrode location and gender match v mismatch (F(i,i5) = 0.86, p = 0.37) for these 
electrode groups. Nor was there a significant effect of gender match v mismatch in 
the frontal (F(i = 0.036, p = 0.85) or the posterior (F(i,i5) = 3.04, p = 0.10) 
electrode groups. Nor was there a significant interaction between gender and vowel.
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The response to vowel matched test stimuli was weaker than the response to vowel 
mismatched stimuli, particularly in right frontal electrodes. This suggests that 
presentation of visual articulated vowels habituated the infant’s response to that same 
vowel when subsequently presented in an auditory context, i.e. cross modal 
habituation occurred, implying that the infants must have a cross modal 
representation of vowels by 9-12 weeks of age.
9.3.3 Gender match vs. mismatch
Conditions where the gender of the speaker in the test and the context stimuli 
matched each other (i.e. VM/GM and VMM/GM), were compared with conditions 
where the test and context gender did not match (i.e. VM/GMM and VMM/GMM), 
irrespective of vowel (see Figure 9.4). This comparison did not show the habituation 
of the auditory response by gender matches, in the same way as seen when 
comparing VM to VMM above. The comparison of GMM -  GM did not result in the 
same difference topography as VMM -  VM, namely a frontal positivity (lateralised 
to the right) and a posterior negativity (see Figure 9.3b). Instead there was a 
difference between the conditions across the posterior hemisphere, i.e. over the 
occipital electrodes (see Figure 9.4b). Over the posterior left electrodes the response 
to GMM was more positive than the response to GM (see Figure 9.4d), whereas over 
the posterior right electrodes the opposite was true, i.e. the response to GMM was 
more negative than the response to GM (see Figure 9.4c). So the difference formed a 
dipole across the posterior hemisphere that was positive on the left and negative on 
the right. This difference appeared from about 150 ms, peaked around 280ms and 
remained till around 400ms.
Analysis of the mean amplitude around the peak auditory response (230-330 ms) was 
performed over two posterior packs of electrodes, (see Figure 9.4b to see electrode 
locations), one on the right (45,46,48,49, 50, 51,) and one on the left (27, 28, 31,
32, 35, 36) using an ANOVA with 3 factors: electrode location (posterior left versus 
posterior right); gender (gender match versus mismatch); and vowel (vowel match 
versus mismatch). This revealed a significant interaction between gender (gender 
match versus gender mismatch), and the location of the electrodes in the mean 
amplitude of the auditory potential (F(i,i5) = 14.10, p = 0.002). Post hoc analyses
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showed that over the posterior left electrodes the response to gender mismatches was 
significantly more positive than the response to matches (F(i,i5) = 12.81, p = 0.003), 
whereas over the posterior right electrodes, the response to mismatches was 
significantly more negative than the response to matches (F(i,i5) = 5.82, p = 0.029), 
(see Figure 9.4c & d).
Figure 9.4 -  Gender mismatch -












a) Topographies of the evoked potential in response to the auditory test stimulus at 280ms 
after stimulus onset, at the peak of the auditory potential, b) Topography of the maximum 
difference between the response to gender mismatch and gender match auditory test stimuli 
(GMM- GM) at 280ms after stimulus onset, at the peak of the auditory potential. Two 
groups of electrodes were selectedfor statistical analysis: a left posterior group shown in 
black, and a right posterior group shown in white, c) The average wave form for the group 
of right posterior electrodes located over the negative maxima o f the difference (GMM- 
GM), showing a significantly more negative response to gender mismatches (GMM- solid 
line) than to gender matches (GM -  dashed line) from 230-330ms after stimulus onset, c) 
The average wave form for the group of left posterior electrodes located over the postive 
maxima of the difference (GMM- GM), showing a significantly greater response to gender 
mismatches (GMM- solid line) than to gender matches (GM- dashed line) from 230-330ms 
after stimulus onset. In c) and d) * indicates significance. Arrow indicated stimulus onset.
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In contrast, the same 3 way ANOVA did not reveal a significant interaction between 
electrode location and vowel match v mismatch (F(iji5) = 0.94, p = 0.35) for these 
electrode groups. Nor was there a significant effect of vowel match v mismatch in 
the left-hand (F(i,i5) = 2.69, p = 0.12) or the right-hand (F^is) = 0.002, p = 0.97) 
electrode groups. There was no interaction between gender and vowel.
Thus, although the auditory response was not habituated by gender matches, in the 
same way as it habituated to vowel matches, the infant brain did distinguish and 
show differential responses to gender matches compared to mismatches, and 
therefore must be integrating gender information from the face and voice.
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9.4 Discussion
I hypothesised that if infants have a neural network encoding a cross- or a-modal 
representation of phonemes, the response of such a network to auditory phonemes 
would be habituated by the prior presentation of that same phoneme visually. The 
response to vowel mismatched auditory test stimuli was significantly greater, than 
the response to vowel matched stimuli (see Figure 9.3). Thus the presentation of 
visually articulated vowels habituated the infant’s response to that same vowel when 
subsequently presented in an auditory context. This suggests that infants must have a 
cross modal neural representation of vowels, i.e. a network of neurons that respond 
to specific phonetic information irrespective of the modality it is perceived in, by 9- 
12 weeks of age. This may explain infants’ ability to recognise the speech sounds 
produced by observed articulations.
Preliminary analyses conducted by my colleagues (S.Baillet, G.Dehaene-Lambertz, 
J-F.Mangin and J.Mattout, personal communication) have localised the source of this 
cross-modal phonetic habituation to Broca’s region and the left superior temporal 
gyrus/sulcus. This is consistent with the accumulating evidence in adults that both 
seen and heard speech activate regions involved in speech production (Calvert and 
Campbell, 2003;Fadiga et al., 2002;Skipper et al., 2005;Watkins et al., 2003;Wilson 
et al., 2004). In addition, there is evidence from studies of imitation of an early 
correspondence between heard speech and the appropriate motor representation in 
infants (Chen et al., 2004;Kuhl and Meltzoff, 1996). This preliminary result suggests 
that, like adults, infants represent seen and heard speech amodally in the motor 
regions involved in speech production This is consistent with the mo tor theory of 
speech perception, which proposes that speech is primarily represented as 
articulatory gestures during both speech production and perception (Liberman and 
Mattingly, 1985;Liberman and Whalen, 2000). The involvement of the superior 
temporal gyrus, is consistent with activation in adults of the auditory cortex, 
including the superior temporal gyrus, by observation of someone silently 
articulating speech (Calvert et al., 1997;Pekkola et al., 2005). This suggests that 
infants, like adults, represent the predicted sensory consequences of the observed 
articulation in their own sensory cortices.
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As expected, the response to the auditory test stimuli did not show cross-modal 
habituation to gender information as it did for phonemes. The frontal and posterior 
electrode bundles that were analysed to examine the difference between vowel 
matches and vowel mismatches, showed no significant effect of gender match versus 
gender mismatch. Nor did they show any significant interaction between gender and 
vowel. Instead, I found a large difference between the response to gender match and 
gender mismatch test stimuli, across the posterior electrodes (see Figure 9.4). This 
suggests that infants’ brains do discriminate between gender matches and 
mismatches across modalities.
This finding is surprising in the light of previous behavioural findings in infants. 
Until 6-8 months of age, infants are unable to match gender information in faces and 
voices in preferential looking paradigms (Patterson and Werker, 2002;Walker- 
Andrews et al., 1991). But a lack of preferential looking does not necessarily mean 
that infants younger than 6 months cannot match gender information in faces and 
voices.
However, when gender and vowel matching are simultaneously put in full conflict 
with each other, such that infants can either look at a face that matches the vowel but 
not the gender of the voice heard, or vice versa, 4.5 month infants’ ability to match 
phonetic information in face in voice is disrupted (Patterson and Werker, 2002).
Thus is appears that conflicting gender information interferes with infants’ ability to 
match face and voice on the basis of phonetic information, suggesting that infants, at 
some level, do detect equivalent gender information in face and voice, but are unable 
to use this information to guide visual exploration of facial cues when both gender 
and phonetic information are varied.
Our findings demonstrate a difference in neural response to gender matches and 
mismatches, and thus that infant’s brains can detect equivalent cross/a-modal gender 
information in faces and voices at as young an age as 2.4 months, even if they do not 
use this information to match faces and voices in looking time paradigms until 6-8 
months of age.
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The topography of the difference between gender matches and gender mismatches 
was very different from the topography of the difference between vowel matches and 
mismatches (the electrodes showing significant of vowel match v. mismatch, did not 
show significant effects of gender match v. mismatch, and vice versa) suggesting that 
the neural sources involved in representing phonemes across modalities, are different 




I have demonstrated phoneme specific cross modal habituation, suggesting that 2-3 
month-old infants do indeed have a cross-modal neural representation of vowels. 
This could account for infants’ ability to match phonetic information in faces and 
voices from as early as 2 months of age. I also demonstrated that 2-3 month -old 
infants’ brains discriminate gender information in faces and voices, even though they 
do not yet use this information to guide their behaviour at this age. The topography 
of the differences between matches and mismatches was very different for gender 
and vowel suggesting that different neural networks are involved in detecting 
matching gender and phonetic information in face and voice.
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CHAPTER 10: COMPARISON OF CROSS-MODAL AND AUDITORY 
ONLY PHONETIC HABITUATION IN 2-3 MONTH OLD INFANTS
10.1 Introduction
In Chapter 9 ,1 used high density electro-encephalography (EEG), to examine 
whether 2-3 month old infants have a cross-modal or a-modal neural representation 
of phonemes that is accessed by both auditory and visual speech. I designed a cross- 
modal habituation paradigm to see whether the response to auditory speech could be 
habituated by the prior presentation of visual speech in a phoneme specific manner. I 
hypothesised that if infants have a neural network encoding a cross-modal 
representation of phonemes, it should be possible to habituate the response of such a 
network to auditory phonetic stimuli by the prior presentation of that same phoneme 
visually. Any such habituation should be specific to the phoneme used for 
habituation, and that a change of phoneme, compared to presentation of the same 
phoneme, across modalities should elicit a greater neural response.
In that earlier chapter, I established that the response to vowel mismatched auditory 
test stimuli was significantly greater, than the response to vowel matched stimuli. 
Thus I demonstrated that presentation of visual articulated vowels habituated the 
infants’ brain responses to that same vowel when subsequently presented in an 
auditory context. This implies that infants must have some sort of cross modal neural 
representation of rowels, i.e. a network of neurons that respond to specific phonetic 
information irrespective of the modality it is perceived in, by 9-12 weeks of age.
The topography of the difference between vowel match and vowel mismatch stimuli 
was extremely similar to that seen in purely auditory phonetic mismatch studies. In 
our study, the difference consisted of a more positive response for mismatches than 
matches over frontal areas and a more negative response for mismatches than 
matches over posterior temporo-occipital areas along a right frontal-left posterior 
axis (see Figure 9.3b). This is the same difference topography seen when comparing 
purely auditory phonetic standard and deviant stimuli in 2-month old infants 
(Dehaene-Lambertz and Dehaene, 1994) and neonates (Dehaene-Lambertz and Pena, 
2001). Here I sought to directly compare purely auditory phonetic habituation and
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the ensuing mismatch response, to cross-modal phonetic habituation and the ensuing 
mismatch response in the same group of 2-3 month old infants, in order to directly 
examine whether the same neural sources are involved and whether the timing of the 
two types of habituation is the same.
On each trial infants were presented with a short video clip of a person silently 
articulating a vowel, a French /a/ or a French /i/, (the visual habituation stimuli), or 
with an auditory vowel, a French /a/ or /i/, (the auditory habituation stimuli) 
presented twice in succession. This was followed by presentation of the test stimulus: 
an auditory only vowel, either a French /a/ or l\l. In half the trials the auditory test 
vowel was the same as the preceding visual or auditory vowels (\owel match trials), 
and in half the trials the alternative vowel was presented (vowel mismatch trials). I 
predicted that the response to vowel matched auditory test stimulus would be smaller 
than the response to the vowel mismatch auditory test stimuli, in both visual and 
auditory habituation conditions. I also predicted that the topography of the mismatch 
response would be the same for visual and auditory mismatch responses.
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10.2 Materials and Methods
10.2.1 Subjects
21 full term infants (12 boys; 9 girls) were tested between 9 and 12 weeks after birth 
(mean age 10.2 weeks, SD = 0.7 weeks). 15 additional infants were tested but 
rejected for fussiness, excessive movement, or bad electrode recording.
10.2.2 Stimuli
To create the visual habituation stimuli, two adult male and two adult female actors 
were filmed articulating /a/ and /i/ against a white background to create the stimuli. 
Thus there were four possible visual habituation stimuli:
1) a female articulating /a/
2) a female articulating /i/
3) a male articulating /a/
4) a male articulating /i/.
One video clip of each vowel was selected for each actor. Four still images were 
extracted from each clip: i) mouth closed, ii) beginning of movement, iii) mouth 
semi-extended, iv) mouth fully extended. These 4 imagps were presented at fixed 
time intervals (calculated from the original videos) to recreate natural looking 
articulatory movements.
To create the auditory habituation stimuli two different male and two different 
female actors were recorded saying /a/ and IM. Thus there were four possible auditory 
habituation stimuli:
1) a female spoken /a/
2) a female spoken N
3) a male spoken /a/
4) a male spoken /i/.
The auditory stimuli were recorded and edited using Audacity software. A single /a/ 
and N  lasting 190-200 ms were selected for the male and female speaker. To
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minimise the difference between the auditory and visual habituation stimuli a visual 
background was created for the auditory habituation stimuli. A still image of each of 
the actors, used for the visual habituation stimuli, was extracted from their video clip, 
and the mouth region was hidden with a picture of a surgical mask using CorelDraw 
(Corel Corporation), so that the lack of mouth movement would not conflict with the 
sounds heard.
Similarly there were four possible auditory stimuli (the test stimuli):
1) a female spoken /a/
2) a female spoken N
3) a male spoken /a/
4) a male spoken N
Whereas several different actors were used to create the visual and auditory 
habituation stimuli, the four test stimuli were always the same. Only one female and 
one male speaker were recorded and only one of each vowel was used for each 
speaker. The auditory stimuli were recorded and edited using Cool Edit Pro software. 
A single /a/ and /i/ lasting 190 ms were selected for the male and female speaker. The 
vowels were then matched for subjective intensity and volume.
10.2.3 Paradigm
Each trial consisted of 3 stimuli; 2 habituation stimuli, which were either visual or 
auditory vowels, presented in succession, followed by an auditory vowel (the test 
stimulus) (see Fig 10.1). Each visual habituation stimulus consisted of a short video 
clip of a person silently articulating a vowel. Each articulatory movement lasted 
567ms, and was preceded and followed by 500ms of the mouth being fully closed. 
The auditory habituation stimulus consisted of a spoken vowel of duration 190- 
200ms, played while a photograph of a face with its mouth hidden behind a surgical 
mask was presented on screen for 1567ms. The auditory vowel occurred 634ms after 
the onset (the time at which the equivalent visual articulation stimuli would reach 
maximum opening). The auditory test stimulus consists of a spoken vowel of 
duration 190ms. The two visual context stimuli and the auditory test stimuli were 
presented with a 1567 ms interval between the onset of each stimulus (onset of the
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two articulatory movements and onset of the sound) (see Figure 10.1 for trial 
structure). A brightly coloured bull’s eye was presented after the offset of the 
habituation stimuli, and during the presentation of the auditory test stimulus, in the 
same location as the mouth and nose in the visual stimuli, to keep the infant’s 
attention on that location in readiness for the appearance of the visual stimuli in the 
next trial.










a) A visual habituation trial, consisting of a video o f a vowel silently articulated twice in 
succession followed by an auditory test stimulus, b) An auditory habituation trial, consisting 
of two auditory vowels presented against a background visual stimulus, matchedfor 
everything except the articulatory movement, followed by an auditory test vowel.
Stimuli were presented using Eprime (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.). Trials were 
presented in 8 blocks of 16 trials (trial length = 5134 ms) of the same context (2 
blocks for each possible context), e.g. a visual /a/ or an auditory /if. Each of the 4 
possible actors appeared 4 times in each block. In each trial the auditory test stimuli 
was either the same vowel (match) as in the habituation stimulus or the alternative
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vowel (mismatch). The gender of the test stimulus was always the same as that of the 
habituation stimulus. Thus there were four possible trial types/conditions:
1) Visual match (VM)
2) Visual mismatch (VMM)
3) Auditory match (AM)
4) Auditory mismatch (AMM)
Test Stimuli
Context Auditory /a/ Auditory N
Visual /a/ VM VMM
Visual l\l VMM VM
Auditory /a/ AM AMM
Audiotry N AMM AM
Matches and mismatches occurred 8 times in each block (twice following each 
individual actor), and each trial type occurred 32 times during the whole experiment.
The infants were seated in their mother’s lap facing a black screen and two speakers 
hidden behind the screen on each side. Participants viewed the visual stimuli 
projected onto this screen situated at 60 ±10 cm, subtending 37° x 37° of visual 
angle. The auditory stimuli were played through the speakers hidden behind the 
screen. The entire presentation of the 8 blocks lasted 11 minutes, however the 
presentation of trials was stopped whenever the infant looked away and restarted 
once their attention returned to the screen. Pauses also occurred whenever the infant 
needed comforting. Once the infant’s attention had returned to the screen, interrupted 
trials were restarted at their beginning.
10.2.4 ERP recording and data analysis
A continuous electro-encephalogram (EEG) was recorded with a Geodesic electrode 
net (EGI), with 128 electrodes, referenced to the vertex (electrode 129). The net was 
positioned in anatomical reference to the vertex and the cantho-meatal line. Scalp 
voltages were recorded amplified, digitized at 125 Hz and filtered between 0.5 and
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20 Hz. Segmentation, artefact detection and averaging was then carried out on the 
EEG using EEGlab toolbox (Delorme and Makeig, 2004). The EEG was segmented 
into epochs starting 500 ms before the onset of each auditory test stimulus and 
ending 1000 ms after stimulus onset. The epochs were then automatically checked 
for artefacts. Channels contaminated by eye or motion artefacts were automatically 
rejected. All trials with more than 50% contaminated channels were rejected. Any 
electrodes contaminated in more than 70% of the retained trials were excluded from 
the analysis. The artefact free trials were averaged for each infant for each condition. 
Averages were then baseline corrected, with baseline from -200 to 0ms relative to 
stimulus onset, and an average reference transformation was applied to obtain 
absolute reference-independent potentials. Two-dimensional reconstructions of scalp 
voltage at each time step were computed using spherical spline interpolation.
10.2.5 Statistical analysis
To avoid any possibility of interference between subsequent blocks of different 
modality, for example information from an auditory habituation block interfering 
with a subsequent visual habituation block, I only analysed those blocks that were 
preceded by another block of the same modality, i.e. visual blocks preceded by a 
visual block (V), and auditory blocks preceded by an auditory block (A). Blocks that 
were preceded by a block of the opposite modality and thus at risk of interference i.e. 
visual blocks preceded by auditory blocks (aV) and auditory blocks preceded by 
visual blocks (vA) were not included in the analysis.
I then examined the effects of vowel match versus mismatch on the evoked response 
potential to the auditory test stimulus for both types of habituation -  auditory and 
visual.
Scalp topographies of the difference between mismatches and matches in the visual 
habituation (VMM -  VM), and auditory habituation conditions (AMM -  AM) were 
generated. The difference topography was also calculated for all mismatches minus 
matches across habituation conditions (MM-M).
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A bundle of electrodes showing the greatest difference between all matches and 
mismatches at the peak of the auditory response potential (272ms) was selected. The 
voltages from this right frontal electrode group, (electrodes: 105, 106,107, 111, 112, 
113, 118, 119) were averaged for each of the four conditions: VM, VMM, AM and 
AMM. The mean voltage was then averaged across the peak of the auditory response 
(240-304ms) and entered into an ANOVA with two factors: vowel (match v. 
mismatch); and type of habituation (auditory v. visual). Paired t-test were also 
carried out to compare the mean auditory response to VM and VMM, and to compare 
the mean auditory response to AM and AMM.
To see whether I was justified in excluding blocks preceded by a block of the 
opposite modality (which I did to avoid interference between adjacent blocks of 
opposite modalities) I also examined the effects of vowel match versus mismatch on 
the response to the auditory test stimulus, for those blocks that had been preceded by 
a block of the opposite modality (i.e. aV and vA) and thus excluded from my main 
analysis. I created scalp topographies of the difference between mismatches and 
matches, across habituation conditions (MM -  M), and for the visual habituation 
(aVMM -  aVM) and auditory habituation conditions (vAMM -  vAMM) separately.
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10.3 Results
10.3.1 Auditory response to all test stimuli
The main auditory potential, consisting of a strong frontal positivity and a posterior 
negativity, began around 120ms, peaked at around 270ms, and started declining 
gradually from around 480 ms.
10.3.2 Matches v. mismatches
Figure 10.2 -  Phonetic mismatch -  match across habituation type
a M (V&A) b Difference: MM - M
a) Topographies of the evoked potential in response to the auditory test stimulus at the peak 
of the auditory potential 272ms after stimulus onset for phonetically matched (M) and 
mismatched (MM) test stimuli across auditory and visual habituation conditions, b) 
Topography of the difference between the response to phonetically matched and mismatched 
auditory test stimuli (MM-  M), showing an increased response to mismatched test stimuli 
over the right frontal electrodes. A group of electrodes located over the maximum of this 
right frontal positivity was selectedfor statistical analysis (shown in white circle)
Conditions where the vowel presented in the test and the context stimuli matched 
each other (i.e. VM and AM), were compared with conditions where the test and 
context vowel did not match (i.e. VMM and AMM) irrespective of habituation
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modality (auditory and visual), and separately for each type of habituation. 
Examination of the topography revealed a difference between MM and M consisting 
of an increased response to mismatched test stimuli in the right frontal electrodes (a 
right frontal positivity) (see Figure 10.2).
Examination of the topographies of VMM-VM and AMM-AM, also revealed very 
similar difference between matches and mismatches for each type of habituation, 
again consisting of an increased response to mismatched test stimuli in the right 
frontal electrodes (a right frontal positivity) (see Figure 10.3).
Analysis of the mean amplitude of auditory response across the peak of the response 
(240 to 304ms) was performed over the bundle of electrodes (electrodes: 105,106, 
107, 111, 112,113,118,119), that showed the greatest difference between all 
matches and mismatches at the peak of the auditory response potential (272ms), 
using an ANOVA with 2 factors: vowel (match v. mismatch); and type of habituation 
(auditory v. visual). This revealed a significant effect of mismatch versus match, 
across type of habituation (p=0.015, F(i,20)=7.052), but there was no effect of 
auditory versus visual habituation (p=0.173, F(i>20)=1.997). Nor was there a 
significant interaction between the vowel (matched vowel versus mismatched 
vowel), and type of habituation (F(i,20)=0.434, p=0.517). Paired t-tests were carried 
out to compare the mean auditory response of this electrode bundle to matches and 
mismatches separately for each type of habituation. The response to mismatches was 
significantly more positive than the response to matches for both visual habituation 
(p=0.0483) and auditory habituation conditions (p=0.0256).
The response to vowel matched test stimuli was weaker than the response to vowel 
mismatched stimuli, particularly in right frontal electrodes. This suggests that 
presentation of visual articulated vowels has habituated the infant’s brain response to 
that same vowel when subsequently presented in an auditory context, i.e. cross modal 
habituation occurred, implying that the infants must have some sort of cross modal 
representation of vowels by 9-12 weeks of age.
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Figure 10.3 -  Mismatch v. match for visual and auditory habituation conditions
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a,) Topographies of the peak o f the evoked response to the auditory test stimulus 272ms after 
stimulus onset for phonetically matched (VM) and mismatched (VMM) stimuli in the visual 
habituation condition, b) Topography of the difference between the responses to matched 
and mismatched test stimuli in the visual habituation condition (VMM- VM) at the peak of 
the auditory potential, c) The average waveform of the right frontal electrodes selected for 
statistical analysis (shown in white circle in b) located over the positive maxima of the 
difference (VMM -  VM). The response to mismatches (VMM -  dashed line) is significantly 
greater than the response to matches (VM -  solid line) over the peak o f the auditory 
potential (from 240 to 304ms after stimulus onset), d) Topographies o f the peak of the 
evoked response to the auditory test stimulus 272ms after stimulus onset for phonetically 
matched (AM) and mismatched (AMM) stimuli in the auditory habituation condition, e) 
Topography of the difference between the responses to matched and mismatched test stimuli 
in the auditory habituation condition (AMM -  AM) at the peak of the auditory potential 
272ms after stimulus onset, f) The average waveform o f the right frontal electrodes selected 
for statistical analysis (shown in white circle in e) located over the positive maxima of the 
difference (VMM -  VM). The response to mismatches (AMM -  dashed line) is significantly 
greater than the response to matches (VM -  solid line) over the peak of the auditory 
potential (from 240 to 304ms after stimulus onset).
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10.3.3 Blocks preceded by the opposite type of block (vA and aV)
Conditions where the vowel presented in the test and the context stimuli matched 
each other (i.e. aVM and vAM), were compared with conditions where the test and 
context vowel did not match (i.e. aVMM and vAMM) irrespective of habituation 
modality (auditory and visual), and separately for each type of habituation. 
Examination of the topography reveals no clear difference between MM and M (see 
Figure 10.4a).
Figure 10.4 -  Difference between matches and mismatches for blocks not included 
in main analysis that were preceded by a block of the opposite modality
a M M - M  b aVMM - aVM C vAMM - vAM
a) Topography of the difference between the responses to phonetically matched (M) and 
mismatched (MM) test stimuli in visual and auditory habituation blocks that were preceded 
by a block of the opposite modality (i.e. visual blocks preceded by an auditory block and 
auditory blocks preceded by a visual block) at the peak o f the auditory potential 72 ms after 
stimulus onset. There is no clear difference between matches and mismatches across 
habituation conditions, unlike for the blocks in the main analysis (see Figure 10.2). b) 
Topography of the difference between the responses to mismatched and matched stimuli 
(aVMM -aVM), at the peak of the auditory potential, in visual habituation blocks that were 
preceded by an auditory habituation block, c) Topography o f the difference between the 
response to mismatched and matched stimuli (vAMM- vAM), at the peak o f the auditory 
potential, in auditory habituation blocks that were preceded by a visual habituation block.
Examination of the topographies of aVMM - aVM and vAMM - vAM, revealed 
differences but not those expected on the basis of previous auditory phonetic
234
habituation experiments or on the basis of my previous cross-modal habituation 
experiment (see Figure 10.4b & c).
The topography of aVMM -  aVM revealed a difference almost completely opposite 
to that expected: more negative response to mismatches than matches over the frontal 
electrodes, and a more positive response to mismatches than matches over the 
posterior electrodes (see Figure 10.4b). The topography of vAMM -  vAM revealed 
more positive response to mismatches than matches over the most frontal electrodes, 
and also revealed more negative response to mismatches than matches over the 
posterior right electrodes (see Figure 10.4c). These findings suggest that, as I 
suspected, the information from the previous block of the opposite modality, was 
carried over and interfered with the next block, which always used the opposite 
vowel as the habituation stimulus, (e.g. if the preceding auditory block used /a/ as the 
habituation stimulus, the subsequent visual block would use /i/ as the habituation 
stimulus and vice versa). This interference appears to be strongest for visual 
habituation blocks preceded by auditory blocks, suggesting that the auditory 
habituation from the preceding block was carried over into the subsequent visual 
block, leading to an almost complete reversal of the expected difference. Carry over 
of habituation from visual blocks does not appear to have as strong an effect on the 
subsequent auditory blocks as the difference was still roughly in the expected 
location (frontal positivity, posterior negativity). However, it was much weaker than 
in the auditory blocks not preceded by visual blocks suggesting that some 
interference still occurred. These data support the notion that I was correct to 
separate my analysis on this basis, and to exclude blocks preceded by a block of the 




The mean amplitude of evoked response potential to vowel mismatched auditory test 
stimuli was significantly greater than the response to vowel matched stimuli across 
the peak of the response (240-304ms) for both auditory and visual habituation 
conditions (see Figure 10.3). Thus it appears that, as expected, both purely auditory 
and cross-modal habituation occurred. Repeated presentation of auditory vowels 
habituated the infants’ brain response to that same vowel, i.e. auditory habituation 
occurred, and a change of phoneme elicited a mismatched response. This is 
consistent with previous studies of auditory phonetic habituation in 2 month old 
infants (Dehaene-Lambertz and Dehaene, 1994) and neonates (Dehaene-Lambertz 
and Pena, 2001). Likewise, as in my previous experiment, (see Chapter 9), visual 
presentation of silently articulated vowels habituated the infants’ brain response to 
that same vowel when subsequently presented in an auditory context; and a change 
of phoneme across modality also elicited a mismatch response. This confirms my 
previous conclusion that infants have a cross modal neural representation of vowels, 
i.e. a network of neurons that respond to specific phonetic information irrespective of 
the modality it is perceived in, by 9-12 weeks of age.
The topography of the difference between the mismatches and matches seen for the 
visual habituation condition, is consistent to that seen in my previous cross-modal 
habituation experiment (see Chapter 9, Figure 9.3), and is extremely similar to that 
seen in the purely auditory phonetic habituation condition (see Figure 10.3). The 
same group of right frontal electrodes, selected on the basis of the location of the 
peak difference between all mismatches and matches across type of habituation (see 
Figure 10.2), showed a significantly greater response to mismatched compared to 
matched auditory test stimuli for both visual and auditory habituation across the peak 
of the auditory response potential, and there was no interaction between the effect of 
match versus mismatch and the type of habituation. This suggests that the same 
neural generators are involved in detecting a phonetic match or mismatch 
irrespective of the modality in which the mismatch occurs, and thus that the phonetic 
information is represented in the same brain areas, irrespective of whether it is 
presented in the auditory or visual modality. The timing of the mismatch response is 
similar in both conditions; with the effect being significant across the peak of the
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auditory evoked potential in both conditions (if anything the cross-modal mismatch 
response appeared to start a little earlier), suggesting that visual and auditory 
phonetic information access this same phonetic neural representation in the infants’ 
brains at approximately the same speed.
The results also suggest that the auditory phonetic information directly accesses the 
same cross modal neural representation as the visual phonetic information without 
passing through a uni-modal representation first, as if this was the case I would 
expect to see a difference in the topography or time course of the mismatch response 
between the auditory and visual habituation conditions, due to habituation of this 
putative uni-modal neural representation in the auditory condition only. This 
supports the notion put forward in the motor theory of speech, that phonetic 
information is primarily represented as articulatory gestures, rather than sounds 
(Liberman and Mattingly, 1985;Liberman and Whalen, 2000). If phonemes were 
represented as sounds first, one would expect the auditory mismatch response to 
appear earlier than the cross-modal mismatch response; however this was not the 
case. Thus it appears that auditory and visual phonetic information directly access the 
same cross modal representation.
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10.5 Conclusion
I have again demonstrated phoneme specific cross-modal habituation, thus 
replicating my findings in Chapter 9, and confirming that 2-3 month-old infants do 
indeed have a cross-modal neural representation of vowels. I also demonstrated 
simple auditory phonetic habituation in the same group of infants. In addition I found 
that the timing and topography of the mismatch response to deviant phonemes was 
the same for both auditory only and cross-modal habituation. This suggests that 
visual and auditory phonetic information directly access the same amodal neural 
representation of phonemes in the infants’ brains at approximately the same speed. 
This cross-modal representation may underlie infants’ ability to match observed 
articulatory movements and their auditory consequences.
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CHAPTER 11: GENERAL DISCUSSION
This thesis has described a series of experiments investigating the neural mechanisms 
underlying our ability to monitor our own actions and predict their sensory 
consequences, and our ability to understand and predict the actions of others. It has 
been proposed that our ability to monitor our own actions and predict their 
consequences is based on the use of a forward model which uses an efference copy 
of the motor command to predict the sensory consequences of that action. Chapters 4 
and 5 focused on the use of this sensory prediction to attenuate or cancel the sensory 
consequences of our actions. There is increasing evidence that our ability to 
understand and predict the actions of others and their consequences is based on the 
same neural mechanisms, that are involved in monitoring our own actions. In 
Chapters 6 and 7 ,1 investigated the neural mechanisms involved in monitoring the 
actions of others and their sensory consequences. In Chapter 8 ,1 examined the 
possibility that, in addition to using our own motor systems to understand the actions 
of others, we understand the sensations experienced by others by representing these 
sensations in our own sensory cortices. Chapters 9 and 10 focused on the 
development of our ability to monitor the actions of others. I investigated the neural 
basis of young infants’ ability to recognise the sensory consequences of observed 
actions.
11.1 Sensorimotor attenuation of the consequences of our actions
It has been proposed that animals use an efference copy (von Holst, 1954) of their 
motor commands sent from the motor areas controlling the actions, in parallel with 
the motor signals, to predict the sensory consequences of their actions. On the basis 
of this efference copy, a prediction of the sensory consequences of the action is 
generated by an internal forward model (Wolpert and Miall, 1996). This sensory 
prediction is known as a corollary discharge (Sperry, 1950). This sensory prediction, 
or corollary discharge, can then be used to cancel self-produced sensory stimulation. 
There is substantial support for the existence of such a mechanism coming from a 
number of experiments demonstrating a reduced neural response to self-produced 
stimuli, compared to externally produced stimuli in the somatosensory (Blakemore et 
al., 1998b;Blakemore et al., 1999a;Blakemore et al., 1999b;Voss et al., 2006), and
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auditory (Curio et al., 2000;Martikainen et al., 2005;Numminen et al., 1999;Schafer 
and Marcus, 1973) modalities.
Such a mechanism also appears to operate during blinking, as suggested by the fact 
that we rarely notice our blinks, despite their frequency and the pronounced 
interruption to visual input they cause. External darkenings of the visual field of a 
similar duration and magnitude as the interruptions to visual input caused by blinks, 
are readily apparent (Volkmann et al., 1980). Evidence for sensorimotor prediction 
and attenuation during blinks comes from several psychophysical studies 
demonstrating that visual sensitivity is reduced during blinks, an effect known as 
blink suppression (Manning et al., 1983;Riggs et al., 1982;Volkmann et al.,
1980; Volkmann et al., 1982; Volkmann, 1986).This loss of visual sensitivity begins 
before the onset of the blink and thus is thought to result from a corollary discharge 
signal associated with the blink motor command (Manning et al., 1983;Volkmann, 
1986). However, until now the neural mechanism underlying blink suppression 
remained unknown. In Chapters 4 and 5 ,1 described two fMRI experiments 
investigating the neural mechanisms underlying the ability of blinks to pass 
unnoticed.
In Chapter 4 ,1 compared the neural responses to self-produced darkenings (blinks) 
and externally generated darkenings. Two factors were independently manipulated in 
a blocked design; the presence/absence of voluntary blinking, and the 
presence/absence of visual stimulation. To control for the simple loss of visual input 
caused by eyelid closure I created a fifth condition where external darkenings were 
dynamically matched to each subjects’ own blinks. Areas of lateral occipital cortex, 
including area V5/MT and V3a, showed a reduced response to visual stimulation 
during blinking. Matched external darkenings of the visual scene reduced activity in 
these regions to a lesser extent than blinks. Thus, I concluded that the reduced 
response to visual stimulation associated with blinking reflects an active suppression 
of these lateral visual areas, mediated by an oculomotor signal associated with the 
blink motor command. This suppression is consistent with the known loss in visual 
sensitivity that occurs during blinks, and therefore may be the neural mechanism 
underlying blink suppression.
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In Chapter 5, by maintaining constant retinal illumination whether the eyes were 
open or shut, I was able to examine the top-down effects of blink-associated motor 
signals on cortical activity directly, without the need for an external darkening 
condition as a control for the confounding effect of the loss of visual input caused by 
eye-lid closure. Even though retinal illumination was kept constant during blinks, I 
found that blinking nevertheless suppressed activity in visual cortex, specifically area 
V3, and in areas of parietal and preffontal cortex previously associated with 
awareness of environmental change. However, unlike in Chapter 4, no suppression of 
the response to visual stimulation in V5/MT was revealed in Chapter 5, because the 
trans-cranial retinal stimulation failed to activate V5/MT significantly. The reduced 
response to retinal stimulation during blinking observed in V3 in this experiment is 
consistent with the reduced response to visual stimulation observed in lateral 
occipital regions in Chapter 4. Likewise parts of the parietal cortex, showed a 
reduced response to visual input during blinking in both experiments. Thus the 
findings in Chapter 5 support the findings in Chapter 4. In addition, because retinal 
stimulation remained constant throughout the blink, the findings in Chapter 5 
definitively demonstrate that the suppression of the neural response to visual 
stimulation observed during blinks, in both experiments, is an active top-down 
process associated with the blink motor command.
In addition, I observed a positive blink related signal in early visual areas in the total 
absence of retinal stimulation (as described in Chapter 5), which has been observed 
in previous studies of blinking but has not previously been remarked upon (Bodis- 
Wollner et al., 1999;Kato and Miyauchi, 2003a;Kato and Miyauchi, 2003b;Tsubota 
et al., 1999). A similar positive signal has also been observed in visual cortex during 
saccades (Sylvester et al., 2005). Since visual stimulation was entirely absent, this 
activation is likely to represent a motor signal associated with blinking in the visual 
cortex. However, the precise neural mechanisms relating the blink motor command 
to the neural suppression I have observed remains to be explored.
Together the studies described in Chapters 4 and 5, suggest a possible neural 
mechanism by which blinks go unnoticed, namely top down suppression of parts of 
the visual system, both early visual areas, and of areas involved in visual awareness, 
associated with the blink motor command. This parallels previous observations of
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attenuation of the neural responses to self-produced stimuli in the somatosensory 
system (Blakemore et al., 1998b), in the auditory cortex (Curio et al., 
2000;Martikainen et al., 2005;Numminen et al., 1999;Schafer and Marcus, 1973), 
and most recently in the visual cortex during saccades (Sylvester et al., 2005). Thus 
our findings provide further evidence that sensorimotor prediction and attenuation is 
a general mechanism in the human brain that operates in several, if not all, 
modalities.
11.2 Monitoring the actions of others
In Chapters 6 and 7 I investigated the neural mechanisms involved in monitoring the 
actions of others and their sensory consequences, in the light of accumulating 
evidence that this involves the same neural systems, including the internal forward 
model, as monitoring our own actions and predicting their sensory consequences.
Numerous studies have demonstrated activation of parts of our own motor system 
during the observation of actions (see General Introduction for a review). Simulation 
of observed actions by this mirror system is thought to underlie our ability to 
understand the actions of others (Rizzolatti et al, 2001;Rizzolatti and Craighero, 
2004). It has recently been proposed that the mirror system acts in a predictive 
manner, predicting and simulating the actions of others, and then using the internal 
forward model, normally uses to predict the sensory consequences of our own 
actions, to verify its prediction (Kilner et al. in submission). According to the 
predictive model of the mirror system, the observer predicts the actions of others on 
the basis of the current context and the goals and intentions attributed to the other. 
The predicted action is then simulated in the observers own motor system and the 
internal forward model is used to predict the sensory consequences of the simulated 
action. This sensory prediction can then be compared to the action actually observed, 
giving rise to a prediction error, which can then be used to modify the original 
prediction of what the other person is doing. There is increasing evidence that the 
mirror system does indeed actively predict the actions of others rather than simply 
responding to sensory input (Flanagan and Johansson, 2003;Fogassi et al., 
2005;Haueisen and Knosche, 2001;Kilner et al., 2004;Ramnani and Miall, 
2004;Rotman et al., 2006;Umilta et al., 2001).
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Two recent studies have shown that the superior temporal sulcus (STS), part of the 
mirror system, shows a greater response to unpredicted compared to predicted 
movements (Pelphrey et al., 2003;Pelphrey et al., 2004a). In these studies the 
observer’s expectation of what the actor would do was experimentally controlled by 
the presence of a visible target, the inferred goal of the action. Eye and hand 
movements towards this target fulfilled the observer’s expectation, while movements 
not directed towards the expected goal violated the observer’s expectation. The 
increased STS activity is thought to reflect the reformulation of the observer’s 
expectation or the prediction error, when the observed movement does not match the 
observer’s original prediction.
In Chapter 6 ,1 sought to investigate further the effect of the observer’s expectation 
on the mirror system. In addition to inducing an expectation in the observer via the 
presence of a visible target, I also modified the observer’s expectation by changing 
the social context of the gaze shift and thus the intention attributed to the person 
making the gaze shift. Two faces were presented, one gazing directly at the subject 
(the ‘social’ face) and one with averted gaze (the ‘unsocial’ face). One face then 
made a gaze shift that was either towards a visible target (‘correct’) or towards 
another location in space (‘incorrect’). Direct gaze often signals the intention to 
communicate, and thus induced the expectation in the observer that the ‘social’ face 
(rather than the ‘unsocial’ face) would indicate the presence of the target by looking 
at it. When the ‘unsocial’ face made the gaze shift this expectation was violated. As 
in a previous experiment (Pelphrey et al., 2003), the presence of a visible target 
induced the expectation that the gaze shift would be directed towards the target. This 
expectation was violated in the ‘incorrect’ condition. I found significantly greater 
activation in the parieto-frontal oculomotor network, and in some parts of the 
posterior STS, in response to ‘invalid’ and ‘unsocial’, compared to ‘invalid’ and 
‘social’, gaze shifts.
The increased activation of these areas during the ‘unsocial’ and ‘incorrect’ 
conditions is consistent with Kilner’s predictive model of the mirror system, which 
includes the STS (Kilner et al. in submission), (see General Introduction for a 
review). I propose that the increased activity observed in the STS in the ‘unsocial’ 
and ‘incorrect’ conditions reflects the reformulation of the observer’s expectations,
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once their original prediction has been violated, or the prediction error between the 
observer’s prediction of what the actor is going to do and the actual action observer. 
The increased activity in the fronto-parietal oculomotor network, which is thought to 
be part of an oculomotor mirror system (Grosbras et al., 2005), may also reflect the 
reformulation of the observer’s prediction or the prediction error. However, the 
increased activation in these regions can also be explained in terms of additional 
attentional shifts during the ‘unsocial’ and ‘incorrect’ conditions. Therefore, unlike 
in the STS, I cannot definitively conclude that the observed increase in activity in the 
fronto-parietal network represents increased activation of the mirror system to 
unpredicted actions. However, the increased activity observed in the STS in response 
to unpredicted gaze shifts, provides support for Kilner’s proposal that the mirror 
system is involved in actively predicting the actions of others rather than merely 
responding to sensory input.
Further support for the idea that the mirror system acts in a predictive manner comes 
from a number of studies demonstrating modulation of activity in our sensory 
cortices during action observation (see General Introduction for a review). This 
modulation may represent the prediction of the sensory consequences of the observed 
action, calculated on the basis of the simulation of the other’s action by the mirror 
system. This would be in line with the proposal that the mirror system uses the same 
forward model used to predict the sensory consequences of our own actions to 
predict the sensory consequences of the actions of others.
In Chapter 7 ,1 investigated whether the same neural systems are involved in 
monitoring the sensory consequences (a tone) of our own actions (a button press) and 
in monitoring the sensory consequences (a tone) of the actions of another person (a 
button press). I also sought to examine whether the neural response to sensory 
stimuli caused by the actions of others is modulated, compared to externally 
generated stimuli, and if so whether it is modulated in the same way as the response 
to self-produced stimuli.
Subjects performed a task in which they had to monitor the relationship between an 
action, namely a button press, and its sensory consequences, namely an auditory 
tone. The action was either performed by the subject or the experimenter, whose
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hand was in the subject’s field of view adjacent to the subject’s own hand. In a 
control ‘no agent’ condition subjects monitored the relationship between an 
externally generated tone, and a computer generated event, the disappearance of a 
white dot.
Contrary to expectations, I did not identify a difference between the response to self­
generated (‘subject’ condition) and externally generated (‘no agent’ condition) 
auditory stimuli in the auditory cortex. It may be that my auditory stimuli did not 
activate the auditory cortex sufficiently, relative to auditory activation caused by the 
background scanner noise, for a difference between the self- and externally- 
generated conditions to be detected. This may also explain the absence of a 
difference in the auditory cortex between the ‘other’ and ‘no agent’ conditions, and 
between the ‘other’ and ‘subject’ conditions. Thus I cannot conclude that agency 
does not affect the response to auditory stimuli, (a conclusion which in the case of 
self-produced stimuli would be contrary to many previous studies).
I found that a set of brain regions, previously implicated in action monitoring 
(Amodio and Frith, 2006;Frith, 2006; Saxe, 2006), namely the dorsal medial 
preffontal cortex, precuneus, the posterior STS and temporal poles, were activated 
during both the ‘subject’ and the ‘other’ conditions, compared to the ‘no agent’ 
conditions. I conclude that these regions are involved in monitoring the relationship 
between actions and their consequences, irrespective of who is executing the action. 
This provides further support for the notion that the same neural systems are 
involved in monitoring the sensory consequences of our actions and the sensory 
consequences of the actions of others.
The cerebellum was also activated during both the ‘subject’ and ‘other’ conditions. 
The cerebellum has previously been implicated in the predicting the sensory 
consequences of our own actions, and it has been proposed that the cerebellum is the 
site of the internal forward model that predicts the sensory consequences of our 
actions (Blakemore et al., 1998a;Blakemore et al., 2001). Thus, my finding that the 
cerebellum is also involved in monitoring the consequences of other people’s 
actions, provides support for the proposal that we use the same internal forward 
model, usually used to predict the sensory consequences of our own actions, to
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predict the sensory consequences of the actions of others (Kilner et al. in 
submission).
In Chapter 8 ,1 investigated whether in addition to representing actions of others in 
our own motor system, and representing the sensory consequences of these actions in 
our sensory cortices, we also represent the sensations experienced by others in a 
similar manner. Recently, a number of brain systems with ‘mirror’ properties have 
been described, for emotions (Carr et al., 2003;Wicker et al., 2003), pain (Singer et 
al., 2004), and most recently touch (Keysers et al., 2004). In the latter study, 
observing touch to someone else's legs activated similar regions in the secondary 
somatosensory cortex (SII) in the observer's brain as when the observer's own legs 
were touched. However, this SII activation was also found during the observation of 
touch to an object, and no primary somatosensory cortex activity was found in either 
condition (Keysers et al., 2004). In Chapter 8 ,1 investigated the potential existence 
of a touch mirror system by examining the neural response to the observation of 
touch to a human face relative to observation of touch to an object, and comparing 
this to the neural response to somatosensory stimulation.
In normal subjects the primary and secondary somatosensory cortices were 
somatotopically activated by somatosensory stimulation, and by the mere 
observation of touch to a human (relative to touch to an object). Thus it appears that 
we represent the sensory experiences of others by simulating the observed tactile 
sensations in our own somatosensory systems, similar to the way in which we 
represent the actions of others in our own motor system. This somatosensory 
stimulation may underlie our ability to understand the sensations experienced by 
others, in the same way that simulation of the actions of others is thought to underlie 
our ability to understand the actions of others (Rizzolatti et al., 2001). In one subject, 
C, which I describe in Chapter 8, this somatosensory mirror system was activated to 
a significantly greater extent than in all other subjects, with the result that rather than 
merely enabling C to understand the sensations others, C actually experiences the 
observed touch as somatosensory stimulation of her own body. Whether, like the 
action mirror system, this touch mirror system operates in a predictive manner 
remains to be seen.
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11.3 Development of action monitoring
In this thesis I also investigated the development of our ability to monitor the actions 
of others and their consequences. There is strong behavioural evidence, mainly from 
studies of imitation, for the early development of a system for coupling the 
perception and production of actions (see General Introduction for a review). These 
studies suggest that infants, like adults, use their own motor system to simulate the 
observed actions of others. There is also behavioural evidence that infants can 
recognise the consequences of the actions of others from an early age. Two month 
old infants are able to match observed articulations with the appropriate speech 
sound (Kuhl et al., 1991;Kuhl and Meltzoff, 1982;Patterson and Werker, 
1999;Patterson and Werker, 2003;Walton and Bower, 1993). In Chapters 9 and 10,1 
investigated the neural mechanism underlying infants’ ability to recognise the 
auditory consequences of observed articulatory movements. Using EEG, I 
demonstrated phoneme specific habituation of the neural response to auditory 
phonetic stimuli by the prior presentation of visual speech, thereby demonstrating 
that 2-3 month old infants have a cross modal neural representation of phonemes. In 
Chapter 10,1 directly compared this cross modal phonetic habituation to simple 
auditory only phonetic habituation. The topography of the difference between 
mismatches and matches was extremely similar for the two types of habituation, as 
was the timing of the mismatch response to deviant phonemes. These results suggest 
that visual and auditory phonetic information directly access the same amodal neural 
representation of phonemes in the infants’ brains, at approximately the same speed.
In adults, both seen and heard speech activate brain areas involved in speech 
production (Calvert and Campbell, 2003;Fadiga et al., 2002;Skipper et al., 
2005;Watkins et al., 2003;Wilson et al., 2004) (see General Introduction for a 
review). There is also evidence of a connection between heard speech and the 
corresponding motor representation in infants. When infants, aged 12-20 weeks, 
listened to an adult speaker produce different vowels, they produced more 
vocalisations resembling that particular vowel (Kuhl and Meltzoff, 1996). Likewise, 
new bom infants, aged from 1 to 7 days, make the appropriate mouth movement in 
response to speech sounds (Chen et al., 2004). Given this evidence of an early 
correspondence between heard speech and motor production in infants, I
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hypothesised that infants’ ability to match observed articulations to the appropriate 
speech sound, might be based on a cross-modal neural representation of speech in the 
motor regions that would later be involved in speech production. Preliminary 
analyses conducted by my colleagues (S.Baillet, G.Dehaene-Lambertz, J-F.Mangin 
and J.Mattout, personal communication) have localised the source of the cross-modal 
phonetic habituation to Broca’s area, suggesting that this is indeed the case. It 
appears that in infants, like adults, seen and heard speech activate a cross-modal 
motor representation of speech. The preliminary analyses also revealed a source in 
the left superior temporal gyrus. In adults the auditory cortex, including the superior 
temporal gyrus, is activated both by hearing speech and observation of silent 
articulations (Calvert et al., 1997;Pekkola et al., 2005). Thus the involvement of the 
superior temporal gyrus suggests that infants, like adults, represent the predicted 
sensory consequences of the observed articulation in their own auditory cortex.
Thus, the studies described in Chapters 9 and 10, provide evidence that from 2-3 
months of age infants use their own motor and sensory cortices to represent the 
actions of others and the sensory consequences of these actions, at least in the 
context of speech. Further research is needed to elucidate whether this is also true of 
other types of actions.
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11.4 Conclusion
The experiments in this thesis have added to our understanding of the neural 
mechanisms underlying our ability to monitor our own actions and predict their 
sensory consequences, and our ability to understand and predict the actions of others, 
and the sensory consequences of these actions. They provide evidence that our ability 
to understand and predict the actions of others and their consequences, is based on 
the same neural mechanisms that are involved in monitoring our own actions and 
predicting their sensory consequences, including the internal forward model. They 
also provide evidence that the mirror system acts in a predictive manner, anticipating 
and simulating the actions of others, and then using an internal forward model to 
verify its prediction, rather than merely responding to sensory input. In addition, the 
last two experiments begin to shed light on the development of our ability to 
understand other people’s actions, providing evidence for the early development and 
involvement of the mirror system in action observation and in predicting the sensory 
consequences of actions. Future work should combine fMRI and EEG/MEG in order 
to look at the precise timing and the connectivity of the various regions implicated 
in the prediction system. Such studies would have the potential to reveal the neural 
mechanisms that underlie our ability to predict the consequences of actions.
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